PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

JAN 20 1977
PROPERTY OF
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA

Vol. 91 No. 4 Winter 1976–77

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Liberalism Upside Down
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.

The Great Society Did Succeed
Sar A. Levitan
Robert Taggart

Soviet Control of Eastern Europe: Morality versus American National Interest
Roy E. Licklider

Advancing American National Interests Through Soviet Control: A Modest Proposal
Piers Ploughman

Rejoinder to Piers
Roy E. Licklider

Politics of American China Policy, 1945
Kenneth S. Chern

The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953
Athan G. Theoharis

The Competition for Certainty: The Polls and the Press in Britain
Sanford L. Weiner

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD OF THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

ALLAN BLOOM
University of Toronto

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
University of California, Los Angeles

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

DORIS H. KEARNS
Harvard University

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

LANCE LIEBMAN
Harvard University

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
The University of Texas at Austin

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY
Barnard College, Columbia University

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
Congressional Budget Office

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH
University of Chicago

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

TOM WICKER
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $16 a year. Three years, $42. Students, $12 a year. Libraries and institutions, $22 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and additional mailing offices. Volume 91 Number 4. Winter 1976–77.

Subscribers are urged to notify the Academy of any change in address

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Liberalism Upside Down
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr.

The Great Society Did Succeed
Sar A. Levitan
Robert Taggart

Soviet Control of Eastern Europe: Morality versus American National Interest
Roy E. Licklider

Advancing American National Interests Through Soviet Control: A Modest Proposal
Piers Ploughman

Rejoinder to Piers
Roy E. Licklider

Politics of American China Policy, 1945
Kenneth S. Chern

The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953
Athan G. Theoharis

The Competition for Certainty: The Polls and the Press in Britain
Sanford L. Weiner

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

DORIS H. KEARNS
Harvard University

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

LANCE LIEBMAN
Harvard University

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
The University of Texas at Austin

SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH
University of Chicago

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

TOM WICKER
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $16 a year. Three years, $42. Students, $12 a year. Libraries and institutions, $22 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and additional mailing offices. Volume 91 Number 4. Winter 1976–77.

Subscribers are urged to notify the Academy of any change in address

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Managing Editor

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

Barnard College
Columbia University

Assistant Managing Editor

MARY ANN EPSTEIN

. . . .

Associate Editor

JOYCE FINE SCHULTZ

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Publishing continuously since 1886.

Copyright © 1976, by The Academy of Political Science.
All rights reserved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Annual Corporate Meeting

In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 17, 1977, at 3:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the executive director's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting. The bylaws have been amended to provide that the members of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors shall act as a nominating committee for board members. Additional nominations may be made in writing by twenty-five or more members of the Academy provided that such written nominations are received at the offices of the Academy by December 31 preceding the annual meeting of the corporation.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025. Manuscripts must be submitted in duplicate and accompanied by an abstract of between 100 and 200 words specifying the article's major theme or conclusions. Authors wishing their manuscripts returned must enclose return postage. Correspondence concerning advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Currently articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in its Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1966 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10016. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Singe issue, $4.00. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. One copy, $3.00. Additional copies, $.50 each. Complete issue, $.08 per page.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 91
Number 4
Winter 1976–77

Contents

Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order
EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR. 577

The Great Society Did Succeed
SAR A. LEVITAN
ROBERT TAGGART 601

Soviet Control of Eastern Europe: Morality versus American National Interest
ROY E. LICKLIDER 619

Advancing American Interests Through Soviet Control: A Modest Proposal
PIERS PLOUGHMAN 625

Rejoinder to Piers
ROY E. LICKLIDER 629

Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia
KENNETH S. CHERN 631

The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953
ATHAN G. THEOHARIS 649

The Competition for Certainty: The Polls and the Press in Britain
SANFORD L. WEINER 673

Book Reviews 697

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 757

Title Page and Index to Volume 91 759

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy — Walter LaFeber — 697

Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy; *Nash*, Nuclear Weapons and International Behavior — Lincoln P. Bloomfield — 698

Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream — Lucian W. Pye — 699

Harrington, The Twilight of Capitalism — Lewis A. Coser — 701

Keech and Matthews, The Party's Choice — Gerald M. Pomper — 703

Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton, Explorations in Convention Decision Making: The Democratic Party in the 1970s — Paul T. David — 704

Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election — David Adamany — 705

Rubin, Party Dynamics: The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change — Michael R. Kagay — 707

Maisel and Sacks, eds., The Future of Political Parties — Frank J. Sorauf — 708

Cole, Blacks in Power: A Comparative Study of Black and White Elected Officials — Shirley E. Ostholm — 710

Clem and associates, The Making of Congressmen: Seven Campaigns of 1974 — David A. Leuthold — 711

Wheeler, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: The Manipulation of Public Opinion in America — David L. Paletz — 712

Friendly, The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment: Free Speech *vs.* Fairness in Broadcasting — Doris A. Graber — 714

Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal? — Ira Sharkansky — 716

Ungar, FBI — Robert A. Horn — 717

Rossett and Cressey, Justice by Consent: Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse — John C. Cratsley — 719

Oates, ed., Financing the New Federalism: Revenue Sharing, Conditional Grants, and Taxation — Frank Levy — 720

Gorham and Glazer, eds., The Urban Predicament — Jeffrey Prottas — 722

Sternlieb and Hughes, eds., Post-Industrial America: Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts — James Heilbrun — 723

Schwartz, ed., The Changing Face of the Suburbs — Frederick M. Wirt — 725

Pincus, ed., School Finance in Transition: The Courts and Educational Reform — James W. Guthrie — 727

Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics, 1789–1801 — Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. — 728

Russett and Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen — Jesse W. Markham — 729

Galambos, with Spence, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880–1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change — Richard S. Tedlow — 731

Kinsley, Outer Space and Inner Sanctums: Government, Business, and Satellite Communication — Edith Brown Weiss — 733

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York's Little New Deal — Bernard Bellush — 734
Martin, Madame Secretary: Frances Perkins — Norman Markowitz — 736
Hoogenboom, A., and Hoogenboom, O., A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Palliative — William R. Childs — 737
Murray, The 103rd Ballot: Democrats and the Disaster in Madison Square Garden — John L. Shover — 739
McPherson, The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the NAACP — Clayborne Carson — 740
Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia — Jack P. Greene — 742
Carmichael, Trotsky: An Appreciation of His Life — Peter Juviler — 744
Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Major Powers — Steven I. Levine — 745
Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837–1860 — James M. McPherson — 746
Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain — Frank J. Donner — 748
Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City — Alejandro Portes — 749
Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile — Robert G. Hawkins — 751
Smock, D., and Smock, A., The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana — M. Crawford Young — 754
Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style — Lewis Brownstein — 755

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR., contends that in the last decade, support for liberal causes and candidates has been most forthcoming from voters at the highest socio-economic levels. This pattern is in contrast to the New Deal era, when such causes and candidates drew their strongest support from lower-status voters.

SAR A. LEVITAN and ROBERT TAGGART report on their extensive reevaluation of the Johnson administration's Great Society programs. Their conclusion is that the Great Society programs did not fail—as has been widely charged in recent years—but that despite some deficiencies, the programs led to substantial improvements in the living conditions of the poor, the sick, the elderly, and the members of minority groups.

ROY E. LICKLIDER argues that while morality impels American foreign policy to oppose Soviet control of Eastern Europe, it is in the interests of American national security that such control remain. Licklider maintains that an Eastern Europe without Soviet control would be politically unstable and thus a breeding place for conflicts that might draw the Soviet Union and the United States into a major war. Pushing Licklider's argument one step further, PIERS PLOUGHMAN (a pseudonymous commentator) ironically offers a "modest proposal" for promoting American national interests through supporting an extension of Soviet control even to other troubled areas such as Africa. In a serious vein, however, Ploughman charges that acceptance of Soviet control of Eastern Europe will not serve American national interests and therefore that the West should continue to advocate peaceful relaxation of such Soviet domination.

KENNETH S. CHERN reviews the American foreign policy debate of 1945 over the question of intervention in the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese. Chern believes that the Truman administration failed in its obligation to educate the American public about the near inevitability of Communist victory.

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS details the history of presidential directives issued between 1936 and 1953 bearing on the FBI's authority to investigate dissident political activities. He concludes that because presidential supervision of the FBI was inadequate, the FBI was able to self-define the scope of its authority.

SANFORD L. WEINER explains that a highly competitive environment for British political polls creates strong pressures for them and their consumers to derive certainty and significance from ambiguous information. The result is that a tightly knit political elite collectively reinforces its expectations with the aura of "science."

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR.

A new class-ideology alignment has taken form over the past decade as part of the transformation of political conflict and hence of the American party system. Since the mid-1960s, there has been an inversion of the relationship of class to electoral choice from that prevailing in the New Deal era. Broadly interpreted, the New Deal experience sustained the proposition that liberal programs and candidates would find their greatest measure of support among lower-class voters and that conservatives would be strongest within the high socioeconomic strata. Now, in many although not all instances, groups at the top are more supportive of positions deemed liberal and more Democratic than those at the bottom. We also see some evidence of an emergent curvilinear pattern, with the top more Democratic than the middle but the middle less Democratic than the bottom.

Table 1 reviews the "classic" pattern of class voting as it persisted throughout the New Deal era and into the early 1960s. What had been well established as the "traditional" configuration held neatly for the several sets of groups represented in this table and indeed for all of the various socioeconomic groupings which we can locate with survey data. For example, 38 percent of whites of high socioeconomic status (SES) voted for Democratic nominee John Kennedy in 1960, compared to 53 percent for Kennedy among middle SES whites, and 61 percent of low SES white voters. By 1968, the relationship had changed

---

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR., is professor of political science and director of the Social Science Data Center at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of numerous books and articles on American politics including *American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response* and *Ideology in America*. This article draws upon and extends a line of anlysis from his latest book (with Charles D. Hadley), *Transformations of the American Party System*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

markedly. For the most part, the top gave the higher measure of backing to the relatively more liberal Democratic nominee than did the bottom. Humphrey was supported by 50 percent of high status whites under thirty years of age, but by only 39 percent of their middle SES age mates and by just 32 percent of young, low status electors. The newly emergent conformation was even clearer in 1972, when the somewhat distorting factor of the Wallace candidacy was removed. Among whites—for blacks continued to constitute a "deviating" case of voters disproportionately in the lower socioeconomic strata but overwhelmingly Democratic—those with college training were more Democratic than those who had not attended college; persons in the professional and managerial stratum were more Democratic than the semiskilled and unskilled work force; and so on. McGovern was backed by 45 percent of the college-educated young, but by only 30 percent of their age mates who had not entered the groves of academe. Comparing 1948 and 1972, we see a reversal of quite extraordinary proportions.

Table 1 also suggests, somewhat lightly, the emergence of a curvilinear relationship between class and support for relatively more liberal as opposed to more conservative candidates. McGovern was weakest within the middle strata: among whites holding positions as skilled workers; among women of middle socioeconomic status; among young people holding positions as skilled manual

TABLE 1

Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Ballots, White Voters by Socioeconomic Position, 1948–1972

	1948	1960	1968	1972
All				
High SES*	30%	38%	36%	32%
Middle SES**	43	53	39	26
Low SES***	57	61	38	32
Women				
High SES	29	35	42	34
Middle SES	42	52	40	25
Low SES	61	60	39	33
Under 30 years of age				
High SES	31	42	50	46
Middle SES	47	49	39	32
Low SES	64	52	32	36
College educated	36	45	47	45
Noncollege	56	49	33	30

SOURCE: Data are from the following AIPO surveys: for *1948,* #430, 431, 432, 433; *1960,* #635, 636, 637, 638; *1968*, #769, 770, 771, 773; *1972,* #857, 858, 859, 860.

* High SES includes persons having upper white collar and managerial occupations who have had college training.

** Middle SES includes persons having lower white collar or skilled manual occupations.

*** Low SES includes persons having semiskilled and unskilled occupations, service workers, and farm laborers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers. On the whole, McGovern's strength was greatest among those of high status, lowest within the ranks of the middling strata, and somewhat higher again in the lower reaches of the socioeconomic distribution.

Some qualification is in order. While a massive transformation of the relationship of class in voting has obviously occurred, the old pattern has not been obliterated everywhere. If blacks are included, the lower socioeconomic strata still appear more Democratic than the higher cohorts. Even within the white population, some distributions from the 1968 and 1972 presidential contests show the top more Republican than the bottom—although in all cases by a margin markedly reduced from that of the New Deal era. The proportion of professional and managerial whites backing McGovern was 3 percentage points lower than that of blue-collar whites. However, comparing professionals alone (excluding businessmen) to manual workers, we find the former 4 percentage points more Democratic than the latter—the first time since the availability of survey data that this inversion has occurred. And for the first time in the span for which we have survey materials, the college educated in 1972 gave the Democratic nominee a higher percentage of their vote than did the noncollege population. So while there are some exceptions, depending upon how the high and low status publics are defined, an inversion of the New Deal relationship has indeed occurred.

Even though this inversion is most notable in presidential voting, the general *direction* of the shift is evident at other levels as well. In Table 2, we compare the congressional vote of the several socioeconomic strata for the elections of 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1972. The weakening of traditional class voting can be seen clearly, especially among young voters. In 1947, just 36 percent of high status voters under thirty cast their ballots for Democratic congressional candidates, as against 66 percent of their low status age mates—a margin of 30 percentage points between these two groups. By 1968, the direction was the same —with those of low status more Democratic than their high status counterparts —but the margin had shrunk to just 8 points. In 1972, even the direction had shifted, as 60 percent of the high status young, 53 percent of their age mates of middle status, and only 51 percent of those of low status, cast ballots for Democratic congressional contenders.

For some observers, the 1974 balloting showed the evanescent character of the forces that had contributed to inversion.[1] Yes, issues arose in the 1960s which divided the populace along new lines, different from those of the New Deal years, and thereby scrambled the old class-party relationships. But the conflict of the 1960s lacked staying power, according to this view, and it has faded as quickly as it once arrived. By 1974, issues running coincident with the basic line of cleavage of the New Deal party system had reasserted themselves:

[1] See, for example, James L. Sundquist, "Hardly a Two-Party System," *The Nation* (December 7, 1974), 582–586. Sundquist believes the 1974 electoral results support an argument he had developed previously in *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D. C., 1973), that the New Deal alignment remains essentially intact.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Democratic Percentage of the Congressional Ballots, White Voters by Socioeconomic Position, 1948–1972

	1948	1960	1968	1972
All				
High SES	33%	46%	42%	48%
Middle SES	49	60	51	49
Low SES	63	66	55	54
Women				
High SES	35	41	42	48
Middle SES	49	57	49	45
Low SES	64	64	55	56
Under 30 years of age				
High SES	36	49	46	60
Middle SES	54	54	51	53
Low SES	66	59	54	51
College educated	42	51	46	55
Noncollege	60	55	52	53

SOURCE: Data are from the following AIPO surveys: for ***1948,*** #430, 431, 432, 433; ***1960,*** #635, 636, 637, 638; ***1968,*** #769, 770, 771, 772; ***1972,*** #857, 858, 859, 860.

> as soon as Vietnam, race questions, and the social issue gave way to class questions and issues of governmental intervention in the economy, the existing party system [that of the New Deal] took on meaning once again. In 1974, the questions were whether people were going to have jobs, whether their wages would keep pace with the prices in the grocery story, whether oil company projects were too high, who was going to bear the brunt of inflation and of taxes. These aroused class feelings. . . . Sensing that they were threatened, people of traditional Democratic leanings turned instinctively to *their* party. . . .[2]

This argument contains a large element of truth—and a fundamental flaw. It fails, in the first instance, to account for what actually happened in the 1974 voting. Examining the data in Table 3, we see that the Democrats *did* do exceptionally well among low status voters. Working-class whites, who had deserted McGovern (although not the congressional Democrats) in 1972, overwhelmingly endorsed Democratic candidates for House and Senate, and those running for lower offices, in 1974. Economic worries, together with a Watergate reaction, did in fact submerge the social and cultural issues that were so prominent between 1964 and 1972.[3] Even in this time of economic woe, however, when the economic dimension of conflict loomed larger than it had in the preceding years, there was no return to the class-party relationship of the 1930s and 1940s, even to that which persisted into the early 1960s. The Democrats

[2] Sundquist, "Hardly a Two-Party System," p. 385.

[3] Gallup has provided survey confirmation of this. See *The Gallup Opinion Index,* 113 (November 1974), especially pp. 1–2, 29–31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did not do as well among whites of high socioeconomic status in 1974 as among low status whites but, considering the circumstances, they came remarkably close.

The contrast between the 1974 vote distributions and those of 1964—the great congressional landslide a decade earlier—is sharp. The Democrats did no better among middle to lower status voters in 1974 than in 1964, in fact they did not do quite as well, but they bettered their performance markedly within the high status cohorts. While conditions in both elections evoked memories of the New Deal—some said Goldwater wanted to repeal it, and some felt we were entering anew in 1974 the situation that precipitated it—there was no reappearance of class voting in the more recent of the two contests. The "distance" between high and low status voters, immense in 1964, was modest a decade later. Indeed, where noncollege whites under thirty years of age were 18 percentage points more Democratic than their college age mates in the former election, there was no difference at all between the vote of these two groups in 1974.

Nothing in the above commentary offers any comfort to the Republicans. They were badly—almost identically, in the overall percentages—beaten in the 1964 and 1974 congressional contests. The 1974 results actually seem a bit more gloomy for the GOP, since the party lost even its old base among high status voters, a base which had remained relatively secure in the general Goldwater rout. It is essential to note that the Republicans lost *differently* in 1974 than during the New Deal era. The "old New Deal coalitions" were not put back together in the 1974 balloting. Indeed, the only thing that 1934 (or 1964) and

TABLE 3

Democratic Percentage of the Congressional Ballots, White Voters by Socioeconomic Position, 1964 and 1974

	1964	1974
All		
High SES	48%	57%
Middle SES	65	62
Low SES	74	67
Women		
High SES	44	60
Middle SES	64	61
Low SES	74	68
Under 30 years of age		
High SES	50	66
Middle SES	70	68
Low SES	74	73
College educated	53	69
Noncollege	71	69

SOURCE: Data are from the following AIPO surveys: for *1964*, #697, 699, 701, 702; *1974*, #915, 916.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1974 appear to have in common is that Democratic congressional candidates trounced their Republican opponents on each occasion. Can anyone seriously describe a contest in which Democrats secured the support of two-thirds of young college-trained, professional and managerial white voters as a "New Deal type" election?

We have here a basic element in the disruption of the New Deal alignment. In the party system that Franklin Roosevelt built, the top had been decisively more Republican than the bottom. A structure of class voting was erected, remained intact, and became "natural." It was natural in the context of the social group composition and political agenda of the industrial state. It is in no sense natural in postindustrial America. Among its other dimensions, the contemporary party system transformation comprises an inversion of the old class relationship in voting, an inversion first evident at the presidential level but likely to penetrate the entire range of electoral contests where broad policy issues can intrude. The performance of liberal—often but not always Democratic—candidates at the top of the socioeconomic ladder increasingly is approaching, and even surpassing, that at the bottom.

Republican Weakness at the Top

The coin, one side of which is proportionally increased backing for liberal, and thereby often Democratic, candidates among the upper social strata in the United States, has a second surface. Support for conservative, often Republican candidacies within the higher status groups has markedly declined.

Before the New Deal, the Republicans were the party of the American "establishment," although that term was not applied then to the dominant business interests. Even during the New Deal period, the GOP remained the establishment party, in the sense that it held the loyalties of disproportionate numbers of people among those groups who controlled major social institutions, notably the economy. With entry into the postindustrial era, however, two related developments have eroded this Republican position. The *composition* of the establishment has changed with the ascendancy of new political classes, principally of a broad professional stratum—or with substantial overlap and a somewhat different perspective, a massive new intelligentsia. Apart from this altered composition, the ideological proclivity of large segments of the establishment has experienced a major shift.

The Republicans' hold on that loose array of groups and interests which might be said to exercise disproportionate influence in the society has slipped. The intellectual community has grown in numbers and importance. But the Republican position has grown weaker, not stronger, within it. There has been, we know, a long-standing tendency of intellectuals generally to be critics, and of American intellectuals to be socially critical from a liberal perspective.[4] So the

[4] For extensive analysis of this subject, see by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and S. M. Lipset, *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics* (New York, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GOP, as the more conservative party, has long had good reason not to expect the intellectual community to be one of its strongholds. Still, intellectuals are a variegated group, and they are for the most part among the advantaged rather than disadvantaged segments of the populace. During the New Deal era, there was substantial Republican support within the intellectual stratum. Over the last two decades, this support has declined. In 1948, for example, college faculty were only 6 percentage points less Republican than the electorate generally. The 1972 Republican professorial vote, however, was 18 percentage points below the Republican vote within the electorate at large.[5]

Data on the politics of college students show a similar progression. S. M. Lipset has noted that Harvard University students, generally more liberal and Democratic than their counterparts at other campuses around the country, were solidly Republican in presidential preference up until the 1960s. The respectable straw polls conducted by the *Harvard Crimson* indicated that Thomas Dewey was the choice of 56 percent of the Harvard student body in 1948, while just 25 percent favored Truman. In 1952 and 1956, Adlai Stevenson demonstrated considerable appeal in Harvard Yard, but he still ran behind Eisenhower in the universitywide student balloting. It was not until 1960 that a Democratic presidential nominee was recorded as the choice of a majority of Harvard students, when the *Crimson's* straw poll found Kennedy securing about three-fifths of the student vote. In the elections of 1964, 1968, and 1972 the Harvard student body, so solidly Republican during the New Deal when Harvard alumnus Franklin D. Roosevelt was the popular Democratic standard-bearer, supported the Democratic presidential nominees by overwhelming margins.[6] Harvard is certainly part of the American intellectual establishment—a training ground for so many of the top leaders of government, business, science, the arts, and culture. Throughout the New Deal, its student body was Republican. By the 1970s, Harvard students have become strongly Democratic.

While the absolute distributions are different from campus to campus, the student population of the 1930s and 1940s had been generally Republican, following the normal class distributions of the time: groups of higher socioeconomic status tended to be Republican, and college students were drawn largely from the middle and upper middle classes. During the Eisenhower years, too, students were solidly Republican in presidential politics, supporting Eisenhower by

[5] For further data and explanation of faculty voting, see Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and S. M. Lipset, *Academics, Politics and the 1972 Election* (Washington, D. C., 1973), chaps. 3 and 4. See, too, by the same authors, *The Divided Academy*, chap. 9.

[6] For a discussion of the Harvard student straw vote historically, see S. M. Lipset, "Political Controversies at Harvard," in Lipset and David Riesman, *Education and Politics at Harvard* (New York, 1975), chap. 8. There have been changes in the social group composition of the Harvard student body since World War II, of course, but these are not sufficient to account for the partisan shift. The representation of blacks has increased, but blacks remain less than 10 percent of Harvard students. The proportion Jewish is about the same now as in 1948. Harvard students are still an enormously privileged group, in terms of social background, compared to the public at large.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much greater margins than did the general public.[7] By the late 1960s, however, the national college student population was decisively Democratic—or, more precisely, heavily anti-Republican, since large numbers of students were self-described independents consistently voting against Republican presidential nominees. Gallup found a marked drop in Republican allegiance among students continuing during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1966, 26 percent of college students described themselves as Republicans, 35 percent as Democrats, and 39 percent as independents; by 1970, Republican identifiers in the student population had declined to 18 percent, compared to 30 percent self-described Democrats, and a massive 52 percent independents; and in 1974, the Republican proportion was at an all time low of 14 percent, as against 37 percent Democratic, and 49 percent in the independent category.[8] Among graduate students, an almost unbelievably low proportion of 9 percent identified with the GOP, while 43 percent thought of themselves as Democrats, and 48 percent as independents.[9] A 1972 CBS election day survey found 54 percent of students in the eighteen to twenty-four age category voting for McGovern, 16 points higher than the proportion among the public at large.[10] Gallup reported in October 1972 that 68 percent of graduate students planned to vote for McGovern, compared to just 31 percent for Republican incumbent Richard Nixon.[11]

These current distributions are really quite extraordinary. Not only are college students an important component of the intelligentsia, but from their ranks will come the bulk of the leadership of the principal institutions in the United States. When only 14 percent of all students and just 9 percent of graduate students profess an affinity for the Republican party, the extent of the latter's decline—and even more, the scope of its potential decline—among the principal political classes becomes evident.

The position of the GOP is even bleaker than these data suggest. Among students at major colleges and universities, Republican electorate support falls below that within the general student population. For both faculty and students, the most prestigious and influential—and most affluent—sectors are the most solidly Democratic.[12]

What we have noted for students and faculty and other segments of the intellectual community applies in all essential regards to the higher and ascendant socioeconomic strata in the United States generally. Data on partisan identification and congressional vote from the New Deal through to the present demon-

[7] For supporting data, see S. M. Lipset and Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., "College Generations: From the 1930's to the 1960's," *The Public Interest*, no. 25 (Fall 1971), 105–109.

[8] *The Gallup Opinion Index*, no. 109 (July 1974), 15.

[9] Ibid.

[10] CBS News Election Day Survey, data made available to the Social Science Data Center, University of Connecticut, courtesy of CBS News.

[11] *The Gallup Opinion Index*, no. 88 (October 1972), 3.

[12] For supporting data and analysis, see Ladd and Lipset, *The Divided Academy*, chaps. 5 and 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strate clearly the dramatic decline of Republican backing among the higher status cohorts.

In Figures 1 and 2, we compare the Democratic and Republican proportions of party self-identification and congressional vote throughout the New Deal era and into the contemporary period, for three groups of high socioeconomic status, all of which have expanded greatly as the society has moved into postindustrialism. The college educated, people employed in professional occupations, and young whites of high socioeconomic status—defined as the college educated employed in professional and managerial positions—are not the only representations of the high socioeconomic strata and the intelligentsia which we could make, but they faithfully illustrate developments occurring in the larger stratum.

One basic fact comes through with absolute clarity from the data presented in these two figures: groups of high socioeconomic status were solidly Republican throughout the New Deal era; sometime in the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a pronounced move toward the Democrats. In 1964, for the first time, Democrats outnumbered Republicans (in terms of self-identification) throughout many high SES cohorts, and majorities of these groups backed Democratic congressional candidates. While there was some temporary falling off in Democratic support among these groups immediately after 1964, the overall secular progression has not been interrupted. Substantial portions of the high socio-

FIGURE 1

Percentage Point Difference (+, More Democratic; −, More Republican) in the Party Self-identification of Selected Social Groups, 1940–1974



SOURCE: Data are from the following year AIPO surveys: for *1940,* #208, 209; *1944,* #328, 329; *1948,* #430, 431, 432, 433; *1952,* #506, 507, 508, 509; *1956,* #572, 573, 574, 576, *1960,* #635, 636, 637, 638; *1964,* #697, 699, 701, 702; *1966,* #724, 729, 737; *1968,* #769, 770, 771, 773; *1970,* #814, 815, 816, 813; *1972,* #857, 858, 859, 860; *1974,* #889, 897, 899, 903, 906.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2

Percentage Point Difference (+, More Democratic; −, More Republican) in the Congressional Voting of Selected Social Groups, 1940–1974



SOURCE: Data are from the following AIPO surveys: for ***1940,*** #208, 209; ***1944,*** #328, 329; ***1948,*** #430, 431, 432, 433; ***1952,*** #506, 507, 508, 509; ***1956,*** #572, 573, 574, 576; ***1960,*** #635, 636, 637, 638; ***1964,*** #697, 699, 701, 702; ***1966,*** #724, 729, 737; ***1968,*** #769, 770, 771, 773; ***1970,*** #814, 815, 816, 817; ***1972,*** #857, 858, 859, 860; ***1974,*** #889, 897, 899, 903, 906.

economic strata in the United States are consistently displaying absolute Democratic majorities in both self-identification and congressional balloting.[13]

Particularly ominous for the long-run prospects of the GOP is the disaffection of young high status whites. During the New Deal era, this group was solidly, indeed massively, Republican. By the mid-1970s, it has become solidly, massively Democratic. These voters will grow older, of course, and perhaps become relatively more conservative, swinging somewhat toward the Republicans, apart from what happens as a result of changing issues and changing party positions. But Figures 1 and 2 make clear that we are dealing with a long-term secular shift, not simply an artifact of Watergate. The Republicans have lost their

[13] Not all high SES groups show Democratic majorities, of course. People in the very highest income groups—over $25,000 a year—and business executives, still display Republican majorities, although the extent of the GOP advantage has been reduced even here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grip on the American establishment, most notably among young men and women of relative privilege.[14]

Sources of the Inversion

The partisan changes thus far described have their origins within broader social and political transformations. Three interrelated arguments form the explanation: (1) The composition of the several broad social classes or strata has changed, and so has their social and political character. (2) The thrusts and meanings of liberalism (and, of course, conservatism) have been altered. (3) Because of this, the high SES cohorts (as now composed) are much more liberal (as now defined) than were their counterparts of times past. Indeed, they often act as the primary sustainers of what now commonly passes as liberalism. This is evident in candidate and party support, as noted, but can be seen as well in stands on issues.

Let us look first to class composition. Enterpreneurial business has largely passed from the scene. It is no longer a major interest collectivity. Managerial business remains an important stratum. But it experiences peculiar fracturings which could not have been contemplated in earlier periods. Increasingly large segments of the broad new upper middle classes, of the professional and managerial community—primarily those at once the most affluent and secure and most closely associated with advanced technology—cease to function as defenders of business values. More to the point, they cease to think of themselves as "business" in the historic sense. They become incorporated into a rising "new class," the intelligentsia, responding to intellectual values and orientations rather than those traditionally associated with business.[15] At the same time,

[14] Some commentators have insisted that the inversion of the New Deal class-idology relationship carried with it great opportunities for the Republican party, along with the problems noted above. No one has advanced this argument more persistently and forcefully than conservative journalist Kevin P. Phillips. Large segments of the old working class have in the post-World War II years become middle class and supportive of conservative positions—although not of old-style business conservatism. As the GOP lost ground in an increasingly liberal establishment, it could have more than compensated for its losses by inroads into the massive new bourgeoisie. The populism of the New Deal had a conservative establishment to attack and was directed to the support of liberal programs and policies. The populism of the late 1960s and 1970s, confronting instead a liberal establishment, has led to neoconservative policy responses. But the Republicans have blown this "ideological opportunity of a generation." They have lost ground at the top and have failed to gain in the middle. Phillips, "The Future of American Politics," *National Review*, 24 (December 22, 1972), 1398. See as well his *Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age* (Garden City, N. Y., 1975). My own views on why the GOP has failed to achieve any widespread, persistent advance as a result of the inversion cannot be covered within the limits of the present article.

[15] Public opinion analyst Louis Harris has drawn upon his survey data in developing one aspect of this argument. Noting that in postindustrial America, "at the key executive level, more people [are] employed in professional than in line executive capacities," he stresses the finding that "the one quality that divided most professionals from line executives in business organizations was that professionals felt much more beholden to their outside discipline—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parts of the business community, especially those linked to newer enterprises and the top managers, continue to promote business values and reflect relative conservatism.

The intelligentsia, dramatically enlarged, operates as a distinctive social and political class of postindustrial America. It expresses powerful commonalities. Its members are generally secure in their affluence. More importantly, they share contact with intellectual activity—which does not mean, of course, that they participate in high culture or advanced intellectual pursuits—through that extraordinary nexus of 2500 colleges, 8.8 million college students, 600,000 professors, 900,000 artists, authors, and editors. They are linked by a communications network of unparalleled scope and pervasiveness, an instrument of technology (e.g., television) and wealth and intellectual sophistication.[16]

When we identify upper status groups in the contemporary United States—whether in terms of high educational attainment, the holding of "professional or managerial" occupations, high income, or any combination of such variables —we are not locating primarily a "business class" in the 1930s sense. The upper strata have expanded, become more diverse, assumed a new social coloration.

At the same time, "working class" has taken on a quite different social and political character than it held in the 1930s. Most members of the urban working class were economic "have nots" in the 1930s, who either experienced immediate economic privation or operated with precious little margin over subsistence needs. As such, they supported government-directed changes in the economic order. And the trade union movement, which gathered momentum in the 1930s, organized this "have not" working class and served as one of the principal new claimants for economic betterment and security and influence. These objectives were in large measure attained though governmental intervention and economic growth. The unionized labor force has moved up the socioeconomic ladder. For this group, the victory over economic privation has been won. Producing a wonderfully American semantic contradiction, this segment of the *working class* has become (lower) *middle class*. . .

The head of the American labor movement, AFL-CIO president George Meany, has spoken insightfully to the transfiguration of labor's place in the postindustrial era. In a 1969 interview with *The New York Times*, Meany was willing to accept both "middle class" and "conservative" as descriptions of the membership of the labor movement.

---

whether it be systems engineering, teaching, scientific research, or other professional ties—than to the particular company or institution they worked for." *The Anguish of Change* (New York, 1973), p. 45.

[16] College training, an experience shared by more than 35 million Americans, defines the outer boundaries of the intelligentsia. I use *intelligentsia* to include those persons whose background and vocation associates them directly in the application of trained intelligence. It includes, that is, not only intellectuals—people involved in the creation of new ideas, new knowledge, new cultural forms—but also that larger community whose training gives them some facility in handling abstract ideas, or whose work requires them to manipulate ideas rather than things.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Labor, to some extent, has become middle class. When you have no property, you don't have anything, you have nothing to lose by these radical actions. But when you become a person who has a home and has property, to some extent you become conservative. And I would say to that extent, labor has become conservative.[17]

A working class that is middle class and conservative—that is a distinctive feature of the contemporary social structure.

The Meanings and the Objectives of Liberalism

Americans have imposed one more obstacle in the path of intelligent public discourse of political matters by an insistence upon using *liberal* and *conservative* with several different meanings. First, the entire United States political tradition is described, quite appropriately, as liberal. This usage brings to mind Louis Hartz's great book, *The Liberal Tradition in America*. Liberalism here is a body of ideas associated historically with the emergent middle classes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It stands in opposition to classical conservatism—the defense, again historically, of aristocratic norms, values, and institutions. In the New Deal era, liberalism came into common usage with a quite different meaning.[18] Liberals were those who favored a major expansion of intervention by the state, the shift of responsibility for guiding the society from the private (chiefly business) sphere to the public sector. State intervention was on behalf of new beneficiary groups, notably the industrial working class. In this context, conservatives were those who continued to hold to the desirability of the old "business nationalism," those who opposed the New Deal state.

Now, *liberal* and *conservative* are receiving other applications. We are told, for instance, that Senator Henry Jackson is of the "conservative wing" of the Democratic party—although Jackson's liberal credentials are impeccable in both the classical and the New Deal senses of the term. Lewis Coser, Irving Howe, and their associates write of "the new conservatives," in whose intellectual ranks they place such as Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.[19] They recognize explicitly that the perspective in question does not resemble business conservatism. The new conservatives are not New Deal conservatives. Rather, they are New Deal liberals who have come to emphasize a "limits of politics" approach as a result of being seared by public failures of the past decade. Although there is a good bit of disagreement at the level of specifics, there is fairly widespread agreement on a general usage of *conservatism* which encompasses people who, while remaining faithful to New Deal liberal

[17] "Excerpts from Interview with Meany on Status of Labor Movement," *The New York Times*, August 31, 1969.

[18] Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," *The Public Interest* (Fall 1966), 70–82.

[19] Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (eds.), *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left* (New York, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tenets, draw back from certain contemporary facets of social change and extensions of the idea of equality.

All of the basic understandings of *liberal* and *conservative*, of course, revolve around equality. The latter concept historically has received varying interpretations, has been taken to require different public policies. The "beneficiary groups" have thus changed, and so have the "contributory groups." Liberals are in some sense partisans of the idea of equality, but the idea has been taken to mean different things and so the liberal ranks have shifted.

Much of the working class has become *bourgeois* and behaves as the bourgeoisie has historically—anxious to protect a status achieved at considerable effort and often tenuously held. The thirst for change which characterized this stratum in the New Deal era has been quenched by the affluence of the last three decades. Many of the current pressures for equalitarian change, moreover, ask for sacrifices from the lower social strata. In contrast to the 1930s, when policy innovation often involved efforts by the working class to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the business strata, some of the most tension-laden areas where equalitarian change has been sought over the past decade have found the white working class (or lower middle class) and the black underclass confronting each other. More secure in their position, less threatened by such quests for societal transformation, typically residing some distance from the "front," the upper social strata have come easily to a more change-supportive posture.

The equalitarianism of the New Deal tended to be majoritarian in terms of its targeted beneficiaries. The contemporary variety is minoritarian, and often asks more of the middle-to-lower strata than of the top.

The dominant concerns or objectives of equalitarianism have shifted. Representative of the current emphasis are the busing of school children to achieve higher measures of racial integration, a rejection of the "equality of opportunity" definition of the egalitarian society with stress instead on "equality of result," and heightened concern over extensions of civil liberties, notably the rights of the accused. The beneficiaries of such commitments on the whole are quite different from those of New Deal equalitarianism.

Even in the area of domestic social spending, lower-middle income cohorts have moved in striking fashion toward contributor status; at the same time, the relative contributor burden of upper income groups has expanded more modestly. Public expenditures for health, education, and welfare have grown at an extraordinary rate over the past two decades—from $49.9 billion in 1953 to $410.5 billion in 1975, an increase of over 800 percent in current dollars and just under 400 percent in dollars of constant (1975) purchasing power. (Over the same span, military expenditures jumped 240 percent in current dollars and just about held even in constant dollars.) This major growth in domestic spending has been sustained in part by increases in the effective tax rate. And for those families earning incomes around the national median, the rise has been much steeper than for upper-middle and upper income families. Those at the median experienced a *doubling* of the proportion of their income going to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taxes between 1953 and 1975, compared to a *50 percent* increase among families with incomes two to four times the median.[20] Families earning four times the median in 1953—about $20,000—paid 20.2 percent of their income in taxes, while those at the median paid 11.8 percent; twenty-two years later median income families were taxed 22.7 percent of their income, while the rate for those earning four times as much had climbed more slowly, to 29.5 percent.

Trying to sum up the meaning of these data, David Broder commented that it is "no wonder there is a tax revolt in this country."[21] It might be more appropriate to draw the following conclusion: no wonder there is an inversion of the New Deal class order. The top does not pay a much higher share of its income in taxes than does the lower middle, even though it has much more of a cushion, and the burden of an expanding role for the state has in one sense been borne disproportionately by the lower-middle cohorts.

Social policies may be described as liberal on grounds that they employ the state for objectives widely perceived as equalitarian. But the equalitarian thrust may in fact be modest, and what there is of it may not be majoritarian in terms of beneficiaries. Furthermore, such policies need not make any special demands on privileged minorities. If they are modestly equalitarian and at the same time define contributors as the many rather than the few, they may come to be perceived by a large segment of the upper strata as "good buys"—that is, supportive of values, such as basic system stability, which the upper status cohorts can appreciate, at a reasonable price.

Liberalism in the mid-1970s has a different mix of beneficiaries and contributors than it did in the 1930s. Its programmatic thrusts have changed. This is another part of the explanation for the inversion of the New Deal class order, but again it is incomplete. A strict self-interest calculus is useful. It is important to recognize that high status Americans, as a group, have a greater "interest" in liberalism than did their counterparts four decades earlier. There are other dimensions, however, which the self-interest calculus does not capture. The most important element involves the role, and the measure of autonomy, of ideology. The political beliefs and orientations people hold are not simply products of their most proximate interests.

In the contemporary setting, the more prosperous strata are in fact frequently the most demanding and sustaining of social and cultural change, rather than the most resistant to such changes. The crude Marxist model suggests just the opposite, of course—that real conflict is economic, between the rich and the poor, with the rich generally satisfied and the poor at least intermittently dissatisfied and producing demands for change. But in an affluent society, with classical economic tensions muted, a new set of relationships and precipitants is introduced. Just as much of the working class has come to think like a bour-

[20] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism—1976 Edition*, Part I (Washington, D. C., 1976).

[21] David S. Broder, "The Shift in Spending and Taxes," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

geoisie, so substantial numbers of higher SES Americans have been brought into the intelligentsia. As such, they share in at least some of the critical, change-demanding orientations long associated with intellectual life.

One of the first to write with some precision about this phenomenon—of Marx being stood on his head by the new cleavages, of the blanketing of old tensions, the rise of the white working class to middle-class standing, the detachment of much of the upper middle class from traditional business concerns and their incorporation into the intelligentsia—was the sociologist C. Wright Mills. Fifteen years ago, Mills made light of "some New Left writers" who clung fiercely to the notion of the working class "as *the* historic agency" of social change, labeling their fixation upon workers "a legacy from Victorian Marxism."[22] Under some historical conditions, to be sure, industrial workers have operated as "a-class-for-themselves," and have served as the decisive instrument for change. But such conditions were not present in the United States. Instead the intelligentsia was emerging as the primary lever.

Entry into the contemporary era involves the placing of a wide range of new issues on the political agenda. In particular, there are important shifts occurring with the introduction of new value configurations. An affluent, much more highly educated, more leisured public casts off many of the older norms and standards of behavior. The survey work conducted by Daniel Yankelovich and his associate offers a more precise indication of the rapid circulation of new moral norms including more liberal sexual attitudes, a weakening of automatic respect for established authority structures, a decline of "old fashioned" patriotism; changing orientations toward work, marriage, and family, and the relative importance of material achievement in defining success; and a heightened concern with individual self-fulfillment and expression.[23] Not surprisingly, since the transition to the new social setting and the new value configurations is very recent, conflict arises as some sectors sustain while others oppose the emergent value structure. In this conflict pattern, age and socioeconomic position are the most important differentiating variables. The young, less socialized into the value structures of the old order, become for better or worse more receptive to the new; and within each age cohort, higher SES groups, more exposed to bodies of ideas encouraging change and experimentation and inclining to the perspective that the old is often unnecessarily narrow and restrictive, give a larger measure of backing for the new life styles and mores than their counterparts of lower socioeconomic status.

In general, support for elements loosely grouped under "new life styles and values" has become incorporated in the new liberalism. And it has come much

[22] C. Wright Mills, "The New Left," in a collection of Mill's essays, *Power, Politics, and People*, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York, 1963), p. 256. The piece was first published in the *New Left Review* (September–October 1960).

[23] Daniel Yankelovich, *The New Morality* (New York, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more from the higher than from the lower social classes. Has there been any period in which the culturally avant-garde has been a lower class or petit bourgeois phenomenon? Cultural experimentation by the upper classes is not new. The size of the upper classes *is* new, as is the boldness of their assault on older values and life styles. A broad array of issues now dominate the political agenda around which the upper social groups are "naturally" more change supporting than the lower middle and working classes.

There is another, quite different, ideological component of the inversion. It has become progressively easier for groups of high socioeconomic status to support policies of the kind described above because the old ideological objections to intervention by the state have been so greatly weakened. The upper classes of the New Deal years opposed the interventionist programs of the Roosevelt administration not only because they saw threats to their ascendancy and economic costs in the programs but also because they *believed* that private solutions were intrinsically preferable to public ones. Philosophical disagreements over the proper scope of government were deep and widespread.

The American establishments have long since abandoned this view. While some people still oppose the prevailing levels of governmental intervention as a matter of principle, Lowi was broadly correct when he argued that "statesmen simply no longer disagree about whether government should be involved. . . . Once the principle of positive government in an indeterminable but expanding political sphere was established, criteria arising out of the very issue of principle itself became irrelevant."[24]

During the New Deal era, it was possible to distinguish people who thought of themselves as liberals from those who described themselves as conservatives rather sharply by their attitudes on the size and scope of government. In 1964, "the size of government issue split the population along classical liberal/conservative lines."[25] That year, 25 percent of the liberals said government was too big, the position also held by a massive 71 percent of the conservatives. In 1968, continuing to follow views on this issue through University of Michigan Election Study data, Nie and Andersen found that the direction of the relationship remained the same but its strength had begun to decline. By 1972, there was no longer any difference between liberals and conservatives as to the size of government, with 57 percent of the former and 60 percent of the latter taking the position that government was "too big." This is not to suggest that self-described liberals and conservatives took the same view on the range of public issues. In fact, policy differences proved exceptionally sharp. But mass publics along with the "statesmen" to whom Lowi referred are no longer divided in any coherent ideological fashion on the question of the size and scope of government.

[24] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York, 1969), pp. 67, 57.

[25] Norman H. Nie with Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 556.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Scope of the Inversion

An examination of survey data reveals the extent to which high socioeconomic groups in the United States now stand "to the left" of the middle to low status cohorts, and the broad policy range over which this applies. However "high socioeconomic status" is defined, members of the category appear more socially critical, more supportive of cultural change, more inclined to extensions of the idea of equality than the lower strata. This relationship is clear and unambiguous among whites. Black Americans are an exception—disproportionately in the lower socioeconomic strata and at the same time very highly supportive of change. The long history of discriminatory treatment to which blacks have been subjected readily explains their generalized aversion to the status quo and their generalized commitment to extending equality. All of the following survey distributions are for the white population only, in order to bring into sharper focus the inversion which has occurred there but which is not yet widely evident in the black community.

In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, high SES cohorts in the United States were more conservative in a rather consistent fashion than the middle and low status groups. The former were more inclined to describe themselves as conservatives and to reject parties and causes labeled "liberal"; they were generally more opposed to programs associated with New Deal liberalism. The high strata were more internationalist than the middle and low cohorts, and they displayed a somewhat greater sensitivity to civil liberties causes, but on the whole their relative conservatism was clear.[26] This normal New Deal configuration involving policy stance carried over into the early 1960s. For example, in 1964 Gallup asked his national sample which way they would like to see public policy move: "go more to the Left . . . or go more to the Right."[27] Of professionals, 42 percent picked "Left," the position of 59 percent of blue-collar workers. Of those employed in professional and managerial jobs and college educated, 33 percent said "go more to the Left," as against 55 percent of unskilled workers. In the civil rights area, high status whites had begun by 1964 to show somewhat greater sympathy with black demands than low SES whites, but even here the differences were not large. The question of whether blacks should stop demonstrations "now that they have made their point," for example, found professionals and trade unionists taking almost identical positions.[28] As recently as 1966, questions like the legitimacy of employing the death penalty for persons convicted of murder yielded minimal differences among whites by social and economic status: 40 percent of professionals and 46 percent of the college edu-

[26] For further data on the policy orientations of Americans by their socioeconomic position, see Everett Ladd and Charles Hadley, *Political Parties and Political Issues: Patterns in Differentiation Since the New Deal* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1973).

[27] AIPO Survey No. 702, November 18, 1964.

[28] AIPO Survey No. 699, October 6, 1964.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cated, compared to 41 percent of blue-collar workers and 41 percent of unskilled workers indicated they favored the death penalty.[29]

Over the last ten years, however, a shift of considerable magnitude has occurred. It has been as rapid a break from the past as it has been extensive. In most policy areas, whites in the higher socioeconomic status categories have become decisively more liberal than the middle and lower cohorts. There are exceptions in economic policy, but even these are being reduced and removed.

The symbol *liberal* is much more in favor at the top than at the bottom. In 1970, 35 percent of whites in professional and managerial jobs described themselves as liberals, the position of just 18 percent of unskilled workers.[30] In the spring of 1975 the National Opinion Research Center found 41 percent of college graduates calling themselves liberals, compared to 35 percent of those with some college, 21 percent of high school graduates, and 22 percent of persons with less than a high school education.[31] Yankelovich has reported that 25 percent of Americans with incomes over $25,000 a year (1974) accept the designation liberal, as against 18 percent of those earning $5000 or less.[32]

On questions involving race relations it is much the same. In 1968, Gallup found 64 percent of professionals in favor of "open housing" legislation, compared to 37 percent of skilled workers and 32 percent of whites in semiskilled or unskilled manual labor positions.[33] Busing to achieve school integration was endorsed in 1975 by only a distinct minority of Americans, but the proportion was nearly twice as high for college graduates as for the grade school educated.[34] At the time, 28 percent of those with less than high school education, but only 19 percent of college graduates, argued that the country was spending too much to improve the condition of black Americans.

Other, "newer" extensions of equality find much more sustenance among upper status groups. In 1972, 62 percent of professionals, in contrast to 41 percent of manual workers, expressed support for the position that men and women should have an equal role "in running business, industry and government."[35] The idea that there is "too much concern with equality" was rejected strongly in 1974 by 25 percent of those earning $25,000 or more a year but by only 16 percent of persons with incomes under $5000; by 28 percent of the college educated but by just 15 percent of the grade school educated.[36]

Matters involving cultural change and new life styles, which have crowded into the agenda over the past decade, show some of the largest differences be-

[29] AIPO Survey No. 729, May 17, 1966.
[30] AIPO Survey No. 815, October 7, 1970.
[31] NORC General Social Survey, 1975.
[32] Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Survey No. 8400, March 1974.
[33] AIPO Survey No. 769, September 24, 1968.
[34] NORC General Social Survey, 1975.
[35] University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies (CPS), 1972 Election Survey.
[36] Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Survey No. 8400, March 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween the top and the bottom. The argument that abortion "is morally wrong and should not be legally permitted" was rejected without reservation by 69 percent of college-educated Americans in 1974, compared to 41 percent of high school graduates and 27 percent of persons with less than a high school education.[37] Of respondents from families with annual incomes of $5000 or less, 66 percent strongly agreed that the government should "crack down more on pornography," a position taken by only 18 percent in the $25,000 and higher cohort.[38] About half of the poorest Americans, in contrast to just one-third of the richest, strongly believe that too much permissiveness is hurting the United States badly.[39]

Even in domestic economic policy, there has been movement toward an inversion of the old class relationships, although it has not moved as far as in the social and cultural arenas—for the rather obvious reason that people of middle to low socioeconomic status in many instances remain beneficiaries of ameliorative economic legislation. In 1972, 46 percent of professionals indicated they favored increasing the tax rates for people with high incomes, while a slightly higher 48 percent of blue-collar workers took this position.[40] In the spring of 1973, 67 percent of professionals and a slightly smaller 64 percent of blue-collar workers asserted that the country was spending too little "on improving and protecting the nation's health."[41] Also, 51 percent of manual workers and a higher 59 percent of professionals argued that we are spending too little on programs to solve the problems of the big cities.[42] The argument has been made that too many dollars that should go for social welfare programs have been channeled into the defense budget. But the 1972 CPS study and the 1974 and 1975 NORC surveys show the high SES cohorts more in favor of cutting the military budget than their low SES counterparts, though the former remain generally more internationalist.[43]

Among grade school trained Americans, 74 percent, as against just 66 percent of college graduates, profess strongly that "the right to private property is sacred."[44] And 29 percent of our poorest citizens, but only 18 percent of our richest, think that "in the past 25 years, the county has moved dangerously close to socialism."[45] The proportion among the grade school educated who favor more governmental regulation of business is exactly the same as it is among the college educated.[46] It is hard to find much of the working-class awareness and

[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] CPS 1972 Election Survey.
[41] NORC General Social Survey, 1973.
[42] Ibid.
[43] CPS 1972 Election Survey; and NORC General Social Surveys, 1974, 1975.
[44] Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Survey No. 8400, March 1974.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marked antipathy for business which characterized distributions in New Deal years.

Political opinions are complex things. Rather modest changes in question wording can shift responses significantly. Exceptions can surely be found to the pattern outlined above. But the growing conservatism of lower class whites vis-à-vis the upper social strata is shown clearly in scores of recent surveys.

Conclusions

Over the last decade, a decisive inversion has taken place in the relationship established during the New Deal of class to sociopolitical commitments. The high social strata now consistently provide a greater measure of support for liberal programs and candidacies than do the lower strata. This is no temporary phenomenon. No return to the New Deal pattern should be expected. The sources of the inversion lie buried deeply within broad transformations of the society and its political conflict. An understanding of the inversion yields more general insights into the character of contemporary politics.

What we now call liberalism frequently makes the old New Deal majority contributors rather than beneficiaries. Lower-status whites more often feel threatened than encouraged by current extensions of equalitarianism. There has been a significant *embourgeoisement* of the working class. The high socioeconomic cohorts, which had such a distinctive business coloration in the 1930s (and earlier), have changed their social and political character—notably through the growth of the professional stratum. Such developments are central to the inversion described herein.

Nothing in the above requires that the Democrats always find more support at the top than at the bottom. The relationship is between class *and ideology*. The top is more supportive of the new liberalism than is the bottom, and more inclined to the Democrats only when and to the extent that they are perceived as the partisan instrument of the new liberalism.

Postscript

Can the inversion described above be seen in the 1976 balloting and, to the extent that it cannot, why not?

First it should be emphasized that the inverted relationship between class and ideology remains essentially unchanged. Various measures of opinion taken in the course of the 1976 campaign show high-status groups giving more backing than low-status cohorts to programs and policies associated with the contemporary statement of liberalism. And the former continue to show much more positive feeling than do the latter for the symbol *liberal*. To cite one illustration, a national poll conducted by NBC News in mid-September found 40 percent of respondents with advanced degrees calling themselves liberals, compared to 35

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent of those with undergraduate training, and just 22 percent and 23 percent respectively among the high school and the grade school educated.[47]

The effects of this relationship were sharply evident in the 1976 Democrat presidential nomination contest. Throughout the primaries, it was a case of the more liberal the contender, the greater the proportion of his overall support drawn from among people of high socioeconomic status. For example, the NBC News survey of Massachusetts Democratic primary voters found that "two candidates—Harris and Udall—seem to be competing at the liberal end of the party spectrum. Both men appeal to upper socioeconomic status voters in the suburbs."[48] Bayh and Shriver occupied intermediate positions, in terms of the perceived extent of their liberalism and the education-occupation-income status of their supporters. Jackson, Carter, and Wallace did best among lower-status Democrats. Other NBC News polls and those of *The New York Times*/CBS News located similar distributions over the winter–spring 1976 primary season.[49]

Various national surveys confirm these state-by-state findings adding, of course, a measure of overall precision. For example, the April 1976 study of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White shows the most prominent Democratic contenders thus arrayed by the self-defined liberalism or conservatism of their supporters (among Democrats and independents): Udall, who had the highest proportion of liberal and the smallest percent of conservative backers; Humphrey; Jackson; Carter; and Wallace, whose backers were decidedly the most likely to think of themselves as conservatives.[50] (The differences in the Humphrey, Jackson, and Carter voter profiles, it should be noted, are modest.) And the candidate array by the socioeconomic status of their adherents is largely the same. Thus 35 percent of the Udall people were from families where the head of household held a professional or executive position, compared to 26 percent of Carter's backers and 14 percent of Wallace's. An extraordinary 50 percent of those favoring Udall claimed to have completed at least three years of college, the status of 26 percent in the Jackson camp, 25 percent of those supporting Humphrey and Carter, and only 11 percent of the Wallace loyalists.

Much of the commentary immediately following the 1976 general election, however, carried an emphasis quite different from that of this article. It was as-

[47] NBC News, National Poll #55, September 16–18, 1976.

[48] NBC News, "The Election Newsletter," February 11, 1976.

[49] For reports on these surveys documenting the above conclusion, see Robert Reinhold, "Poll Finds Voters Judging '76 Rivals on Personality," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1976, pp. 1, 30; R. W. Apple, Jr., "New Political Universe," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1976, pp. 1, 17; Maurice Carroll, "Jackson Won in New York by Narrowly Based Voting," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1976, p. 30; and Robert Reinhold, "Poll Links Udall Strength to Low Vote in Michigan," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1976, pp. 1, 29.

[50] These data were made available by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, and the author wishes to express his appreciation to Ruth Clark, vice-president of that organization. Democrats and independents in the April 1976 survey were asked: "If you had to make a choice among Jackson, Carter, Udall, Wallace and Humphrey as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, whom would you choose?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serted that Jimmy Carter's victory resulted from a restoration of "the old New Deal coalition"—most notably in a return of the older pattern of class voting. This argument contains a large element of truth—but it has been substantially overstated.

The differences generally in voting patterns between 1976 and, for instance, 1936 are massive. The South was a cornerstone of the New Deal Democratic majority and the region gave the 1976 Democratic nominee his core support. But an exceptional shift has occurred in the underlying structure. During the New Deal era as earlier, blacks were largely disenfranchised in the South and the region voted Democratic because an overwhelming majority of whites were so inclined. In 1976, even with a moderate white Georgian as the party's standard bearer, white southerners appear to have cast a majority of their votes for the Republican nominee.[51] The region went Democratic, then, because relatively recently enfranchised southern blacks returned a heavy Democratic majority.

During the New Deal years, Catholics were heavily and consistently Democratic, in keeping with a pattern of partisan loyalties stretching back to the age of Jackson. In 1976, however, Catholics split their vote evenly between Ford and Carter.[52] Protestants and Catholics voted almost identically in the 1976 presidential balloting—the first time in the period for which we have reliable survey data, and probably the first time in United States history that Catholics have not been notably more Democratic than Protestants.

Even on the matter of class voting, 1976 was hardly a typical New Deal election. According to the NBC election day survey, college students—still a relatively privileged group in social background—continued their recent Democratic ways. The national election day survey conducted by the Associated Press indicates that a large majority of college-educated Americans voted for Democratic House of Representatives nominees. Fifty-six percent of those with advanced degrees backed Democratic congressional candidates. While persons with a high school education or less were more heavily Democratic than the college-educated groups, the differences, according to the AP survey, were modest, on the order of 6 percentage points. The CBS election day survey found higher-income Americans (with family incomes of $20,000 a year and more) dividing 51–49, Republican and Democratic, in the 1976 congressional balloting. This is hardly the New Deal pattern. The movement toward an inversion noted in voting for U.S. House

[51] The *Times*/CBS News election day poll reported a Ford majority among white southerners. Working with these data, with data from the Associated Press election day poll, and with actual aggregate voting data from each southern state, I have concluded that Carter received a majority of the white vote only in Georgia, Arkansas, and Tennessee, among the eleven states of the old Confederacy.

[52] The various national surveys do not agree exactly on the distribution of the vote of Catholics. According to the Harris survey conducted just before the election (October 29–31), for example, Catholics broke 50–50. The *Times*/CBS News election day survey shows Carter with 54 percent of the Catholic vote. The Associated Press survey also indicates Carter won 54 percent of the Catholic vote. All of the major national surveys agree that the distribution was very close.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Representatives candidates for the elections of the late 1960s and early 1970s was not reversed in 1976.

At the presidential vote level, there *was* a somewhat different pattern in 1976 than we saw in 1968 and 1972—and one more in keeping with the early 1960s. There was a fairly steady increase in the Ford proportion with movement up the socioeconomic ladder, however SES is measured. But any suggestion that class voting was as distinct in the 1976 presidential contest as in those of the New Deal years is, quite simply, wrong. There were clearer differences between high- and low-status voters in 1976 than in 1972 or 1968, but the high- and low-status groups were much less differentiated in 1976 than in the 1936–1948 period.

Louis Harris found, for example, that grade school-educated whites were about 14 percentage points more Democratic in 1976 than were their college-trained counterparts. Whites from families earning less than $5,000 a year were approximately 16 points more for Carter than were whites with family incomes of $15,000 and higher per year. Data made available from the election day "intercept" polls of the *Times*/CBS News and NBC News show similar distributions. In the 1930s and 1940s, by way of contrast, high- and low-status whites were separated by between 30 and 40 percentage points in presidential preference. Robert Reinhold, reporting on the *Times*/CBS News survey, noted a related facet of the secular diminution of class voting when he observed that "Mr. Carter succeeded in eating into groups that normally tend to vote Republican. For example, he did better among professional and managerial people than any Democrat in the last quarter century except Lyndon Johnson."[53] Actually, it could be extended to the last half century.

The 1976 Democratic presidential nominee over his long campaign attempted quite successfully to muffle the various social and cultural issues which have been transforming the meaning of liberalism. He did not seek to mobilize—indeed, he sought to avoid mobilizing—a distinctively New Liberal coalition. After eight years in the presidential wilderness and especially because of their overwhelming 1972 defeat, the Democrats generally were willing to follow Carter's lead and sheathed ideological knives in the interests of appeals at once more diffuse and more traditional in their economic emphases. So the 1976 balloting showed some backing away from the inversions of 1968 and 1972. But the relationship described involves, basically, *class* and *ideology*, and the 1976 political experience does not indicate any reversal of the long-term inversion this article has sought to treat.

[53] Robert Reinhold, "Carter Victory Laid to Democrats Back in Fold, Plus Independents," *The New York Times*, November 4, 1976, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Great Society Did Succeed

SAR A. LEVITAN
ROBERT TAGGART

President Lyndon Johnson's social welfare philosophy captured the imagination of the country in the mid-1960s and spurred it into action after a decade of lethargy. In Johnson's words, "We have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society. The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice."[1] Under the banner of the Great Society, there was a dramatic acceleration of governmental efforts to ensure the well-being of all citizens; to equalize opportunity for minorities and the disadvantaged; to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the social, economic, and legal foundations of inequality and deprivation. Congress moved ahead on a vast range of long-debated social welfare measures and pushed on into uncharted seas. In its 1866 days the Johnson administration moved vigorously to implement these new laws and to fully utilize existing authority. The Warren Court aided this dynamism with sweeping, precedent-setting decisions on a number of critical issues. The public supported this activism, giving Lyndon Johnson in 1964 the largest plurality in history, his Democratic party an overwhelming majority in

[1] Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation, 1965–1968* (Washington, D. C., 1969), Vol. II, p. 650.

SAR A. LEVITAN is professor of economics at The George Washington University and director of its Center for Social Policy Studies. ROBERT TAGGART is executive director of the National Council on Employment Policy. They are the authors (with William B. Johnston) of *Still a Dream: The Changing Status of Blacks Since 1960* and of the recently published *The Promise of Greatness*, from which this article is adapted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both Houses of Congress, and his administration high public approval ratings as action got underway.

Yet only eight years after the end of the Johnson administration, the view is widely held that the Great Society failed. The charge is that it exaggerated the capacity of government to change conditions and ineffectively "threw money at problems," overextending the heavy hand of government, pushing the nation too far, too fast, leaving a legacy of inflation, alienation, racial tension and other lingering ills. The repudiation of the Great Society in the late 1960s was based on a tide of analyses alleging to demonstrate the failures of the Johnson administration's domestic endeavors. There was extensive documentation of the "welfare mess." A crisis in medical care was declared and decried. Scandals and high costs in subsidizing housing were exposed, giving support to theoretical arguments about the inherent ineffectiveness of government intervention. Manpower programs, it was claimed, had little lasting impact on employment and earnings of participants. Doubts were cast on the outcomes of education investments. Urban and racial unrest were blamed on civil rights action and community organization. The economic problems of the 1970s were blamed on economic mismanagement during the 1960s.

A Positive Assessment

A careful reexamination of the evidence for the complete spectrum of the 1960s social welfare initiatives suggests that the conventional wisdom of the Great Society's failure is wrong. Our own assessments of the Great Society and its legacy, based on analysis of a vast array of program data, evaluations, and related statistics, challenge the widespread negativism toward governmental social welfare efforts.[2] We contend that the findings provide grounds for a sense of accomplishment and hope.

1. *The goals of the Great Society were realistic, if steadily moving, targets for the improvement of the nation.* By concentrating on the small minority of welfare recipients who are cheaters or who shun work, critics have chipped away at the ambitions of the Great Society, and have suggested that those in need somehow deserve their fate. This view ignores the overwhelming majority of welfare recipients who have no other alternatives, workers who either cannot find employment or are locked into low-wage jobs, and the millions of disenfranchised who are seeking only their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Other less strident critics emphasize the difficulties in changing institutions and socioeconomic patterns. No matter how desirable a change may be, it is likely to have unwanted side effects, and the process itself can be an ordeal. Where opportunities and rewards are distributed unequally and unjustifiably, redistribution will obviously affect the previously chosen people. Improvements cannot be ac-

[2] Specific analyses and studies are cited in Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, *The Promise of Greatness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complished without effort and sacrifice, and the existence of impediments is not proof of unrealistic or unattainable goals.

2. *The social welfare efforts initiated and accelerated in the 1960s moved the nation toward a more just and equitable society.* The claims that these programs were uselessly "throwing dollars at problems," that government intervention cannot change institutions or individuals, or that problems remain intractable are glib rhetoric. The results of government intervention varied, undesirable spillover effects occurred, and the adopted intervention strategies were sometimes ill designed; but progress was almost always made in the desired direction. The gains of blacks and the poor, the two primary target groups of federal efforts, offer the most striking evidence. Government programs significantly reduced poverty and alleviated its deprivations. Blacks made major advances in education, employment, income, and rights in the 1960s.

3. *The Great Society's social welfare programs were reasonably efficient, and there was frequently no alternative to active intervention.* The government operates in a fishbowl, so that all its mistakes and excesses are laid bare to the public; similar problems in the private sector are hidden away, leaving the impression of greater efficiency. Criticism of programs is part of the process by which needed or desired changes are engineered, and the discovery of failure is part of a continuing process of improvement.

4. *The negative spillovers of social welfare efforts were often overstated and were usually the unavoidable concomitants of the desired changes.* Examples are legion. Medical care programs were blamed for the inflation in medical costs. Busing was heatedly opposed as inconveniencing the many to help the few. In fact, however, medical costs rose largely because demand was increased suddenly while supply could respond only slowly. Inflation is unavoidable when reliance is placed on the price mechanism to expand and redistribute resources. Busing to achieve racial balance involves difficulties but critics have not offered alternatives to integrate the schools. Every program generates problems, but these have usually been manageable.

5. *The benefits of the Great Society programs were more than the sum of their parts, and more than the impact on immediate participants and beneficiaries.* In attacking a specific problem such as unemployment, for instance, there is a whole nexus of variables. On the supply side, consideration must be given to the education and vocational training of the unemployed; their access to jobs, their knowledge of the labor market; and their work attitudes, impediments, and alternatives. On the demand side, the quality and location of jobs must be considered along with their number. Discrimination and hiring standards are also crucial factors. Unemployment might be combated by education and training, better transportation, improved placement services, sticks and carrots to force the unemployed to take jobs, provision of child care, economic development in depressed areas, equal opportunity enforcement, and a variety of other measures. None of these alone is likely to have much impact, but together they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can contribute to change, not only in the labor market, but in all those dimensions of life so intimately related to work.

6. *There is no reason to fear that modest steps which are positive and constructive in alleviating age-old problems will in some way unleash uncontrollable forces or will undermine the broader welfare of the body politic.* Only dedicated pessimists and gainsayers can doubt our capacity to achieve substantial improvements. And there is no reason to abandon the aim of providing a minimal level of support for all who remain in need. Progress has been meaningful; it can and must continue. As we enter our third century as a nation, we must reevaluate the recent, as well as distant, past to get a realistic understanding of our limitations but also a greater confidence in our potential. We have the power, if we have the will, to forge a greater society and to promote the general welfare.

Evaluating the Record

Many critics of the Great Society have focused on the least successful attempts at social improvement with their attendant horror stories. There is an opposite temptation to concentrate on and generalize from the areas of accomplishment. The only valid approach is to consider the successes and failures over the entire range of social welfare activities.

Income Support

The expansion of income transfers during the 1965–1975 decade has been criticized from many angles. Aid to Families with Dependent Children—usually called "welfare"—drew the brunt of criticism. Supplemental Security Income—the reformed system of aid for the aged, blind, and disabled—then came under fire, as did unemployment compensation. Even the previously sacrosanct social security program was questioned. In reality, the Great Society had less impact on the transfer system than on any other social welfare dimension. To blame it for the "welfare mess" or for the problems of the social security system is to ignore the complicated factors involved; to associate it with the vast expansion in unemployment compensation in the 1970s or with the difficulties of public assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled is an anachronism. Nonetheless, a major thrust of the Great Society was to provide for the needy. If the programs that attempt to do this are ineffective, then the Great Society's vision must be faulted. Is the transfer system indeed a mess?

Doubts about the soundness of the social security program are, if not groundless, certainly exaggerated. During the 1965–1975 decade benefits were raised substantially in real terms, and the system matured to the point where coverage of workers and benefits to the elderly became nearly universal. The redistributive features of the programs were expanded but social security remained a good insurance buy for most workers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The system remains secure. Declining birth rates mean fewer workers per beneficiary in the future and may require increased revenues. But this problem is more than a quarter century away, during which time productivity gains should provide the wherewithal for the needed transfers. Government contributions from general revenues are a likely possibility to finance the redistributive aspects of the system. And as a result of past improvements, benefits now meet basic needs and will not have to be raised in real terms as rapidly as in the past.

The veterans' pension and compensation system is an important complement to social security. As World War II veterans age, the proportion of needy veterans receiving benefits not carrying the stigma of welfare will rise.

Unemployment compensation grew at an incredible pace during the recession of the mid-1970s. Benefits and coverage extensions financed out of general revenues increased the transfer, as opposed to the insurance, features of the program. While it helps many nonpoor, unemployment compensation has evolved into a form of aid for the working poor who are frequently subjected to forced idleness but who are shortchanged by the welfare system.

Public assistance benefits for the aged, blind, and disabled were markedly improved over the last decade as the growth of social security and private pensions held down the case load and made reform possible. The Supplemental Security Income program that combined these categorical efforts established a federal floor under benefits and reduced geographic eligibility differences.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children has been the center of controversy. The tripling of caseloads and the quadrupling of costs between 1965 and 1972 was alarming to some, as was the subsequent failure to achieve welfare reform. In retrospect, however, the process was neither incomprehensible nor inimical. AFDC benefits were raised substantially to provide most recipients, in combination with in-kind aid, a standard of living approaching the poverty threshold. With liberalized eligibility rules and more attractive benefits, most low-income female-headed families were covered by the welfare umbrella in the early 1970s. Once this had occurred, the momentum of growth slowed.

The welfare explosion did have side effects. No doubt some recipients chose welfare over work as benefits rose above potential earnings. In part, welfare freed mothers from low-paid drudgery to take care of their families. Moreover, the difficulties of placing even the most employable and motivated recipients in jobs paying adequate wages suggested the limited options for the majority of clients. As benefits stabilized in the 1970s, the increase in real wages promised to reduce the attractiveness of welfare to unskilled workers.

The welfare system's bias against families with a male head offered some inducement for nonmarriage or desertion. In cases where AFDC provided a higher or steadier income than male family heads could earn, the costs of broken families had to be balanced against the benefits of improved living standards. The stabilization of real benefits and the rise in real wages should, over time, diminish the inducement to break up homes.

The income support system, including social security, veterans' programs, un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

employment insurance, workman's compensation, public assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled, AFDC, and near-cash programs such as food stamps, is incredibly complex. Yet "messiness" is inevitable where needs are multifaceted and where goals clash. Concentrating aid on female-headed families yields high target efficiency, since these families have the most severe needs and fewest options, but undesirable results are unavoidable. High marginal tax rates may discourage work, but they also tend to keep down costs and to help the most needy. Benefits may be too high in some areas and too low in others, but on the average they are close to poverty levels and geographic differentials are declining. Most families receiving multiple benefits have severe or special needs.

The income maintenance system is thus functioning reasonably well. The developments that seemed chaotic and dysfunctional have created a system within sight of assuring at least a poverty threshold standard of living for all citizens through a combination of cash and in-kind aid.

Health Care

The Great Society went far toward eliminating the main concern of the aged and a major problem of the poor—health care. Medicare and Medicaid have generally fulfilled President Johnson's promise of assuring the "availability of and accessibility to the best health care for all Americans regardless of age, geography or economic status."[3]

Medicare experienced early difficulties in striving for a balance between assuring adequate services and avoiding overutilization. Problems were associated most frequently with innovations. For instance, extended care was initiated as an alternative to longer hospital stays but became a subsidy for nursing home care until corrective measures were taken. Overly long hospital stays were shortened through a variety of utilization review methods. Perhaps to quell fears that government intervention would mean government control, Medicare may have displayed excessive generosity in considering the desires of doctors and other vested interests. After problems emerged, however, steps were taken to cut the fat from the system.

Medicaid remains an object of much criticism because of its rapid and unexpected growth. The scapegoats were overutilization and inefficiency, but quite clearly the basic cause was the explosion of AFDC. By the early 1970s the momentum of growth had already subsided as the eligible universe was reached and measures were taken to discourage overutilization and waste. Being tied to AFDC, Medicaid shared the geographic inequalities of that system, with even greater disparities resulting from the extension of aid to the medically indigent not on welfare in only some of the states. Yet these inequities were reduced over the years as more open-handed states cut back on frills while the tight-fisted ones became more generous.

[3] Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation*, p. 665.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the rapid inflation of health care prices in the late 1960s. But supply did expand and reallocation occurred. The price rises pinched middle-income families and those at the margin of eligibility, and significant inequities were created, providing cogent arguments for a more comprehensive health care system. But with limited resources, those most in need (as defined by individual states) are generally being helped. Attempts to blame Medicare and Medicaid for the alleged (and very questionably documented) failure of our health care system are misplaced and even critics must admit these programs' effectiveness in performing their basic missions.

Housing

Low-income housing programs provide obvious benefits to participants. Subsidies reduce the strain on limited budgets, and the shelter is far superior to what participants could otherwise afford. The long waiting lists and low vacancy rates argue that poor people value these programs, notwithstanding the drawbacks associated with project housing.

There are secondary benefits. Publicly assisted units have helped to suburbanize low-income minority families. The courts have used these subsidy programs as a lever for countering residential segregation. Other lesser accomplishments of the programs include increasing the stability and long-term economic status of some families, organizing and delivering services using housing as the nexus, and experimenting with new industrialized construction methods.

Most significantly, however, the housing programs have built new homes for the poor. Construction yields a tangible, lasting product, permitting some control over location and quality. Building specifically for the needy tends to soften the low-rent and low-cost housing market, rather than waiting for the trickle down of increased production resulting from aid to the more affluent. Housing is as good an investment for the government as it is for private individuals in the present inflationary environment; and in a construction slump, increased assisted housing production can provide a needed stimulus to the economy.

The real issue is not the benefits, but rather the costs. Assistance programs are expensive because they house larger numbers of people who cannot afford to contribute much to their maintenance. Subsidized units are more expensive when they are built in high cost areas or according to high standards, or when they are subject to union wage or minority contracting requirements. The government has been bilked at times like any other buyer, but the exposés of the early 1970s exaggerated the extent of such violations. The new housing programs introduced in 1965 and 1968 needed to be refined and administered more carefully and changes were introduced to correct the abuses. A housing allowance, the panacea of the Nixon administration, is certainly worth considering, but the payoffs of direct production should not be ignored in deciding on the best course.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Education

Learning is difficult to define or measure and the relationship between educational inputs and outputs is uncertain. Hence, there is little conclusive evidence that intensified efforts on behalf of disadvantaged students have improved their cognitive and social development or that educational gains yield long-run benefits.

The limited and very early evaluations of Head Start indicated that statistically significant improvements in achievement were washed out later when students returned to an "unenriched" environment. Evaluations of Follow-Through suggested that the gains could be sustained, and even more optimistically, that the programs improved with experience. Though these conclusions are all very tenuous, early childhood education is a societywide phenomenon. Given the underlying societal premise that school is worthwhile for younger children, it is sound public policy to concentrate resources on those most in need.

The effectiveness of elementary and secondary education programs for the disadvantaged is equally uncertain. Early studies were not encouraging but more recent findings suggest notable successes. This may reflect the fact that the programs have improved. Compensatory education resources were initially diverted for noneducational purposes and for nondisadvantaged students, but tightened controls have reduced waste and misallocation. Until proven otherwise, there is reason for guarded optimism about the current overall impact of the effort.

Federal aid for higher education can stand on its demonstrated merits. The value of the sheepskin has been documented. The test of success is whether resources are concentrated on those most in need, whether their college attendance has increased, and whether they are able to continue until graduation. By these standards, there has been a high measure of success.

Manpower Services

Training, education, counseling, placement, work experience, and other manpower services can improve the attractiveness of disadvantaged workers to employers and can help open doors to better jobs. Evidence suggests that participants improved their wages and job stability. Further, the value of projected future earnings increments exceeded the average cost of the programs. Society's investment in human resources has been profitable.

Institutional vocational training has been most carefully studied, and the findings indicate beneficial effects despite the usually short duration and a frequent absence of linkages to subsequent jobs. On-the-job training has an even greater payoff as measured by benefit/cost studies because the participant is able to earn while learning and usually is guaranteed employment upon completion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More intensive remedial efforts such as the Job Corps have had mixed success. The Job Corps has not demonstrated that the average street-hardened youth can be rehabilitated by six or nine months of intensive aid in a specially structured center; the program has shown, however, that at least some will seize the opportunity and benefit substantially. The assertion that the disadvantaged are trapped by their backgrounds or by labor market realities is subject to all-important exceptions and modifications. Many can be helped, and even if the improvements are only moderate, on the average, they are well worth the effort as long as better proven options are unavailable.

Civil Rights

One of the primary aims of the Great Society was finally to secure the fundamental rights of blacks. Along with its impressive legislative record, the administration exerted its leverage in the marketplace and its power as a rule setter while the courts expanded the government's responsibilities and prerogatives. The Nixon and Ford administrations were less forceful, some critics argue. Nevertheless, the stalling points such as employment quotas or busing to end de facto segregation were far different from those of the early 1960s when the rights, rather than the corrective measures, were being debated.

The salutary effects of these civil rights advances were not difficult to ascertain. Black registration and voting increased, with a visible payoff in office holding. Equal employment opportunity efforts had little direct effect in the 1960s, but the screws were tightened considerably in the 1970s. De jure school segregation was largely eliminated and busing to achieve racial balance became widespread despite fervent opposition in some cases and repeated efforts in Congress, with administration prodding, to proscribe busing as a weapon in combating segregation. Fair housing machinery provided legal backing for some victims of discrimination, but little leverage to overcome patterns and practices was included in housing acts or administrative decisions.

While attention was focused on racial issues, there were other areas of advancement. At the beginning of the 1960s, recipients or potential recipients of governmental aid were dependent on the whim and caprice of government bureaucracies. Antipoverty legal efforts established the principle of due process under social welfare programs and pressed the notions of equal protection and welfare as a right, chalking up some noteworthy victories in overturning the man-in-the-house and state residency restrictions.

The neighborhood legal services program was a vital tool in combating poverty, establishing new rights through law reform as well as providing traditional legal aid. Suits on behalf of clients against state and local governments got the program into political hot water. However, since the courts decided most cases in favor of the poor, the program was criticized for its effectiveness and not for its shortcomings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Community Action

Maximum feasible participation—an ill-defined and much maligned goal—was a basic approach of the Great Society. The aim was to give minorities and the poor a degree of organizational power in order to change institutions, to protect their interests, and to design innovative strategies to serve themselves. Community action agencies, model cities, concentrated employment projects, neighborhood health centers, and community development corporations, though no more participatory or democratic than other groups in our society, had the express purpose of representing the needs of the poor. In doing so, it was necessary to step on firmly entrenched toes, and this generated antagonism, as did efforts to bring about institutional change. Friction was an inevitable ingredient in the process, and though new community leaders sometimes made a virtue of antagonizing the establishment, conflict was mainly rhetorical. Community groups initiated a number of innovative approaches and were condemned for the waste and high failure rate implicit in experimentation. Yet many of the seeds bore fruit locally and nationally.

The community-based programs defy rigorous assessment because of their diversity, but the more narrowly focused efforts can be compared with alternative approaches. Neighborhood health centers, for instance, provided care at roughly the same cost as established institutions. The quality of care was equal, but accessibility and amenability were greater. Health centers used paraprofessionals and took other steps to reach out to those in need, increasing the level of usage. Community development corporations were no more successful in establishing viable businesses in poverty areas than other establishment-run efforts, but the CDC's helped organize the neighborhood and generated short-term employment and income for the poor.

Improving the Status of Blacks

As a result of Great Society civil rights and other initiatives, blacks made very substantial gains on a number of fronts during the 1960s. The purchasing power of the average black family rose by half. The ratio of black to white income increased noticeably. The Great Society's efforts were instrumental in generating advancement. But relative black income fell during the 1971 recession and did not recover subsequently.

Earnings were the primary factor in the income gains made by blacks, although income support and in-kind aid also rose. Blacks moved into more prestigious professional, technical, craft, and secretarial jobs previously closed to them. Earnings rose absolutely and relatively as discrimination declined. Sustained tight labor markets, improved education, manpower programs, and equal employment opportunity efforts all played a role.

The improvements in schooling were dramatic and consequential. Black preschoolers were more likely to enroll than whites, largely because of federally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

financed early education programs. High school completion increased significantly and compensatory programs provided vital resources to the schools where black youths were concentrated. At the college level, absolute and relative enrollment gains were dramatic, the direct result of government aid programs.

Economic and social progress was not without serious drawbacks. Dependency increased, the black family was buffeted, and already high crime rates accelerated. Without minimizing the negative spillover, there is clear proof that blacks were far better off before the advent of the economic slump than a decade earlier. There is a long way to go to equality and progress has been uneven, but advances have been made.

Fighting Poverty

While the war on poverty was not unconditional, it was more than a mere skirmish. The Economic Opportunity Act programs were only one—and not the primary—front in this assault. The Great Society's economic policies, which combined tight labor markets with structural measures such as minimum wages and manpower programs, helped the employable poor. Welfare, social security, and in-kind aid focused on persons with limited labor market attachment.

The number of poor declined sharply in the 1960s then leveled off. The early declines were achieved by raising the income of the working poor, and their place was taken by female heads with little opportunity for self-support. The combination of deteriorating labor markets, declining numbers of working poor, and accelerating family breakups caused poverty to level off despite the fact that the government's antipoverty expenditures continued to rise in the 1970s.

The continuance of poverty does not mean government efforts have been ineffective. In 1971, 43 percent of the otherwise poor were lifted out of poverty by income transfers, compared with 30 percent in 1965. In-kind aid and services going to the poor are not included as income in the poverty measurements, yet they cost more than the cash poverty deficit. If victory in the war on poverty means providing the minimal standard of living, then the war has very nearly been won, though some battles remain to be fought.

Achieving Full Employment

The economic setting is a crucial determinant of social welfare policy. The Great Society's expanding efforts could be afforded, despite the drain of the Vietnam war, because of the healthy growth dividend. Manpower development, equal employment opportunity, and economic development efforts worked best in a tight labor market. Inflation and rising unemployment in the 1970s increased needs and at the same time reduced society's ability to pay. A fundamental question is whether economic growth and full employment can be achieved through governmental action.

It is ironic that in the economically troubled 1970s the successes of the 1960s

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were quickly forgotten and even condemned. The Johnson administration placed highest priority on achieving rapid growth and low unemployment. It succeeded, and prices rose slowly (at least by mid-1970s standards). The Nixon and Ford administrations acted on the premise that added joblessness was necessary to combat inflation and to provide a foundation for measured growth. Unemployment rose precipitously and growth declined, but prices continued to rise rapidly. Common sense would suggest that something was being done right in the 1960s, which was not in the 1970s, and prudence would caution against accepting the claims of policy makers and economists anxious to pass the buck for their own dismal record. Common sense would also question the effectiveness of the strategy of combating inflation by increasing unemployment.

The charge that the Great Society's excesses were the primary cause of the mid-1970s economic difficulties does not square with the facts. Needed restraint was not exercised during the last few years of the Johnson administration and inflationary pressures built up. It is entirely possible that the end-of-the-decade recession could have been moderated or even avoided with more timely action. The Nixon game plan was to let the recession run its course and clamp down on spending. But as the 1972 elections approached, a choice was made to spur the economy. Excessive stimulation and the decontrol of wages and prices led to inflation. The international oil and food crises then continued to push up prices while a combination of governmental restraint and international recession dramatically increased unemployment. The Great Society might be blamed for contributing to the 1969–1971 slump, but subsequent policies have missed the mark far more and, together with international events, must bear the blame for the deepening malaise.

The theoretical basis for shifting blame has always been suspect, suggesting a sophisticated witch hunt more than sound analysis. Apologists for the 1970s recessions have argued that there is a natural rate of unemployment. Demographic changes in the labor market have allegedly raised the potential equilibrium so that unemployment of 5 percent or higher must be accepted. Pushing the aggregate rate below this level in the 1960s, it is claimed, set off a price explosion. The statistical evidence for these assertions is rather shaky at best, and it certainly cannot justify the massive joblessness that prevailed in the mid-1970s. To dismiss structural measures such as manpower training, public employment, and economic development as if the public policy trade-offs were set in concrete is merely to ensure that they will be. The Great Society's structural programs were not of a scale to change things dramatically, but they were certainly steps forward.

Defeatism about reducing unemployment goes back to the 1950s when similar arguments led to a lengthy period of stagnation. The Great Society demonstrated that a tight labor market could be achieved and maintained for many years. The nation has paid dearly for continuing to ignore this lesson.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Redistributing Income

The money income shares of the highest and lowest quintiles are not much different now than at the outset of the Johnson administration. The aim of the Great Society was not a large-scale redistribution of income, but rather the opening of opportunities for those at the end of the line so that they could gradually pull themselves up. Meanwhile it attempted to provide minimal income, goods, and services for all citizens. From 1960 to 1973, total government social welfare spending rose by 5 percentage points of GNP and needs-based aid by less than 2 percentage points. This was certainly a modest effort at redistribution through direct transfers. The subsequent recession lowered GNP while raising transfers, but the lower income quintiles lost ground relatively because they were hardest hit by the loss of jobs.

Offsetting the recession-related increase in inequality, federal taxes have become more progressive, leaving the poor a larger proportion of income. The continuing expansion of payroll taxes has been detrimental to the working poor, but the burden was alleviated by raising the tax base more than the tax rate and by altering the benefit formula to make it more redistributive. Tight labor markets are unquestionably the most effective redistributive mechanism. Low unemployment in the 1960s, combined with boosts in the minimum wage, helped those at the end of the labor queue. Conversely, the subsequent recession hurt them most.

Much was made in the late 1960s of the squeeze on middle-income families. The culprit was the slowed growth of real earnings and not redistribution of income. During the Great Society, the gains of the poor were achieved by reducing the share of the rich, but the rich were still better off in absolute terms as aggregate GNP grew rapidly. The Nixon administration claimed to champion the forgotten Americans, but its tax and transfer policies did little to improve their status.

The Canons of Gainsayers

A combination of shifting fashions among opinion makers and limited analysis of the facts seems to be responsible for the attacks on the Great Society not only by its opponents, but also by many of its former champions and even its beneficiaries. To assess the effectiveness and value of diverse and complex social welfare endeavors, a judgmental framework is needed. Determinations of statistical significance begin with the articulation of an hypothesis. Using some standard of proof, the evidence may then be tested to ascertain whether contradictions are too frequent to allow acceptance. In assessing performance, one hypothesis would be that a program works, demanding contrary evidence of failure. The converse would be to assume failure and require proof of effectiveness. Different

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

results can be obtained from these different hypotheses when measurements are imprecise and proof equivocal. If clear evidence of success is demanded to discount an assumption of failure, then a positive verdict is unlikely; while if absolute failure must be demonstrated to alter the assumption of success, a more positive judgment is inevitable.

What is the most reasonable hypothesis? A primary consideration must be the danger of drawing the wrong conclusion. Almost all social welfare efforts provide benefits to those who would be worse off without them—extra nutrients, a roof that does not leak, more cash, or preventive health care. To conclude that these goods and services are unnecessary, less important than others which could have been acquired with the same funds, or ineffectively delivered, runs the risk of seriously affecting the welfare of recipients if conclusions are wrong. It may also become the basis for retrenchment or counterproductive change. In evaluating social welfare efforts, the small monetary costs to each citizen must be weighted against the possibly severe losses to particular individuals in need. In considering programs with altruistic goals, the compassionate approach is to assume success until failure is reasonably demonstrated. Critics have frequently stressed economy over compassion.

Questionable Standards

Besides basing judgments on negative hypotheses, critics have applied a number of other questionable standards supportive of their gainsaying. One sure way to support a negative case is to measure the real against the ideal. In support of revenue sharing, for instance, the ideal of a politically accountable and locally adaptable decentralized and decategorized system was compared with the realities of categorical federally run efforts with their inherent administrative complexities. Yet where revenue sharing was tried, it did not significantly alter either adaptability or accountability, while the loss of federal control had some negative consequences.

New and experimental efforts will usually come up wanting when compared to long-standing programs. Most Great Society endeavors got underway in 1965 or later, yet their failure was being trumpeted by the late 1960s on the basis of evidence drawn from the first few years of operation. A longer time period encompassing the evolution of the more successful approaches, the retrenchment of the less successful, as well as the implementation of needed reforms, is required to get an adequate perspective.

Secondary and nonquantifiable goals were frequently ignored, biasing judgments against multipurpose programs. The Great Society efforts usually had multiple aims: to deliver goods and services but also to achieve institutional change, to maximize help for the disadvantaged, and to improve the status of minorities. These were not usually as efficient as programs whose sole purpose was service delivery, but they had more positive spillovers.

While the positive secondary effects of programs frequently were ignored,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the negative secondary effects were often in the spotlight. Opponents and threatened interests were quick to seize on incidents of gross failure. Side effects were sometimes taken as proof of failure even when these were part and parcel of achieving the primary aims. For instance, programs redistributing resources by paying for the needs of the poor were blamed for raising prices, while efforts to supply goods and services directly were blamed for competing with alternative sources of supply which had demonstrably failed to provide for the same clients.

Critics applied contradictory standards to social welfare activities. Opponents railed against large or mounting costs as if these inherently demonstrated failure or else stressed the inefficiencies and exaggerated potential savings. Critics of the opposite persuasion focused on what was not being done—target groups who were not being served and benefits which were not adequate to meet minimal standards. The result was a discordant critical chorus of complaints against excessive spending and demands for expanded aid.

Dynamic processes often were ignored in the focus on the problems of the day. Few approaches are right for all seasons and many Great Society initiatives were dependent on rapid economic growth and low unemployment, becoming less effective in subsequent slack labor markets. Some approaches suitable in the early stages of development were inappropriate or unnecessary later. For example, categorical programs staked out new areas and after expansion set the stage for comprehensive reform. These reforms were pushed by emphasizing previous failures when, in fact, they were only feasible because of the successes in building up a foundation through categorical efforts.

Critics tended to use the tools and perspectives of economists, examining the equity and efficiency of existing arrangements, focusing on the pluses and minuses at the margin and implicitly accepting the status quo. Such emphases and methods, presumed to be purely objective and completely rational, were inherently biased. One of the most frequent charges against the Great Society's social welfare programs was their inequity. Geographic disparities and uneven treatment of client groups were inherent in building a system from the ground up. Variations in living conditions and values permitted only gradual standardization. Analysts frequently assumed that inequalities were necessarily inequitable and reprehensible, when in fact they stemmed from a decentralized approach to determining what was equitable.

Great Society programs were also criticized for inefficiencies. If a program aims to change institutions, to experiment with new approaches, or to let a hundred flowers bloom, then it is bound to be inefficient. Change is not an efficient process.

During the Great Society, social analysts and humanists balanced the views of the economists. The latter triumphed in the subsequent years (despite their dismal record in their own area of expertise) because they provided apparent rigorousness and raised the hard-nosed questions consistent with the Nixon and Ford administration philosophies. The result was a deemphasis of nonquantifi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able ends, of social and economic change, and of dynamic rather than static analysis.

An Example of Negative Thinking

The critical fallacies are perhaps best illustrated in the critique of the income support system. The performance of welfare programs tended to be measured against an idealized comprehensive system devoid of inequities or inefficiencies, a system in which all those in need would be given cash aid without work disincentives and without any negative spillovers on family stability. Advocates of guaranteed income schemes tended to brush aside fundamental questions of work disincentives, the role of in-kind aid, the difficulties of altering disparities, and many other critical issues. The existing system was contrasted with and found deficient relative to an alternative which was unrealistic and unattainable, as the difficulties of reforming aid for the aged, blind, and disabled demonstrated.

Critics usually ignored constructive processes in their efforts to find fault with the welfare system. Over time, variations among areas were significantly reduced, standards were raised to near the poverty level, and most of the defined universe of need was reached, yet there was little recognition of these achievements in the debate over the welfare mess.

Critics overemphasized the negative spillovers on work and the family. As welfare standards approached or exceeded wages available to potential clients, some chose to stop or reduce work. While some left the labor market, the supply of workers was still excessive and unemployment rates for the unskilled remained at high levels. Although paid labor may have been reduced, it is still a presumption in our society that children are better off with a mother's care and supervision.

The income support programs have been judged by contradictory standards, criticized simultaneously for costing too much and doing too little. Conservative critics focused on in-kind and cash packages which exceeded prevailing wages in some states. Liberal critics focused on the benefits in other states which fell below subsistence levels. These groups joined hands briefly under the banner of welfare reform when conservatives were convinced that the extension of benefits to male heads was the only way to check the growth of AFDC. When the costs became apparent and growth slowed on its own account, there was a parting of company.

The influence of economists was predominant in the welfare reform debate. The work disincentives issue was argued in terms of trade-offs between lower marginal tax rates, income guarantees, and costs, glossing over the evidence that the 1967 changes which made work more profitable for those on welfare had resulted in almost no increase in work and that training and employment programs for mothers on AFDC accomplished little because jobs were not available. Focusing on the margin where work and welfare overlap, broader realities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such as expanding help to increasing numbers of needy and consequent slowing growth were ignored.

Beyond the Welfare State

The "big gun" of critics, wheeled out to shore up weak arguments or when all else fails, is the specter of an all-consuming welfare state. However affluent, the nation cannot afford a continuous expansion of social welfare efforts at the rate of the previous decade. The extrapolation of the 1965–1975 trends led the critics to the inevitable conclusion that the rising welfare expenditures would lead the government to tax employed workers to the poorhouse in order to support idlers. But is such expansion ineluctable or needed?

The social welfare explosion during the previous decade resulted from rapidly rising benefit levels and expanded eligibility. There were millions of deprived persons who qualified for aid. Once they had been helped, the growth momentum slowed. By the mid-1970s, public assistance was reaching almost all the low-income aged, blind, and disabled, as well as most needy female-headed families. Health programs also treated most of the indigent. The food stamp program expanded rapidly to serve an increasing share of the eligible population once standards were liberalized in the early 1970s. After this rapid saturation process, the pressure for expansion eased. There was a distinct leveling off in 1973 and 1974.

Spending accelerated thereafter not because of expanding responsibilities and commitments, but rather because of the severe economic troubles. The combination of rapid inflation and the highest unemployment since the Great Depression forced millions to rely on their social insurance and swelled the number qualifying on the basis of need for in-kind and cash aid. There were no new initiatives on the order of Medicare and Medicaid, assisted housing construction, the war on poverty, or even an old-fashioned WPA-type program. Social welfare expenditures grew because social problems intensified, not because policy makers were openhanded. Real social welfare spending will in all likelihood recede or at least stabilize when the economy recovers.

Once a minimally adequate social welfare system is established, many of the problems which seem so insurmountable dissipate. As in any building process, most of the spillovers occur during early construction and these have already occurred. Many female family heads and disabled males withdrew from the labor force when offered alternative income options, and other low-income families split when welfare provided support for female-headed units. But once welfare levels stabilized in real terms and began to decline relative to earnings, caseload growth slowed and the impact upon work and family diminished. Over the long run, rising real earnings and stable or slowly growing welfare standards will increase the attractiveness of work and stable families.

Once a package of aid is provided that guarantees an income above the poverty threshold, improvements in the system should prove easier. Welfare reform

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

floundered in the early 1970s because the costs of establishing an adequate minimum were too great and because some reformers were seeking retrenchment rather than improvement. Eliminating allegedly ineffective approaches proved difficult when their termination would have left former beneficiaries in greater deprivation. Once everyone in need is guaranteed a minimum, it will be easier to substitute one form of aid for another and to concentrate on program performance and effectiveness rather than on dividing too few loaves among the multitudes.

Work disincentives have been a continuing concern, but the problem cannot be attacked until a comprehensive system is in place. Aid to low-income male-headed families, even if packaged so as to maximize work incentives, will still leave some of the less motivated the means to avoid work. If unemployables are provided adequate support, some employables will find ways to qualify. But once the shock effects have been weathered, it will be possible to start improving work incentives without pushing down on the help offered to those who cannot work and to minimize the number of nonworkers by making available attractive jobs.

The choice between public or private provision of goods and services can be more easily resolved once the specter of deprivation is eliminated. As long as welfare standards are inadequate, social insurance programs are pressed into service as transfer mechanisms. Once everyone is above poverty thresholds, the scale and scope of transfer payments can be decided on relative merits rather than on the basis of pressing needs. Similarly the issue of relative versus absolute poverty standards can be addressed directly once a minimum is secured.

Each step we take forward makes the next one easier, while also opening new vistas and opportunities. As President Johnson put it, "The Great Society, is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished work. It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labors."[4]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Control of Eastern Europe: Morality versus American National Interest

ROY E. LICKLIDER

The American policy of opposing Soviet control of Eastern Europe has not been seriously questioned, probably because morality (encouraging self-determination) seems to coincide with national interest (weakening Soviet power). This article contends, however, that the primary American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war. Eastern Europe without tight Soviet control would be very unstable due to disputes between the Eastern European countries, problems of national minorities within such countries, and governments without popular legitimacy. A few of these participants might invite outside assistance. Given the importance of Eastern Europe, some of these invitations would be accepted by the Soviet Union and/or Western Europe. The other side would intervene in turn, and the United States would be drawn into a superpower confrontation with a very real risk of war. If these assumptions are sound, it is in the American national interest to keep the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

The usual moral argument for opposition to Soviet domination is simply that the peoples of Eastern Europe are entitled to self-determination, that this right is denied to them by Soviet control (as shown most clearly in the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian revolts), and that therefore Soviet control should be opposed. The realpolitik arguments are somewhat more complex: removal of Soviet control would deny valuable human, material, and industrial resources to the Soviet Union; would make it more vulnerable to pressure from abroad; would encourage nationality groups within the Soviet Union to push for self-determination, further weakening the government; and would be a major propa-

ROY E. LICKLIDER is associate professor of political science at Douglass College, Rutgers University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ganda blow. Not only would a "free" Eastern Europe thus prevent the Soviet Union from using its resources; it would move toward Western Europe, eventually adding these resources to the Western bloc.[1]

The concept of the national interest is not an easy one with which to work.[2] However, it is generally accepted that it is in the interest of all the people and the government of the United States to avoid a thermonuclear war; there is somewhat less consensus on the proposition that the term also includes foiling any significant threat to the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and social unity of the United States. This study defines the American national interest in terms of these two broad objectives. Applying them to Eastern Europe yields fairly straightforward results. Nothing in the area seems likely to threaten, or even affect, the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, or social unity of the United States; therefore the major American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war.

There is certainly nothing unusual in this argument; apparently it was the reason why American officials decided not to intervene in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, the argument can be pushed one step further to suggest that, if the American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war, then it is also in the American national interest to maintain tight Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

This argument, in turn, is based upon assumptions about (1) the condition of Eastern Europe without such control and (2) the likely reaction of outside states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, to such a condition. Each set of assumptions must be set forth and examined in greater detail.

Instability of Eastern Europe

Removal of Soviet control would allow many of the festering international disputes among the Eastern European states to develop fully. These primarily concern disputed territory, such as Macedonia (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece), Transylvania (Hungary and Rumania), Northern Epirus (Greece and Albania), Kosmet (Albania and Yugoslavia), Dobruja (Bulgaria and Rumania), Eastern Thrace (Bulgaria and Turkey), and Western Thrace (Bulgaria and Greece). These are all in the southern part of the area, but several of the northern states have unresolved territorial disputes with the Soviet Union over Bessarabia and

[1] It is true that recent research into the contemporary political systems of Eastern Europe suggests that they have some basis of support other than the Soviet army and that therefore, by implication, the moral case against them may not be as strong as many Americans have imagined. (See, for example, Alfred Meyer et al., "Legitimacy of Power in East Central Europe" in Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and Peter C. Ludz (eds.), *Eastern Europe in the 1970s* [New York, 1972], pp. 45–86.) Nonetheless, this study assumes that the populations of most of these countries are opposed to significant aspects of their current governments; indeed the consequences of this assumption are central to the argument.

[2] James N. Rosenau, "The National Interest," in his *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1971), pp. 239–249.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Northern Bukovina (Rumania), East Prussia (East Germany), Eastern Galicia (Poland), and Carpatho-Ukraine (Czechoslovakia).

Such territorial problems, while serious in themselves, are less significant than the factors that make for internal instability within these states. The two most obvious are the problems of national minorities and unpopular governments. While some of the national minority problems have been settled by the Soviet Union by forced migrations and new national boundary lines, many remain potential trouble spots. Yugoslavia is the extreme case, with a veritable smorgasbord of ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians (Bulgarians), Moslems (Bosnians), Albanians, Hungarians, Montenegrins, and Turks. Even twenty-five years of rule by a nationally respected leader has not solved the Yugoslav ethnic problem. Other similar situations include the Turks in Bulgaria; Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians in Czechoslovakia; Ghegs and Tosks, along with a small number of Greeks in Albania; Germans in Hungary; Ukrainians in Poland; and Hungarians and Germans in Rumania.

Pious hopes that such outmoded internal divisions will disappear seem confounded by their reappearance in Western Europe and North America, and there is good theoretical reason to believe that economic development, particularly in its later stages, tends to increase rather than decrease the importance of such divisions.[3] The impact of a Soviet withdrawal on this kind of problem may be seen during both the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian revolts. In 1956 Czechoslovakia and Rumania took stern measures to prevent their Hungarian minorities from being "infected" with the plague from Budapest, and even Yugoslavia showed concern. The Kadar government had to loudly disclaim any irredentist goals after Warsaw Pact troops had placed it in power. During the few months of civil liberties in Czechoslovakia in 1968 there was a good deal of conflict between the Hungarian minority and the Slovaks about the new constitution that was being drafted.[4]

These problems of national division might be overcome by agreement on a set of governing institutions in each country. Unfortunately the institutions of Eastern Europe have been copied from and imposed by the Soviet Union; they would almost certainly have to be changed significantly. Of course the overthrow of government following the departure of a colonial power is hardly novel. But Soviet control has also deprived these countries of the resource used, with varying success, to bridge the gap of legitimacy from old to new institutions: the charismatic leader with a national political base. It is striking that Nagy and Dubcek seemed cut from the same cloth—good but colorless men who developed no particular personal support aside from their roles as symbols of resistance to the Soviet Union. Therefore the only way in which a new leader could gain support would be to appeal to the very ethnic groups that threaten internal stability.

[3] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 123–164.

[4] Robert R. King, *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 79–90, 115–123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Actually these three kinds of problems can be separated only analytically; in practice they reinforce one another. Thus, Eastern Europe without Soviet control would be a series of states torn by internal conflicts over governmental institutions and competing nationality groups, with a large number of possible points of external conflict, ruled by leaders with no national constituency or legitimacy. Some recent empirical research tentatively supports the intuitively plausible notions that political leaders in such a situation are likely to exacerbate international tensions to create internal unity and that the same governments are easily weakened by intense international conflict.[5] Moreover, in conflicts between such weak forces, there is a strong incentive for the participants to involve outside powers.[6]

But this is only half of the argument. Even if this set of assumptions is accepted, it is still not clear why this instability is a threat to the American national interest. Experience with decolonization suggests that instability is a common phenomenon; this may increase our confidence that it will occur, but it leaves unanswered the question of why none of these experiences has yet produced a world war. What is the link between instability in Eastern Europe and thermonuclear war?

Theorists who support the idea of a "power vacuum" would argue that, with the removal of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States would attempt to establish their own hegemony over the area, that the Soviet Union would resist these efforts, and that the likelihood of war would increase. This theory, however, does not explain why there have been no superpower wars as a result of decolonization in Asia and Africa. Indeed, with the exception of the Middle East, both superpowers seem to be losing interest in most of the Third World, in direct contradiction to the classic power vacuum theory.

The rise of nationalism all over the world has meant that power vacuums are not vacuums at all; the cost to even a superpower of occupying such areas has increased considerably because of the greater likelihood of national resistance. Shifts in the general international view of conquest and support for the right of self-determination, reflected at least for Western democracies in lack of domestic support for such acts, work in the same direction. Moreover, in most of the Third World countries the benefits of such conquest do not seem overwhelming to either superpower. The result has been a general decline in interest in these areas. The one exception may be the Middle East, where the benefits of intervention appear to be unusually high; it is interesting that this is one of the few places where superpower detente is seriously threatened.

[5] Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations" in William D. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (eds.), *A Multi-Method Introduction to International Politics* (Chicago, 1971), pp. 197–198.

[6] For an interesting theoretical model of this process, based upon historical events in the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syn-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reaction of Outside Powers

An unstable Eastern Europe, unlike Asia and Africa, could not be ignored by Western Europe and the Soviet Union; it is simply perceived as too important. (At least the Middle East is vital only to the West.) In terms of location, it has served as an invasion corridor in both directions for the past thousand years. Most of the Communist governments of the world are contained within its borders, and their downfall would certainly be a shock to the Soviet Union. It has ethnic ties with the areas of both sides, and it is potentially a major industrial center. All of this might not matter if it were controlled by a group of stable, neutral governments such as Austria or Finland, but this is unlikely. It is the combination of perceived importance and internal instability that makes outside intervention so likely.

The second assumption, then, is that the Soviet Union or Western Europe would eventually succumb to the temptation to intervene in the internal quarrels of Eastern Europe, probably by invitation. The other side would intervene in turn, and this would surely involve the United States. The result, as stated earlier, would be a superpower confrontation in Eastern Europe with a very real chance of thermonuclear war.

An illustrative scenario may clarify this kind of process. East Germany dominates an independent Eastern Europe. A coalition of other countries forms against it. Rumanian actions directed toward Germans living in that country trigger East German economic sanctions. The Soviet Union steps in, being strongly opposed to German domination of Eastern Europe, and threatens war. West Germany finds it difficult to remain out of the conflict and covertly allows volunteers to go to East Germany. This in turn leads to an ultimatum from the Soviet Union to West Germany, which forces the United States to take a strong stand.

The point is not the likelihood of this particular sequence of events; rather, something like it seems an almost inevitable result of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Given the consequently higher risk of thermonuclear war, such an action does not seem to be in the American national interest.

Conclusion

Let us summarize the argument. The primary American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war. If the Soviet Union withdrew from the area, it would be extremely unstable. Given the importance of the area, there would be outside interventions; these would escalate into superpower confrontations and possibly thermonuclear war. Therefore it is in the American national interest to keep the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

---

drome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development," *World Politics*, 23 (July 1971), 665–683.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After all of this, it may come as a shock to learn that this is not necessarily an argument favoring an American foreign policy directed at encouraging the Soviet Union to remain in Eastern Europe. It is, rather, a demonstration that there is a conflict between morality and national interest in American policy toward Eastern Europe. Of course, many would argue that the national interest should guide foreign policy at all times. However, morality is and sometimes should be more important than national interest, as it apparently has been in American policy toward Israel. While this author's inclination is to support the national interest in the case of Eastern Europe, it is a very difficult choice. The point is that a choice must be made.

But isn't this all academic anyway? If we assume that the Soviet Union is going to remain in Eastern Europe no matter what the United States does short of war, why can't we call for self-determination for propaganda purposes? Because the Soviets have been so committed to Eastern Europe, the United States has been able to do precisely this for the past thirty years without facing the dilemma implicit in that policy. There are two problems, however, in simply keeping our present policy goal. First, the situation may change. Major change within the Soviet Union is not out of the question (possibly somewhat more likely than within the United States), and a future Soviet government may be tempted to pull out of the area. This argument suggests that an American government motivated by the national interest would do whatever it could to avoid pressuring the Soviets in this direction.

Second, this position, if adopted, would alter American policy on several particular issues. For example, internal difficulties are expected in Yugoslavia after Tito's death, and several authorities have suggested that the Soviet Union may intervene at the invitation of one faction. This argument suggests that such an intervention would also be in the American national interest and that it certainly should not be opposed. Similarly we may want to recognize formally Soviet control of Eastern Europe, through a mutual security pact if appropriate, and avoid tying economic relations with the Soviet Union to increased freedom for the Eastern European countries, as has been suggested.

It should be noted again that the argument does not prescribe American foreign policy in this way. We may very well wish to support Yugoslavia against Soviet intervention, or not recognize the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, or demand concessions for countries in the area. This argument does indicate, however, that policy makers in this area must come to terms with the choice between national interest and morality and that American policy toward Eastern Europe is not an escape from the "necessity for choice" that is the hallmark of foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Advancing American Interests Through Soviet Control: A Modest Proposal

PIERS PLOUGHMAN

There is a zany logic about Roy Licklider's argument that while morality may lead the United States to favor the removal of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, realpolitik—American national interest—requires us to support continued tight Soviet domination. Licklider contends that since nothing in Eastern Europe seems likely to threaten our territorial integrity, economic prosperity, or social unity, the major American national interest in the area is to prevent thermonuclear war. Removal, or even a weakening, of Soviet control would create a danger of such war; therefore, United States national interest dictates more and better Soviet control.

Let us push this argument one step further. If it is valid in Eastern Europe, why not elsewhere? Would it not be in the American national interest to encourage tight Soviet control of other areas which have yet to experience the full blessings of the Brezhnev doctrine, such as Africa, South Asia, the Far East, Latin America? We may just have stumbled on the universal remedy for the ills of this troubled world.

I

As in the case of Eastern Europe, nothing in the African continent, for example, seems likely to threaten the integrity, prosperity, or unity of the United States; consequently, the purpose of American policy there should be to prevent thermonuclear war. But one look at Africa will reveal a Dark Continent alive with rivalry, conflict, and the danger of war. Unstable, that's what it is. There are all

---

PIERS PLOUGHMAN is a pseudonym for a sometime contributor to the *Political Science Quarterly*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those territorial and other disputes between African countries which the lack of a firm hand at the helm—a lack compounded by the absence of a helm—permits to fester. A representative sample would include the following: the Western Sahara (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania); Eritrea (Ethiopia, Sudan); the territory of the Afars and Issas (France, Ethiopia, Somalia); southern Ethiopia (Somalia); parts of Kenya (Somalia and Uganda); and Namibia (South Africa, Zambia, Angola). Quite a few more could be resuscitated if need be. It is every bit as ominous a picture as Licklider's survey of territorial disputes in Eastern Europe.

Internal factors working for instability in Africa are much the same as in Eastern Europe, and then some. In addition to the familiar afflictions of national minorities and unpopular governments, Africa suffers from racial strife (Rhodesia, South Africa) and various divisive forms of tribalism, compounded by ethnically and economically irrelevant frontiers inherited from European colonialism. Zaire, Angola, Ethiopia, and many other African states are veritable smorgasbords of ethnic groups, certainly no less so than Yugoslavia and Rumania. While some of the national minority and related tribal problems have been settled locally by judicious massacres, as in Burundi or Uganda; by mass emigration, as in Guinea; or by civil war, as in Nigeria; others persist. Africa is full of Macedonias.

As in Eastern Europe, the question of legitimacy in Africa should give us pause. Few of the African governments have a leadership based on popular consent; indeed, most are military dictatorships, practicing varying degrees of oppressive rule.

The dangerous problems outlined above, so uncannily similar to those of Eastern Europe, tend to reinforce one another. As was the case in Eastern Europe before that area came under Soviet control, African political leaders occasionally find it expedient to instigate international tensions in order to create internal unity. Outside powers readily become involved in the resulting conflicts. The Soviet Union has been tempted to intervene in Africa's internal quarrels and has succumbed to the temptation, successfully in Angola and tentatively (though unsuccessfully) in Zaire. American counterintervention in such cases is seldom far behind. The result may yet be a superpower confrontation with a real chance of thermonuclear war (a chance that came all too close to realization in connection with the Yom Kippur war and may do so again over southern Africa). There is no need to invent scenarios.

Following in the steps of Licklider's analysis, the argument falls neatly into place. He argues, with reference to Eastern Europe, that the way to prevent the danger of nuclear war is for the United States to accept, indeed to support, Soviet control over the area and oppose anything that may weaken it. We have shown, with reference to Africa, that Licklider's argument will readily fit other areas that have been growing increasingly unstable, areas where dangerous outside interventions and superpower confrontations may develop. None of these dangers would loom if the Soviet Union were safely ensconced in those areas as it is in Eastern Europe. Therefore, let the Soviet Union assume control over Africa,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia, etc. And if one or two African or Asian countries should be so shortsighted as to sulk in their tents outside the Soviet orbit (presumably imitating Yugoslavia), we should applaud Soviet intervention to remedy such anomalies as being in the American national interest. Similarly, China's misguided repudiation of Soviet control should be rescinded as soon as possible, and the United States should help the USSR bring a repentant Chinese nation back to the fold before its insubordination triggers a thermonuclear war.

Similar arguments may, with a bit of ingenuity, be applied to justify, indeed to demand, the Finlandization of Western Europe—or its Czechoslovakization while we are at it.

II

Enough of facetiousness. The trouble with Licklider's argument is that it employs a simplistic and totally inadequate definition of the United States national interest. If our national interest were reducible to the avoidance of thermonuclear war, then there would be a simple way to satisfy it: shun any conflict of interest with a thermonuclear power. If an aggressive big power were to try to take control of another continent as the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe after World War II, acquiesce. If that power should succeed in its design, avoid any attempt to weaken its sway, on the grounds that to do so would cause a danger of thermonuclear war.

Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on one's point of view, the world is not all that simple. First of all, if thermonuclear war is the greatest danger, it is so for the Soviet Union as it is for the United States, and Soviet leaders are fully aware of that. It takes two to create superpower conflicts, and this realization has operated as a salutary rein on their foreign policies. That is why the United States refrained from actively assisting the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian revolts, while the Soviet Union displayed restraint in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal. Both sides showed some restraint in dealing with the Yom Kippur war. Detente seeks to institutionalize restraint as a matter of policy. The question is not who wins the game of "chicken," but rather, is that game really necessary?

Far from exorcising the specter of thermonuclear war, a policy of appeasement or surrender only generates more, not fewer, demands and weakens, instead of strengthening, the factors working for reasonable settlements of outstanding problems. This would quickly, as happened in 1936–1939, bring the dogs of war closer to our doors rather than chasing them away. And where, as in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union seized control in the past by conquest or stealth while the Western powers were otherwise engaged, the least we can do is to maintain the position that such behavior remains unacceptable and must not recur. Any other position would be regarded as clear notice that an attempted replay—in Africa, the Far East, or elsewhere—would not be effectively opposed. The significance of this kind of message would be lost neither on our potential antagonists, nor on our friends; indeed, it would cause the latter category to shrink

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drastically. This is no mere question of morality versus realpolitik. It is a question of the kind of world in which our society would have a chance of surviving in the long run without jeopardizing its most vital interests as well as its most precious values.

Continued peaceful Western advocacy of a relaxation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe should not be equated with an open-ended commitment to weakening the USSR, impairing its vital interests, or changing European borders. Self-determination can and should be combined with a recognition of the Soviet Union's very real security needs in the area. Soviet security is no more seriously impaired by the independent policies of a Yugoslavia or Rumania than ours has been by Gaullist France, and should not be invoked to justify any attempt to reassert control over those countries, or over China. A return to the cold war policies of expanding Soviet control would indeed exacerbate tensions to the danger point, and would spell the doom of detente and all its works.

The alternative to Licklider's prescription is neither a policy of militant "liberation," nor one of global surrender, nor a commitment to moralism. It lies rather in the single-minded pursuit of an open world in which no power would feel its vital interests endangered if Italy chose to include Communists in its cabinet or if Czechoslovakia chose to include democratic socialists like Dubcek in its council of ministers. Forcible Soviet control of Eastern Europe, with its denial of the right of self-determination and its insistence on an irreversible and monolithic political system in that area, is an obsolete remnant of the policies of cold war confrontation and hostility. It is high time it were replaced in Eastern Europe, and it would be tragic if a similar pattern should take root in other parts of the world.

There is, of course, a significant kernel of meaning in Licklider's argument: namely, that a system of independent and sovereign states is inherently unstable and dangerous, and that the problem of maintaining international peace and security in a system that lacks a central sovereign authority has yet to be resolved. A hegemonistic system, at least initially, presents the spectacle of peace, stability, and trains running on time, though it may be the peace of political oppression and the stability of the concentration camp. Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin were in fact successful in preventing open conflicts among the countries that came under their sway, at least as long as their empires lasted. (The United States, despite its huge power especially during the post-World War II period, never sought or achieved comparable control.) But sooner or later the great empires either disintegrate gradually or explode violently, and in the nuclear age this process is fraught with untold dangers. While the United States need not dominate the world in order to live safely in it, it cannot live safely in a world dominated by any other superpower. The task at hand is not the fearful clinging to imperial hegemonies nor the establishment of new ones, but the maintenance of peace and the resolution of international conflict in the existing world of sovereign nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rejoinder to Piers

ROY E. LICKLIDER

Ploughman highlights three important points. (1) The argument that Eastern Europe is different from other areas of the world is central to my thesis; if that argument falls, so does the overall thesis. The case for the distinctiveness of Eastern Europe is made in the article, and the reader must decide whether or not to accept it.

(2) Ploughman suggests that the United States must be opposed to Soviet control of Eastern Europe because it "seized control in the past by conquest or stealth" and that "any other position would be regarded as clear notice that an attempted replay—in Africa, the Far East, or elsewhere—would not be effectively opposed." American national interest does not require opposition to any Soviet aggression ipso facto, unless it threatens the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, or social unity of the United States. Ploughman makes no effort to suggest that they are threatened by Soviet control of Eastern Europe; this is rather like a Soviet leader arguing that since the United States was allowed to invade the Dominican Republic without Soviet opposition it will go on to invade Czechoslovakia. Nor is the notion of dominoes finally falling throughout the world twenty-five years after the Soviet takeover persuasive. Obviously there are links between American action in one part of the world and Soviet expectations in another, but they are much more complex than this simplistic formulation.

(3) My argument assumes that Soviet control of Eastern Europe is likely to continue for the forseeable future. No doubt all empires have collapsed in the past; so have all alliances and indeed most governments, but that does not mean that we should not attempt to maintain NATO or the American political system. Solid evidence that Eastern European resentment is so great as to seriously undermine Soviet control in the forseeable future would undercut my argument. I could find no such persuasive evidence, and I gather that Ploughman could not either.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Gift Membership

Enroll a friend in the Academy of Political Science, and they will receive:

- A year's subscription to the *Political Science Quarterly*, beginning with the next issue—plus this issue free.
- Two additional books a year
- Invitations to all conferences
- A membership card

The recipient will be notified of your generosity.
The membership fee is $16 (student, $12).

Enclosed is my check payable to the Academy of Political Science. Please send a gift membership to:

Name (please print)

Address

City State Zip Code

Names and addresses for additional gift memberships are listed on an attached sheet.

My name

Address

City State Zip Code

2852 BROADWAY / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10025

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia

KENNETH S. CHERN

"The vital importance of 'saving China' cannot be exaggerated," wrote Senator Arthur Vandenberg, as civil war raged between Nationalist and Communist Chinese in October 1948. "But there are limits to our resources and boundaries to our miracles."[1] Vandenberg's despair was part of a signal postwar occurrence: the triumph of the Chinese Communist revolution and the transformation of America and China, traditional allies, into enemies. Analyzing the cold war in Asia, historians have dated widespread American concern with postwar China to the failure of the Marshall mission and the convening of a Republican Congress in 1947. Earlier, the nation was reputedly indifferent to East Asia, while Europe and the Middle East occasioned more visible Soviet-American disputes. This indifference, and the Truman administration's failure to inform the country about critical issues in China, allegedly contributed to the shock and partisanship which gripped Washington following the communization of China in 1949.[2]

This article will reexamine American China policy at the end of World War

[1] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe Alex Morris (eds.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), p. 526.

[2] See Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago, 1971), p. 76; H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea* (New Haven, Conn., 1955), chap. 12; Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948* (New York, 1972), pp. 109–114.

KENNETH S. CHERN, lecturer in history at the University of Hong Kong, has taught at the University of Rochester and at Brooklyn College.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II, in an effort to throw new light on the origins of the Sino-American confrontation. In 1945, a vigorous debate occurred, centering on Sino-Russian-American relations and the postwar order. Racking the State Department at first, the debate was publicized after the defeat of Japan, when United States marines were dispatched to aid the floundering Kuomintang regime; it intensified in November, when Patrick Hurley resigned as ambassador to China, openly attacking the U. S. Foreign Service as procommunist. The subsequent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings—the main forum for the debate—failed to clarify America's options in China before the cold war narrowed her range of choices. A generation later, as the United States tries to formulate a post-cold-war policy toward the Far East, it will be instructive to explore the enduring problems of American foreign policy highlighted by the 1945 debate.

The underlying issue was how America should respond to the Chinese Nationalist and Communist factions, then poised for a climactic power struggle after decades of intermittent civil war. The controversy generated by this issue exemplified the intellectual and political struggle of a pluralistic society to formulate a foreign policy at a time of crisis abroad and domestic uncertainty. Clashing assumptions about the viability of the Chinese factions, their foreign orientations, Soviet intentions, and American interests in East Asia were exposed but not resolved. Conflicts seething within the Truman administration erupted publicly, as contradictions arose between Washington's pacific rhetoric and its military intervention. Unrealized wartime ideals of Chinese unity and democracy exposed the administration to attack by liberals and conservatives urging opposing policies. Widespread confusion and dissension fostered partisanship. Failing to heed either the national mood or its own China specialists, the administration maintained a course set according to unrealistic political and strategic goals. The debate thus foreshadowed the cold war in Asia.

In the debate the United States Senate played a crucial part, befitting its unique role in influencing foreign policy. Ratifying treaties, approving presidential appointments, and (with the House of Representatives) passing legislation, the Senate influences both the attentive public and the policy-making elite which seeks domestic support. In shaping the dialogue that culminated in the December 1945 hearings, four senators were especially significant: Styles Bridges, Arthur Vandenberg, Tom Connally, and Elbert Thomas. Distinguished by their seniority and power within the Senate, their public prestige, and their special interest in foreign policy, these men represented a cross section of the American ideological spectrum. All four sat on the Foreign Relations Committee.[3] In accordance with their political loyalties and their conceptions of the emerging world order, they articulated a wide range of attitudes toward China. An analysis of their interactions will help to explain America's response to the Chinese revolution.

[3] Vandenberg and Connally had been elected to the Senate in 1928; Thomas in 1932; and Bridges in 1936.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Incipient China Lobby

The conservative critique of American China policy was precipitated by Ambassador Hurley's rift with the Foreign Service. An experienced but shallow envoy in President Roosevelt's bipartisan diplomatic system, Republican Hurley had gone to Chungking in 1944 hoping to keep China in the war and to fashion a coalition between the feuding Kuomintang regime and the Chinese Communist party (CCP) for the peace to follow. Optimistic about the Kuomintang's ability to fight Japan and unify China under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, he underestimated the depth of the Chinese factional rift, and he assumed that Moscow would support Washington's initiative.[4] In contrast, most subordinate American diplomats in China—the veteran "China hands"—had shrewdly reported since 1943 that the CCP was ascendant. As John Paton Davies, Jr., argued late in 1944, America must "not indefinitely underwrite" Chiang's "politically bankrupt regime," but must pursue "military and political cooperation" with the CCP, which would "probably inherit North China and Manchuria." Encouraged by Mao Tse-tung's informal feelers for American economic support, John S. Service similarly noted that a dominant CCP might be open to American influence, in view of Russia's "overwhelming presence so oppressively close."[5]

The continuation of such reporting into 1945 infuriated Hurley, who imagined a procommunist conspiracy to undercut his mission and destroy Chiang's regime. Lack of direction from the Roosevelt administration, then intent on the climaxing European war, exacerbated the rift. Bridling under Hurley's censorship, the Chungking embassy staff in February 1945 cabled Washington that America should arm the Communists to help fight Japan; Hurley, home for consultations, secured Roosevelt's support, and soon had his critics transferred out of China. The dying president authorized him to implement the Yalta agreement, in which Stalin had promised to sign a treaty with Chiang in exchange for concessions in the rich Manchuria border region. Hurley thus continued to pursue a coalition on Chiang's terms—prior subordination of Communist armies—and a supporting Sino-Russian entente. When the factions began their postwar death struggle he went home frustrated, resigning on November 27, 1945, and publicly blaming a procommunist State Department for

[4] Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1973), pp. 149–150, 201–202, and chap. 7; Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, N. J., 1953), pp. 221–222.

[5] John S. Service, *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations* (Berkeley, Calif., 1970), pp. 161–187, and chap. 7; John Paton Davies, Jr., *Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another* (New York, 1972), pp. 352, 362–363, 371, 428; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) *1944* (Washington, D. C., 1967), VI, *passim*. For less favorable views of the China hands, see Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 201–218; Walter LeFeber, "New Perspectives on American-East Asian Relations," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXII (August 1973), 679–682.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China's troubles.[6] In the ensuing furor, his most persistent ally was Senator Styles Bridges.

An arch-conservative New Hampshire Republican, Bridges was intensely anticommunist, and profoundly suspicious of the Soviet Union. Repeatedly condemning American acquiescence in Soviet domination of eastern Europe, he also followed the "*Amerasia* affair," from the arrest in June 1945 of John S. Service in Washington for giving classified documents to left-wing journalists, through Service's exoneration and reinstatement in August. Like-minded conservatives, such as importer Alfred Kohlberg, publisher William Loeb, and Congressman George Dondero (Republican, Michigan), simultaneously fretted about "pro-Soviet" influence on American Far Eastern policy allegedly emanating from the press, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the State Department. Others, like Congressman Walter Judd (Republican, Minnesota), and *Time-Life* editor Henry Luce, urged all-out support for the Chinese Nationalists, "the best friends now and the greatest-friends-to-be a nation ever had."[7] Spearheading the first concerted effort of this incipient China lobby, Bridges conferred with Hurley in advance of his dramatic resignation and urged him to "shoot the works"—that is, to release the still secret Yalta agreement which Hurley had helped to implement, as "the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China." Echoed by right-wing newspapers and politicians, Bridges thereafter successfully agitated for public Senate hearings into Hurley's allegations.[8]

At the hearings, Bridges postulated an all-out ideological struggle between communism and Western civilization, with the emerging Asiatic power balance a barometer of that struggle. He stressed America's "very definite moral or ethical obligation" to Chiang, who before Pearl Harbor had fought Japan, while America had supplied steel and munitions to that aggressor. He needled Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that the China hands' suggestion to arm the CCP was a prescription for Chinese civil war. Unable to elicit publicly from Hurley the nature of the Yalta terms, he prodded an evasive Byrnes that it was

[6] Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 188–271; Davies, *Dragon by the Tail*, pp. 379–419; Service, *Amerasia Papers*, pp. 124–126, 186–189; *FRUS, 1945* (Washington, D. C., 1969), VII, pp. 244–246.

[7] *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), pp. 3393–3394, 5316, 5845, A1659–A1660; Styles Bridges to Joseph J. Betley, May 14, 1945, File 94, Styles Bridges Papers (New England College Library, Henniker, N. H.); George Dondero speech, October 10, 1945, and news clippings, File 27, ibid.; Alfred Kohlberg to American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, August 31, 1945, 811.43 Institute of Pacific Relations/8-3145, Department of State Decimal files (hereafter cited as DS), Record Group 59 (National Archives, Washington, D. C.); William Loeb to Dean Acheson, October 6, 1945, 123 Service, John, ibid.; Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley*, p. 266; Paul A. Varg, *The Closing of the Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936–1946* (East Lansing, Mich., 1973), p. 233.

[8] *Congressional Record* (1945), 11110–11117; Bridges statement, November 28, 1945, File 27, Bridges Papers; Patrick J. Hurley to Mrs. Constantine Brown, August 1, 1955, Box 104, Patrick J. Hurley Papers (Bizzell Memorial Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.); Hurley Collection Office Diaries, November 27, 1945, ibid.; *New York Journal-American*, December 4, 5, and 6, 1945.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"rather peculiar" for the powers to reach a "life or death accord" about China in the absence of her spokesmen. Referring to the appointment of General George C. Marshall to succeed Hurley, Bridges hinted that Washington would now press Chiang for "certain concessions" to the CCP in exchange for continued military and financial aid.[9]

From beginning to end, Bridges ignored the strategic implications of his pro-Nationalist posture. In fact, he fell into line with the strong nationwide movement for demobilization, having publicly apologized to constituents in October for its "slow start," while cheerfully forecasting a repatriation rate exceeding 600,000 men per month. This was odd strategy for a man who had supported armament and conscription to combat fascism during 1938–1941, and who now condemned American flaccidity before Communist expansion in Europe and Asia. But it was good politics. Casting "final blame" for Foreign Service sabotage "at the top" of the administration, he termed the Service case "most weird," hinted that high-level pressure had secured a whitewash, and made innuendos about policy subversion in other areas of the world.[10] Combining ideological fanaticism and partisan cynicism, Bridges blamed American diplomats for events in China which lay beyond America's power and will to alter, as the China hands had suggested all along.

Sharing many of the extreme rightists' assumptions, but more open-minded than they, was Senator Arthur Vandenberg. A moderate Michigan Republican, Vandenberg had abandoned his well-known isolationism by stages during World War II, attaining great prestige as his party's chief congressional foreign policy spokesman and a bipartisan link for the new Truman administration.[11] Long hostile to Soviet expansion, he was nevertheless in 1945 more conscious than was Bridges of the need to acknowledge Soviet power on the Eurasian land mass in preference to risking another world war. Conceiving of China as a surrogate for American power in restraining Soviet Asiatic expansion, Vandenberg reciprocated the loyalty of Kuomintang delegates T. V. Soong and Wellington Koo, who supported the American position on all issues at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco early in the year. In November, he decried the "iron curtain of secrecy" surrounding Yalta, while portraying Soviet discomfiture with the American dominated occupation of Japan as "either the reason for Russia's difficulties with us or at least the excuse." At the hearings, he voiced concern over alleged State Department absorption of procommunist ideas. But

[9] U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), pp. 123–133, 141–142, 231–233, 248–252. Unpublished hearings, in Tray 142, Committee Papers, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (hereafter cited as SCFR Papers), Record Group 46 (National Archives).

[10] U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 86–89; 107ff, 120–130, 142–149, 236–244, 252–253; address to Concord Chamber of Commerce, October 1, 1945, File 69, Bridges Papers; "Preparedness and Styles Bridges," File 25, ibid.

[11] See, for example, James A. Gazell, "Arthur H. Vandenberg, Internationalism, and the United Nations," *Political Science Quarterly*, 88, no. 3 (September 1973), 375–394.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he never became obsessed by betrayal. Advised by Hurley of the plan to divulge the Yalta terms, Vandenberg dissuaded him, warning that such an exposé would wreck the imminent Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers concerning a general settlement.[12]

On the other hand, Vandenberg deftly countered the testimony of China correspondent Theodore White, who at the hearings dismissed the possibility of a Foreign Service cabal against Hurley unknown to American reporters in Chungking. "A man," said Vandenberg, "might have a perfectly honest opinion which could be deadly in its impact upon American policy."[13] Suggesting the existence of a legitimate issue, he moved tentatively toward a definition of the clashing alternatives visualized by Americans for revolutionary China. It remained to be seen how political leaders with different viewpoints would react to his probe.

The Reaction Against Intervention

One such leader was Senator Elbert D. Thomas, a liberal Utah Democrat. Formerly a Mormon missionary in Japan and a professor of Asian politics, Thomas in 1945 was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. He counseled recognition of historic Soviet interests in eastern Europe and northern Asia, and he recommended that Britain and Japan retain Hong Kong and Formosa, respectively, while a postwar China developed her natural land power. Lauding "the three greatest social, political, and economic revolutions in the world's entire history, the Chinese, the Indian, and the Russian," he suggested that a traditional imperial balance of power could initially stabilize Asia, while transnational revolutions, given American economic support, stimulated Asian modernization within a collaborative United Nations framework.[14] Thomas thus belonged to a loose group which may be termed the "noninterventionist" school. Ideologically diverse, the group included pragmatic American diplomats; liberals such as editor Laurence Salisbury; and radicals like Congressman

[12] Vandenberg and Morris, *Senator Vandenberg*, pp. 91–236, *passim*; C. David Tompkins, *Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican* (East Lansing, Mich., 1970); *Congressional Record* (1945), pp. 164–168, 6983, 10696–10697, 11313–11314, A534; Vandenberg diary (1945), pp. 3, 20, 42, 49, 50, 53, Arthur H. Vandenberg Papers (William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.); U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 220–221, 228, 320; Hurley to Brown, August 1, 1955, Box 104, Hurley Papers; Hurley to Mrs. George A. Fitch, June 14, 1952, and Hurley to Hiram Bingham, n.d., Box 101, ibid.; Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 427–473, *passim*.

[13] U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 310–311, 315, 318.

[14] "Biographical Sketch," Box 127, Elbert D. Thomas Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.); Thomas to Betty Brunson, March 15, 1945, Box 109, ibid.; Thomas to Charles Corddry, September 17, 1945, enclosing statement, Box 107, ibid.; Elbert D. Thomas, *The Four Fears* (Chicago, 1944), pp. 47–87, 97–103, 111–133, 143, 147–155. Thomas also wrote a Japanese translation of Mormon scripture (1911); *Chinese Poiltical Thought* (New York, 1927); and *Thomas Jefferson, World Citizen* (New York, 1942). He held a Ph.D. from the University of California, and had taught at the University of Utah.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hugh DeLacy (Democrat, Washington). Although, unlike Thomas, many noninterventionists opposed continued colonialism in Asia, his thinking on China was akin to theirs. The noninterventionists deplored Hurley's unqualified support of the Kuomintang faction; they admired the vigor and popular appeal of the CCP; they favored a wartime distribution of supplies to all Chinese willing to fight Japan; and they worried lest an American commitment to Chiang in the event of civil war undermine the Soviet-American entente necessary to stabilize the postwar Far East. As Thomas warned, days before Hiroshima: "If Russia impairs 'the integrity and independence' of the so-called [Chinese] Republic and [the United States] attempts to guard it we can only get ourselves into a third great war."[15]

Noninterventionist fears were confirmed that autumn, when the factional contest to liberate Chinese territory from the defeated Japanese stimulated an American military intervention. Between August and December 1945, an American sea and air lift transported approximately half a million Nationalist troops from Chiang's base in southern China to the north and east. In October, 50,000 United States marines were dispatched to north China to supplement the 60,000 United States army troops already in China. The marines' directive—to occupy strategic areas pending the Nationalists' arrival, without participating in any "fratricidal war"—was contradictory, as their clashes with nearby Communist units demonstrated. In November, General Albert Wedemeyer urged his superiors in Washington either to withdraw American forces or to expand the scope of operations.[16]

The Truman administration agonized between increasing aid to Chiang, on the one hand, and evacuating Japanese armies from north China while leaving the region open to the CCP. Worried by America's rapid demobilization, and sensitive to Stalin's indignation at the exclusion of Russia from direction of the Japanese occupation, Secretary of State Byrnes sought to calm Soviet tensions over China pending the Moscow Conference. Similarly, John Carter Vincent, director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, warned against creating "a *de facto* protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese army under our direction."[17] In contrast, Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Navy Secretary James Forrestal stressed that a Communist entrenchment in Manchuria would leave that region attuned to Soviet foreign policy while eclipsing America's hope for a united China. Recommending American support for a Nationalist occupa-

[15] Thomas, "The Way to the Next Great War," August 2, 1945, Box 99, Thomas Papers; Laurence E. Salisbury, "Our China Policy," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIV (April 25, 1945), 89–92, enclosed with letter, Salisbury to Thomas, April 20, 1945, Box 108, ibid.; *Congressional Record* (1945), A3884–A3885.

[16] Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 355–389, 401; Tsou, *America's Failure*, pp. 308, 341–342; *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 527–721; Lyman P. Van Slyke (ed.), *The China White Paper: August 1949* (Stanford, Calif., 1967), pp. 311–312.

[17] *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 615–617; Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 390–394; George Curry, *James F. Byrnes* (New York, 1965), pp. 148–159; Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 102, 106–107, 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of north China and Manchuria, they argued that the Soviet Union, temporarily occupying Manchuria, could be persuaded to sanction this effort. On November 27, hours before Hurley resigned, the administration finally resolved to keep the marines in place, exert pressure on both factions to coalesce, and threaten Chiang with abandonment unless he compromised.[18] All along, the administration publicly disavowed any "intention . . . to become involved in the internal affairs of China," beyond evacuating the Japanese forces. Accenting the wartime ideal, Vincent told the Foreign Policy Association in New York on October 20 that America wanted a strong, unified, democratic, and commercially accessible China, along with Sino-Russian-American collaboration "for stability in the Far East."[19]

Such soothing rhetoric fell upon a disbelieving Congress and press. On October 16, Representative Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) warned Vincent that the marines' presence might provoke Russia to extend her occupation of Manchuria indefinitely. On November 5, California Democrat Albert Engel told the House of Representatives that the American people would "not tolerate" another war in the Far East: "You cannot help to move troops in a country that is at war, and China does have civil war, without becoming involved on one side or the other."[20] In the ensuing weeks, other legislators, and such newspapers as the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Detroit News*, criticized Hurley's "unjustifiable intervention" on behalf of the Nationalists. On November 26, six congressmen sponsored resolutions for the withdrawal of American forces and munitions from China; the same day, Representative DeLacy attacked Hurley's "blank-check support" of Chiang against the "vigorous new democracy" of the CCP. This speech, allegedly based on State Department leaks, served as a pretext for the resignation which Hurley had already composed.[21]

Simultaneously, resentment against the intervention swept the attentive public. During November, such varied groups as the United Christian Council for Democracy; the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, led by left-wing intellectuals; the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union; and the New York State Communist party, urged dissociation from the "undemocratic and reactionary . . . clique" dominating the Kuomintang.[22] Not only from liberal centers like New York and San Francisco, but from the heart-

[18] *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 606–607, 639–643, 646–647, 664, 670–678, 685–686; Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 396–405.

[19] James F. Byrnes to Ellis Patterson, November 28, 1945, 711.93/11-1445, DS; U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, XIII (October 21, 1945), 644–648.

[20] *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 580–581; *Congressional Record* (1945), pp. A4734–A4735.

[21] Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 265–266; Ellis E. Patterson to Byrnes, November 14, 1945, 711.93/11-1445, DS; *Congressional Record* (1945), pp. 10993–10995, 11007; Hurley Collection Office Diaries, November 20–27, 1945, Hurley Papers.

[22] Leland Stowe et al. to Harry S. Truman, November 4, 1945, 711.93/11-445, DS; Harry Bridges to Robert Patterson, November 10, 1945, 711.93/11-2645, ibid.; Richard Morford to Byrnes, November 10, 1945, 711.93/11-1045, ibid.; Communist party, New York State, to Byrnes, November 13, 1945, 711.93/11-1345, ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land—Illinois, Indiana, Georgia, Texas, Colorado, Hurley's native Oklahoma, and elsewhere—came signals of confusion and alienation. An Ohio congressman complained that his mail and telephone calls were "filled with demands" for an explanation which he was "at a loss" to provide. Some people, mirroring the organized noninterventionists, voiced fear of a confrontation with Russia, or outrage at American succor to a repressive regime. Others, more particularistic, deemed an unstable China—"that rotten country," as one soldier's mother termed it—unworthy of American bloodshed. After Hurley quit, *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* called for a thorough inquiry into the whole affair; many people urged an open examination of General Joseph Stilwell, the former American commander in China, or of the China hands whom Hurley accused.[23] Taking stock, the State Department noted that "large numbers" of communications were "practically unanimous in opposing" the intervention, and that apart from organized Communist and CIO drives, the reaction was widespread and spontaneous. "The use of U. S. troops in China," it concluded on December 13, "is unpopular with the American people."[24]

Amid such confusion, nobody was better qualified to fault the intervention than Senator Thomas. With conservatives and liberals making discordant demands on an uncertain administration, he might have tried, along with Vandenberg, to clarify the issues. Had he spoken for the Chinese revolution or for Russia's border aspirations in East Asia, the conflict with the conservative vision of a united China under Chiang would at least have raised the level of debate. But although he was observant at the first two hearings, during the crisis Thomas refrained from comment as the arch-conservatives impugned the loyalty of diplomats whose judgments closely resembled his own.[25] Ironically, his unaccustomed silence appears to have stemmed from a simmering partisan animosity toward the Republican leadership. Having earlier written to Truman about obstructionism by Bridges, "who incidentally is a Republican and sits very close to Vandenberg," Thomas during the 1946 Congressional campaign would confide to friends:

> Vandenberg has made the boast that since Republicans now run our foreign policy, it is a good policy. I have never . . . believe[d] in ever allowing a national

[23] Mrs. N. B. Honeycutt to Tom Connally, November 21, 1945, Box 103, Tom Connally Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.); William R. Thom to Byrnes, November 23, 1945, 711.93/11-2345, DS; other correspondence in 711.93 and 711.00, November–December 1945, ibid.; news clippings in File 27, Bridges Papers.

[24] Memorandum, S. Shepard Jones to James K. Penfield, December 14, 1945, enclosing report, "Organization Opinion on U. S. Policy toward China as Reflected in State Department Mail," December 13, 1945, 711.93/12-1445, DS. The department analyzed a sample of the mail arriving on December 6, 1945.

[25] U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 1, 70, 97. Under questioning by Senator Theodore F. Green (D.; R. I.), Hurley did not recall earlier referring to John K. Emmerson, a diplomat. "You mentioned Em[m]erson," Thomas interjected. "I wrote it down as you mentioned it." Neither the hearings, the Thomas Papers, nor the *Congressional Record* yields any other comments by Thomas in December 1945 concerning China or Hurley's charges.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> policy to become dependent on . . . leaders of the opposing party, especially when those leaders feel that the lightning from heaven is about to strike them and turn them into Presidents of the United States.[26]

Evidently perceiving in Vandenberg's comments a reinforcement of Bridges' partisan attack, Thomas in December 1945 shunned the last two hearings,[27] stood by the administration, and muted his own perceptive criticism at a crucial juncture in Sino-American relations. In contrast to the persistent conservative lobby for Chiang Kai-shek, his silence reflected the failure of the left to mobilize the widespread feeling against intervention to influence the course of American policy as the debate reached its climax.

Launching the Marshall Mission

The administration's defense against the China lobby fell to Thomas' senior colleague, Democrat Tom Connally of Texas. A conservative New Dealer and internationalist, Connally since 1941 had chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was an exponent of bipartisan foreign policy consultations. Backing the Roosevelt administration's efforts to prop up China symbolically as a "powerful ally," he nonetheless, like Roosevelt, welcomed Soviet entry into the Pacific war and envisioned an Asiatic order based on Russian and American power. Conscious also of Nationalist wheedling for American aid—Madame Chiang herself had lobbied him in 1943, while "lying on a day couch" upstairs at the White House—Connally, after Japan's surrender, counseled against intervention in China. Without a factional reconciliation providing for "the simple economic wants" of poverty-stricken peasants, he warned Truman, "we will either have to pull out of China entirely or fight a full-scale war on the side of Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt and reactionary government."[28] Facing in November an eruption of mail from opponents of the intervention—"Why should my son's life, and those of thousands of other American boys, be placed in jeopardy, in order to force any particular form of government, down the throats of the Chinese people?" asked one Brooklynite—Connally lamely replied that American forces would have no part "in the suppression of civil strife."[29]

[26] Thomas to Truman, August 25, 1945, Box 117, Thomas Papers; Thomas to Willis W. Ritter et al., August 15, 1946, Box 204, ibid.; Thomas to Irving Richter, January 30, 1945, Box 110, ibid.

[27] U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 186, 263.

[28] Tom Connally and Alfred Steinberg, *My Name Is Tom Connally* (New York, 1954), pp. 98, 100, 200, 246–260, 281, 283, 313; *Congressional Record* (1945), pp. 8017, A2341-A2342; Connally speech, January 19, 1945, Box 562, Connally Papers; Connally press statements, February 7, 12, and 14, 1945, ibid.; Connally broadcast, April 5, 1945, ibid.; G. R. Williams to Connally, November 6, 1945, and Connally to Williams, November 9, 1945, Box 103, ibid. See also Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), p. 63.

[29] Herman Horowitz to Connally, November 15, 1945, and Connally to Mrs. W. R. Boswell, November 15, 1945, Box 103, Connally Papers. See other correspondence, ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Torn between his loyalty to the administration and his personal convictions, Connally was infuriated by Hurley's sensational charges against "a clerk or two somewhere in the service who does not agree with him." Attacking Hurley for covering American policy "with obloquy and diplomatic slime," he acceded to Bridges' demand for a public inquiry, so that Hurley might "look some of us in the eye and tell us what are these terrible acts of treachery."[30] Yet it rapidly became apparent that the right-wing leaders were successfully exploiting deep-seated conservative anxieties, much as Henry Luce had hoped in savoring a favorable public response to his recent pro-Chiang *Life* magazine editorials. In opposition to the continuing noninterventionist tide, Connally's mail now revealed an undercurrent of rage at America's leftward drift since the beginning of the New Deal, her vulnerability to Communist subversion, and her failure to combat Soviet expansion. One extremist denounced union racketeers, "the communist press," infiltrators into radio and government, and other "double-crossing skunks"; the *Tulsa Tribune*, among others, touted Hurley for president. Under attack from left and right, the administration resolved to neutralize Hurley.[31]

At the hearings, Connally's interrogation and Byrnes's testimony showed that Hurley had been confused in his thinking, indecisive in the months preceding his resignation, and self-serving in his accusations. When Hurley testified that middle-level diplomats had sought a Nationalist collapse in opposition to presidential policy, Connally responded that American officials at all levels had hewn to a common wartime objective: somehow to unite all Chinese factions against Japan. In this context, Connally dismissed the China hands' abortive proposal to arm the CCP. When even Byrnes admitted that such differences in method, if not in objective, were "serious," Connally called upon China correspondent Theodore White, who testified that all concerned had sanctioned a united war effort, with appropriate lend-lease aid to the Communists. Demanding that Hurley substantiate his gravest charge—that the China hands had "continuously advised the Communists" against interpreting Hurley's course as American policy—Connally drew lame references to leaks and anti-Nationalist reporting. Finally, Connally suggested that Hurley had clashed with General Stilwell, causing that commander's expulsion from China in 1944. Angrily denying any such clash, Hurley termed Stilwell a "fine officer."[32]

Nothing better exemplifies the muddled thinking and partisan dissimulation

[30] *Congressional Record* (1945), pp. 11112–11117.

[31] Garnett Underwood to Connally, December 1, 1945, Tray 142, SCFR Papers; *Tulsa Tribune*, November 30, 1945, ibid.; Connally to Byrnes, December 5, 1945, ibid.; Brynes staement, December 7, 1945, ibid.; Varg, *Closing of the Door*, pp. 226, 233; Truman, *Memoirs*, pp. 65–66; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), pp. 328–329; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 113; memorandum, Walter Brown to Secretary [of State], November 27, 1945, 711.93/11-2745, DS. See also Box 103, Connally Papers; Boxes 93, 94, Hurley Papers; Tray 143, SCFR Papers.

[32] U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 8–9, 15–17, 38–47, 74–75, 82–84, 89–90, 179–181, 184–185, 223–226, 234, 240, 253–261, 310–312, 316–326, and *passim*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surrounding American China policy than the paradox of Connally denying dissension on China, yet probing Hurley on a serious difference with Stilwell; while Hurley, basing his indictment on fundamental rifts, refused to acknowledge any divergence with that popular general, who long had disdained Chiang.[33] In minimizing dissension, Connally hoped that policy would unfold within the prudent framework of bipartisan consultations. Eschewing the expert testimony that many people demanded, he helped to smother the public dialogue which, in other cases, was the hallmark of bipartisanship's vitality. Ridiculing Hurley's indiscriminate charges, he dampened the conservative protest. While nationwide interest persisted during the hearings (December 5–10), the mail ran strongly against Hurley, whose pro-Nationalist critique drew noninterventionist wrath away from the administration. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy wired Connally: "More power to you and treat him rough." Relieved by the outcome, Connally gloated that "Pat's fiasco did not confer any credit upon him. All we had to do was let him rave." By mid-December, tension over China eased, as the flood of critical letters rapidly shrank to a trickle.[34]

As the China debate developed, Washington launched the new mission which had been only vaguely formulated when Hurley quit. General George C. Marshall, the prestigious wartime army chief of staff, was appointed to head the mission, partly to "take the headlines away from Hurley." In early December, Marshall's tactics were outlined, with the State Department and the army dividing over the relative emphasis to be given the coalition initiative and military operations to secure north China and Manchuria. While this problem was left to Marshall's discretion, the ultimate dilemma persisted: what to do if he failed to secure "a conference by Chinese leaders and a cessation of hostilities." Vincent and Byrnes argued that if the Communists were to blame, America should aid Chiang to occupy north China; but if the Nationalists were at fault, the United States should evacuate the Japanese from north China, abandoning the region to the CCP. Unsatisfied, Marshall persuaded Truman and Byrnes that Washington must side with Chiang if he proved obdurate, lest "a divided China" and Soviet ascendancy in Manchuria thwart "the major purpose of our war in the Pacific." But with his objective precisely to forestall such a crisis, Marshall could exploit Chinese uncertainty, threatening the Kuomintang with a cutoff even as he menaced the Communists with massive aid to Chiang.[35]

There were two additional preconditions for Marshall's success: Soviet good-

[33] See Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York, 1970); Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley*, pp. 134, 155–161.

[34] Ilona Ralf Sues to Connally, December 7, 1945, and Connally to Harry B. Hawes, December 17, 1945, Box 103, Connally Papers. See also Trays 142, 143, SCFR Papers; 711.00 and 711.93, December 1945, DS; note 24 above; *The New York Times*, December 6, 7, 8, and 11, 1945.

[35] Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 113; Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 413–415; *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 745–773; Van Slyke, *China White Paper*, pp. 606–609.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will and American public acceptance. The domestic clamor for demobilization, and the refusal of American leaders to court political disaster or risk a confrontation with Russia through a military entrenchment in China, made it imperative to convince Russian leaders that Soviet and American interests could be reconciled in a strong and independent China, open to commerce, and free of foreign military forces. Assurances along these lines by Byrnes and Vincent had not eased Russian alarm about America's presence in north China. At the Moscow Conference (December 16–23), an angry Foreign Minister Molotov insisted that the marines be removed by mid-January 1946, the scheduled withdrawal date for Soviet forces in Manchuria. But a more conciliatory Stalin affirmed Soviet support for Marshall's peace-keeping effort, and Byrnes left Moscow encouraged with the chances for the chimerical coalition.[36]

To domestic critics, the State Department continued its denials of any intention to intervene in China. On December 15, Truman reiterated that "the detailed steps" toward political unity "must be worked out by the Chinese themselves."[37] The nation was responsive. Hopeful for Soviet-American collaboration in East Asia, people were careful not to jeopardize the Marshall mission. The pro-Nationalist Congressman Judd expressed pleasure with the Moscow communiqué, citing its goal of a united, democratic China as his own. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee declined to report on the hearings. Lamented Hurley: "I took a terrific beating not only in the public press but from my friends who believed that I had made charges . . . which I had not upheld." Even Styles Bridges agreed to suspend the State Department inquiry. A hiatus in congressional criticism, lasting several months, signaled the end of the controversy.[38]

The China Debate in Perspective

How much were preexisting American notions about China influenced by the events of 1945? How closely did these notions conform to reality in China, in America, and in world politics? These problems hinge on four basic phenomena in American diplomacy which were exemplified and reinforced by the China debate.

The first phenomenon was a blend of dissension and confusion about the

[36] Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 108; *FRUS, 1945*, VII, pp. 762, 833–850; Department of State, Moscow, to Secretary of State, November 30, 1945, 711.93/11-3045, DS; Department of State, Moscow, to Secretary of State, December 11, 1945, 711.00/12-1145, ibid.; Feis, *The China Tangle*, pp. 424–427; Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 336; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), p. 228.

[37] Byrnes to Jed Johnson, December 10, 1945, 711.93/11-3045, DS; Van Slyke, *China White Paper*, pp. 605, 608.

[38] James Alan Fetzer, "Congress and China, 1941–1950" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1969), pp. 67–70; Westerfield, *Foreign Policy*, p. 254; Hurley to Herbert Heath, December 26, 1945, Box 93, Hurley Papers; Hurley to Wirt Franklin, December 27, 1945, Box 94, ibid.; Hurley to Samuel Crowther, December 18, 1945, ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implications of Soviet power and Chinese instability for the United States. Dissension flowed from a spectrum of domestic political allegiances and from corresponding perceptions of Great Power relationships. Conservatives exaggerated the connection between the Chinese Communists and the Russians, while mistakenly assuming an identity of American and Kuomintang interests. Obsessed with ideology, arch-conservatives overlooked the CCP's indigenous strength, its nationalistic appeal, its long history of troubled relations with Stalin, and its cordial contacts with American officials and journalists.[39] In contrast, liberals more fully understood that Chinese communism had grown out of long-lived misery, misgovernment, and foreign incursion; they perceived that an ideological affinity toward Moscow need not translate into a political alliance against Washington. But the left failed to see that Soviet-American competition for influence was bound to occur in a key country like China. Combining the illusions of left and right were administration officials, who clung to the wartime goal of a pro-American China under Chiang along with a collaborative Great Power relationship in Asia. In a pattern that came to characterize the cold war, the Communist insurgency caused Washington to militarize its Asian policy. A perplexed administration turned to the armed forces and their cabinet spokesmen, who imprudently counseled intervention in a revolutionary situation near the Soviet border.[40]

Related to such confusion was the second phenomenon of American foreign policy: difficulty in the national assimilation of insights developed by perceptive American diplomats. The complexity of Asian politics was best discerned by China hands like John Paton Davies, Jr., who proposed to treat with the CCP —as well as with the Kuomintang, so long as it lasted—in order to encourage a nationalistic Chinese regime to resist "the possessive Russian embrace."[41] Ideology, they knew, is just as easily modified as confirmed by geopolitical realities, particularly in a self-directed regime in a large country. But they exerted no influence on the policy planning which followed the defeat of Japan. Their exclusion from these deliberations stemmed from the nation's traditional attitude toward the Foreign Service, and from the administration's conception of the evolving Asiatic order. Certainly, a cold reception at home was nothing new to America's diplomats, customarily scorned as Europhile "cookie-pushers." Foreign Service officers, some of them brilliant, lived in obscurity, their counsel routinely ignored. During World War II, Roosevelt had dispatched

[39] See Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," *Foreign Affairs*, LI (October 1972), 44–64; Jim Peck, "America and the Chinese Revolution, 1942–1946: An Interpretation," in Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. (eds.), *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 319–355; Kenneth E. Shewmaker, *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927–1945: A Persuading Encounter* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1971).

[40] But see Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy's warning of November 6, 1945, that if America intervened on behalf of Chiang, and Russia in response actively supported the CCP, "then we are 'in a real mess.' " *FRUS, 1945*, VII, p. 607.

[41] Davies, *Dragon by the Tail*, p. 428.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trusted envoys like Hurley around the world; while under the aged Cordell Hull, the State Department had gone frequently ignorant, not to mention impotent. With such a weak base of support, the China hands in 1945 were at a disadvantage, especially after their dispersal in April. Moreover, in doubting both the possibility of Chinese unity under Chiang and the likelihood of Soviet support for such an objective, they challenged the fallacious assumptions underlying the Marshall mission. Calling for an imaginative response to the Chinese revolution, they were deemed irrelevant. Their main ally in Washington, Vincent, was articulate but ineffectual.[42]

In terms of the public debate, the China hands seemed positively dangerous. This administration perception derived from the third phenomenon exemplified by the China debate: the limitations of a bipartisan political system in its self-conscious efforts to educate and unify the country in foreign policy ventures. The administration was caught in a cross fire: with national sentiment overwhelmingly opposed to the Chinese intervention, while the right branded the State Department "procommunist," a candid airing of the issues would have magnified the controversy, thereby undercutting American leverage with the Russians and with both Chinese factions. Seeking a balance between intervention and passivity, the administration justly sought to discredit the Red-baiting of Hurley and Bridges. But in so doing, it further muddled the issues, and forfeited the opportunity for a badly needed reevaluation of the Chinese revolution. Connally made bipartisanship a mask for decisions rather than, as in theory, a conduit to inform the nation and mobilize support behind a plausible foreign policy grounded in the national interest. Little wonder that the respected Stilwell, who confidentially advised Marshall that his mission would fail, was not invited by Connally to refute Hurley. Nor is it strange that in the highly charged atmosphere, Vandenberg, Thomas, and other voices of reason were unavailing.[43]

The final phenomenon—an imprecise correspondence between ideals and power considerations in the formulation and discussion of American foreign policy—was closely related to the problems of confused dissension, Foreign

[42] See Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington"; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), pp. 661–662, 756–757, 834–835; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs (1925–1950)* (Boston, 1967). Hull retired in November 1944. His successor, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was replaced by Byrnes in July 1945. Vincent, counselor of the American Embassy in Chungking in 1942–1943, was named chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs in Washington in 1944, and was appointed director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in 1945.

[43] Tuchman, *Stilwell*, p. 673; Connally to Lewis M. Herrmann, December 17, 1945, Box 103, Connally Papers. At the hearings, Republican Senators Alexander Wiley (Wis.), Warren R. Austin (Vt.), and Henrik Shipstead (Minn.) briefly queried Hurley about "the validity" of American policy, the political and military power of the CCP, the nature of the Chinese factional rift, and the suitability of the term "republic" in reference to the Nationalist regime. But, like Vandenberg, they probed no further. U. S. Senate, *Investigation of Far Eastern Policy*, pp. 72–73, 159, 167–169.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Service alienation, and bipartisan dysfunction. In projecting World War II as a struggle for liberty, self-determination, and collective security from aggression, Washington articulated an ideal of China—a democratic, pro-American pillar of postwar Asian stability. Stimulating morale and endowing the war with a purpose, such idealizations often obscured power relationships on which the postwar order would depend.[44] When such visions were frustrated after the war—whether in Poland, in Greece, in Iran, or in China—various interest groups and policy makers would cite the ideals in an effort to influence the course of American diplomacy. This was an additional cause for the administration to suppress the frank views of the professional diplomats; under attack by angry conservatives, it obfuscated realities which threatened both its continued hopes for China and the image on which it continued to depend to stimulate bipartisan support for postwar policies. Washington's violation of the national self-determination ideal in China, and even more, its incipient involvement in an Asian land war, created widespread skepticism which was only temporarily mitigated by administration tactics.

The Marshall mission used borrowed time for a futile purpose. When the mission collapsed at the end of 1946, Washington tried to disentangle itself from Chungking—but by then, the deterioration of Soviet-American relations cast the Chinese revolution in a far more sinister light. The promulgation of the Truman Doctrine (1947)—a policy designed to secure domestic support for aid to Europe, but couched in terms suggesting Washington's sympathy with all regimes combating Communist aggression or subversion—restricted America's freedom of maneuver.[45] On the offensive now, the Bridges-Hurley group secured from Congress hundreds of millions of dollars for the waning Kuomintang, while campaigning to drive such "procommunists" as Service and Vincent from the government. Vandenberg opposed shouldering a strategic responsibility in China which would jeopardize American security, even as he urged Truman in 1949 not to give the Nationalists a "last push" into oblivion by cutting off their military supplies. Connally championed the European aid programs to combat Soviet expansion, while opposing the efforts of "Chiang-lovers" to increase China aid. Condemning Communist China's Korean "aggression" in 1950, he warned that American engagement in "a shooting war on the Chinese mainland" would free Russia to "subjugate mankind." Thomas, convinced by 1947 that the Nationalists had lost the "mandate of Heaven," felt "very much a minority in my basic thinking"; but by the time the CCP had triumphed two years later, his lingering doubts were eclipsed. Lauding in 1950 "the fight which we and other free nations are making against the forces of Communism throughout the world," he defended America's "firm stand" in Korea, lest the

[44] See Akira Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1974), pp. 101–105; Tsou, *America's Failure*, pp. 33–56; Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York, 1967).

[45] Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine*, pp. 88–104.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

menace subsequently spread to Formosa or Indochina.[46] The conversion even of collaborative internationalists like Thomas symbolized the emergence in America of the cold war consensus. More than thirty years later, long after the Vietnam war had destroyed that consensus, the enduring problems of United States foreign policy continued to affect American efforts to cope with new conditions in Far Eastern and world politics.*

[46] Bridges to Vandenberg, March 24, 1947, Vandenberg Papers; Vandenberg and Morris, *Senator Vandenberg*, pp. 529–532; Connally and Steinberg, *Tom Connally*, pp. 313–316, 338–339, 350–357; Thomas to Frederick C. McKee, February 8, 1950, and Thomas to Mrs. Margaret S. Rowberry, July 7, 1950, Thomas Papers; and materials in Box 105, Hurley Papers.

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago on December 28, 1974. The research was facilitated by grants from the University of Chicago and the Center for Asian Studies, University of Rochester. For advice and criticism I am grateful to Akira Iriye, William H. McNeill, Eugene D. Genovese, Richard D. Challener, Robert Dallek, and John K. Emmerson.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

Recent revelations concerning the scope and purpose of FBI investigations of dissident political activities compel social scientists to examine how the bureau first obtained the authority to conduct these investigations. The FBI's statutory authority is limited to investigating activities of individuals violating or suspected of violating federal laws. Nonetheless, when responding to doubts publicly articulated only during the 1970s, bureau officials claimed the right to investigate "subversive activities and related matters" and based this claim on specified presidential directives of 1936, 1939, 1943, 1950, and 1953. Yet, whatever this nebulous phrase "subversive activities and related matters" means, a review of the actual authority granted by these directives and the background to their issuance raises serious questions about the adequacy of executive oversight of the bureau and about the procedures and objectives of FBI officials. In fact, the 1936, 1939, and 1943 directives did not authorize the FBI to investigate "subversive activities." By misrepresenting the authority granted in the 1939 directive, however, FBI and Justice Department officials succeeded in having Presidents Truman in 1950 and Eisenhower in 1953 issue directives ostensibly reaffirming this authority. Thus, a review of the history of these directives dramatizes how FBI Director Hoover independently defined the scope of the bureau's authority. Director Hoover's success, however, was not merely a case of masterful bureaucratic politics. Rather, it offers insights into the impact of the cold war on American politics and insti-

---

ATHAN G. THEOHARIS is professor of history at Marquette University. He is the author of *The Yalta Myths* and *Seeds of Repression*, coauthor of *Anatomy of Anti-Communism*, and co-editor of *The Specter*. He is presently completing a book-length study of internal security policy covering the years 1936–1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tutions: how the acceptance of the need for secrecy and for deference to "internal security" bureaucrats made possible far-reaching intrusions on individual liberties and the creation of a climate which eventually led to the Watergate affair.[1]

The FBI Rationale

On July 23, 1970, Charles Brennan, head of the FBI's Intelligence Division, informed the Scranton Commission on Campus Unrest that a September 6, 1939, directive by President Roosevelt had authorized the FBI to investigate "subversive activities" and that it was "within the framework of this executive order that basically the FBI over the years has tried to fulfill these responsibilities."[2] In more recent (1974) testimony before the House Committee on Internal Security, however, FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall qualified this claim somewhat. Wannall stated,

> The FBI *interprets* the September 6, 1939, directive as reaffirmed by subsequent

[1] For a differing interpretation of FBI political surveillance authority, see the thoughtful reports (actually authored by Brandeis University political scientist John Elliff, the head of the Select Committee's Domestic Agency Task Force) of the U. S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Reports, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans* (hereafter cited as *IARA*), Book II, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1976), pp. 21–22, 24–36, 45–46, 127–136; *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans* (hereafter cited as *SDSR*), Book III, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1976), pp. 375–558. This author is presently completing a book-length study of internal security policy during the years 1936–1976, one chapter of which will discuss FBI political surveillance authority in greater detail by extending this analysis beyond 1953.

[2] Brennan's testimony is cited in John Elliff, "The FBI and Domestic Intelligence," in Richard Blum (ed.), *Surveillance and Espionage in a Free Society* (New York, 1973), p. 25. Bureau officials offered the same rationale in testimony before the Senate Select Committee and in an October 28, 1975, memorandum analyzing the FBI's "domestic security intelligence investigations" authority which the bureau submitted to the Committee. U. S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Hearings on Intelligence Activities* (hereafter cited as *HIA*), Vol. 6, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C., 1975), pp. 547–575 and particularly pp. 560–575. Other students of the FBI, whether or not agreeing that these directives provided such authority, concur that the directives constitute the sole basis for FBI political surveillance authority. See Frank Donner, "Hoover's Legacy: A Nationwide System of Political Surveillance Based on the Spurious Authority of a Press Release," *The Nation*, June 1, 1974, pp. 678–699, and Jerry Berman and Morton Halperin (eds.), *The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies* (Washington, D. C., 1975). See also, Elliff, "The FBI and Domestic Intelligence," pp. 21–22; Richard Cotter, "Notes toward a Definition of National Security," *Washington Monthly*, December 1975, pp. 4–16; Don Whitehead, *The FBI Story* (New York, 1959); Victor Navasky, *Kennedy Justice* (New York, 1970), p. 36; and the essays by Vern Countryman, William Turner, John Elliff, and Thomas Emerson in Pat Watters and Stephen Gillers (eds.), *Investigating the FBI* (Garden City, N. Y., 1973), pp. 49, 51, 114, 256, 261, 419. Even the U. S. Supreme Court reached this conclusion in *Pennsylvania* v. *Nelson* when ruling that the federal government had preempted state sedition laws. 350 U. S. 497 (1956), 504–505.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> directives, as an instruction "to take charge" and "correlate" investigative work [relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters], not as a grant of new or additional authority. . . . Thus, the FBI views President Roosevelt's September 6, 1939, directive as an instruction that the FBI is to be the executive agency which will "sift out" and "correlate" security investigative matters as a clearinghouse, keeping for itself matters falling within its own investigative jurisdiction, and referring to other executive agencies those matters falling within their respective jurisdictions.

Wannall had not concluded that the FBI lacked the authority to investigate "subversive activities." Rather, he based this authority on an earlier August/September 1936 *oral* directive by President Roosevelt: "the President requested that investigations be made of subversive activities," the assistant director claimed.

> Going back to the [September 6, 1939] directive, there is no reference in the first paragraph [of that directive] that the Attorney General had been requested by the President to instruct the FBI to take charge of subversive activities as such. But I think the [September 10, 1936] *memorandum* . . . is indicative of the basis for the statement in the third paragraph of the [September 6, 1939] directive requesting police officers, sheriffs, and all law enforcement officers promptly to turn over to the FBI information relating not only to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality laws, but subversive activities. [Italics added.]

In yet another statement, Wannall maintained:

> The directive of 1939 instructed that the FBI take charge of investigations in three specifically named areas of espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters. It also, *we feel*, placed a responsibility on the FBI to conduct in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, investigations relating to the three specifically cited statutes. By its third paragraph, the directive of 1939 requested law enforcement officers to turn over to the FBI information relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and violations of the neutrality laws. *By subsequent directives, we feel* we were charged with the responsibility of *correlating* information regarding subversive activities. . . . *It is our interpretation* of subsection (d) of title 28, subpart P [of the Code of Federal Regulations defining the FBI's internal security functions], that the Attorney General *apparently* has instructed the FBI to carry out the responsibilities which were imposed upon us by the directive of September 1939. [Italics added.][3]

In the absence of a prior explanation as to the context and nature of the 1936, 1939, and Code of Federal Regulations provisions, these quotes can only be confusing. They have been cited to establish that the FBI's claimed authority to

[3] U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Internal Security, *Hearings on Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes* (hereafter cited as *HISC*), Part I, 93d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1974), pp. 3568–3569, 3572, 3606–3607. Contrast Wannall's testimony with that of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney during these same hearings, ibid., pp. 3333, 3335, 3363, 3364, 3365, 3366, 3369–3370, 3385, 3388–3390, 3392, 3393, 3396, 3438–3439.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

investigate "subversive activities and related matters" has shifted. Nonetheless, the bureau has consistently claimed that its surveillance authority derives only from presidential directives which were formally incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations by the attorney general during the 1960s. (The specific language of that section of the code defining the FBI's investigative responsibilities reads "Carry out Presidential directive of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presidential directives of January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.")[4]

Did these directives provide such authority? What, moreover, led to their issuance? A review of these questions supports two conclusions: (1) The cited directives did not formally authorize the bureau to investigate "subversive activities and related matters." (2) By misinforming Presidents Truman and Eisenhower about Roosevelt's 1939 directive FBI Director Hoover obtained tacit presidential approval for ongoing FBI investigations of dissident activities.

President Roosevelt's Directives

Had President Roosevelt in 1936 directed the FBI to investigate "subversive activities"? What had the president authorized and what had led him to make this directive? Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered conclusively since our knowledge of this Roosevelt directive derives exclusively from FBI sources. No White House document records the president's purposes and specific authorization. To ensure maximum secrecy, Roosevelt orally conveyed this request to the FBI director. Moreover, although Hoover had written in one of his memoranda on the August 1936 meetings with the president that Roosevelt had expressed his intent to file in his safe a handwritten memorandum detailing this authority, no such document has been found either in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park or in the National Archives.

On August 24, 1936, President Roosevelt met privately with Director Hoover in the White House. According to Hoover's memorandum on this conference the initiative for the meeting came from the president. Roosevelt expressed concern about reports of the travel plans and activities of a Soviet consular official, Constantine Oumansky—reports that the president acquired either from the FBI or from military intelligence officials. During this meeting, moreover, Hoover detailed at length the extent of Communist influence in the trade union movement and in certain federal agencies or departments and further asserted that the Communist Internationale had recently directed all United States Communists to "vote for President Roosevelt and against Governor [Alf] Landon [the Republican presidential candidate] because of the fact that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare." In addition, Hoover also detailed how the anti-New

[4] The code is reprinted in ibid., p. 3695.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deal Catholic priest Charles Coughlin had attempted to convince retired General Smedley Butler to "lead an expedition to Mexico" and further how General Butler had been approached by right-wing elements who had hoped to convince him to lead an anti-New Deal coup. As further evidence that internal security bureaucrats might have sought to precipitate presidential action, in January 1936 Secretary of War George Dern informed Attorney General Homer Cummings about the "definite indication" of foreign espionage in the United States and that "some [domestic] organizations would probably attempt to cripple our war effort [in an emergency] through sabotage." Dern urged the attorney general to establish "a counterespionage service among civilians to prevent foreign espionage in the United States and to collect information so that in case of an emergency any persons intending to cripple our war effort by means of espionage or sabotage may be taken into custody."[5]

According to Hoover's memorandum, this August 24 meeting began with the FBI director detailing the extent of Communist control, or Communist efforts to secure control, of important unions (the West Coast Longshoremen, the United Mine Workers, and the Newspaper Guild), "the activities which have recently occurred with Governmental service inspired by Communists," and the directions given by the Communist Internationale to American Communists. After hearing this report, the president expressed his desire for more systematic intelligence about "subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism," and for "a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole." "No governmental organization" currently compiled such "general intelligence information," Hoover advised the president, adding that membership in the Communist party was not illegal and that the FBI had "no specific authority to make such general investigations." Asked if he had any "suggestions . . . relative to this matter," Director Hoover informed Roosevelt that the FBI's appropriations authorization contained "a provision that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the Department of State and that if the State Department should ask us to conduct such an investigation we could do so under our present authority in the appropriation already granted." When the meeting concluded, at Hoover's suggestion, another meeting was arranged the next day between the president, Director Hoover, and Cordell Hull, the secretary of state. Roosevelt further advised Hoover that he should coordinate investigation with the "Military and Naval Intelligence Services."[6]

Hoover's reference to the FBI's appropriations authorization related to a 1916 amendment to an appropriations statute of 1871, authorizing the attorney gen-

[5] *HIA*, Vol. 6, p. 560; *IARA*, pp. 25 and n.9.; *SDSR*, pp. 393–394.

[6] *SDSR*, pp. 393–395; *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 560–561; Whitehead, *FBI Story*, pp. 188–191. Until the Select Committee investigation, Whitehead's account (based on privileged access to FBI documents and interviews with Director Hoover) had been the principal source for knowledge of this 1936 directive. As the committee staff's more detailed account confirms, Whitehead's account is not always reliable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral to expend funds for "the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States." The 1916 amendment altered this to permit the attorney general to appoint officials "to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice or the Department of State, as may be directed by the Attorney General."[7]

On August 25, again according to Hoover's memorandum detailing this meeting, the president began by relating that both the Communist and Fascist "movements were international in scope and that Communism particularly was directed from Moscow, and that there had been certain indications that [Soviet consular official] Oumansky, . . . was a leading figure in some of the activities in this country, so consequently it was a matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to be made." Expressing his "desire" that such a "survey" of "these conditions" be made, Roosevelt then informed the secretary of state that "this survey could be made by the Department of Justice [i.e., the FBI] if the Secretary of State requested the Department to conduct the inquiry under the FBI Appropriations Act." Roosevelt emphasized his desire that "the matter . . . be handled quite confidentially." Responding to this suggestion, Hull "asked that the investigation be made" and Roosevelt asked Hoover to "speak to the Attorney General." Roosevelt and Hull further considered "the making of a protest, either formally or informally, to the Russian Government relative to its interference with affairs in this country."[8]

While it is clear that the president had directed the FBI to conduct a "general intelligence" operation and that he was not unduly concerned about legal questions, what in fact had been the purpose and scope of Roosevelt's authorization? The phrase "subversive activities" adopted by Hoover in his description of the August 24 meeting does not capture the more limited nature of the president's objective. Roosevelt was concerned about the attempts of foreign agents to influence domestic affairs and the consequences of these foreign-directed efforts on the conduct of national politics. He directed a program to discover the relationship between Communist and Fascist activities within the United States and the actions of foreign powers and/or agents, not one which would focus on domestic radicalism or "subversive activities." This is confirmed by the thrust of the August 25 Roosevelt-Hull consideration of a formal protest to the Soviet Union, by the president's directive that the FBI coordinate this investigation with the military intelligence services and the State Department, by the acceptance of Hoover's suggestion that the appropriations statute provided such authority, and by the president's specific reference to Oumansky's leadership role. Moreover, a private FBI study in 1972 of the bureau's domestic investigative authority (in striking contrast to the October 28, 1975, analysis which the bureau prepared for the Select Committee) affirmed that the impetus behind this

[7] *SDSR*, p. 379.
[8] Ibid., pp. 392, 394–396; *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 561–562.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1936 directive was "the concern for national security . . . [as] related to two international movements [communism and fascism]" and that "there was no national concern for indigenous anarchists or other groups designing the overthrow of this Government."[9]

Nonetheless, if the president's purposes were narrower, the FBI quickly exploited the latitude provided by this secretive presidential directive. Even prior to Hoover's briefing of Attorney General Cummings, required by the statute and also directed by the president, the bureau began planning an extensive surveillance program which would focus on domestic political or trade union activities deemed subversive by FBI personnel. In an August 28, 1936, memorandum detailing the administrative procedures to be adopted to handle the incoming information from these proposed investigations of "subversive activities," a bureau official outlined the "general classifications" to be investigated. These were maritime industry; federal governmental activities; steel industry; coal industry; newspaper field; clothing, garment, and fur industry; general strike activities, armed forces, educational institutions; general activities; Communist and affiliated organizations, Fascists, anti-Fascists movements; and activities in organized labor organizations. Hoover commended this planning as a good beginning.[10]

Furthermore, in his directive to all special agents in charge on September 5, 1936, and in his memorandum reporting his September 10, 1936, briefing of the attorney general, Hoover had acted to ensure a program which would focus on domestic radicalism and would be far-reaching in scope and effect. Hoover's September 5 letter (marked "personal and confidential") informed special agents in charge that,

> The Bureau desires to obtain from all possible sources information concerning *subversive activities* conducted in the United States by Communists, Fascisti, *and representatives or advocates of other organizations or groups advocating the overthrow or replacement of the Government of the United States.* No investigation should be initiated into cases of this kind in the absence of specific authorization from the Bureau, but you should forward to the Bureau information obtained from *all* sources, and in those cases in which investigation is desired the Bureau will issue appropriate instructions to you. It is desired, accordingly, that you immediately transmit to the Bureau *any information relating to subversive activities* on the part of *any* individual or organization, *regardless of the source from which this information is received.* [Italics added.][11]

Hoover's memo about his September 10 briefing of Cummings further outlines the far-reaching scope and domestic focus of this program:

> In talking with the Attorney General today *concerning the radical situation,* I informed him of the conference [*sic*] which I had on September 1, 1936 [*sic*], at

[9] *SDSR*, p. 395, n.71.
[10] *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 562–563.
[11] Ibid., p. 562.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> which time the Secretary of State, at the President's suggestion, requested of me, the representative of the Department of Justice, to have investigation made of *subversive activities in this country*, including communism and fascism. I transmitted this request to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General *verbally* directed me to proceed with this investigation and to coordinate, as the President suggested, information upon these matters in the possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division, and the State Department. This, therefore, is the authority upon which to proceed in the conduct of this investigation, which should, of course, be handled in a most discrete and confidential manner. [Italics added.][12]

The disparity between Hoover's briefing of Attorney General Cummings and the thrust of the intelligence program authorized and directed by President Roosevelt would have future policy consequences in 1938. Then, the conflicting understanding of Cummings and Roosevelt enabled Director Hoover to fully brief the attorney general and yet secure the president's reauthorization for continued FBI surveillance of "subversive activities." Once again, Roosevelt's formal authorization differed substantively from the program actually conducted by the bureau.

In October 1938, President Roosevelt appointed Attorney General Cummings to chair a committee "to inquire into the so-called espionage situation" and to report on the need for an additional appropriation for domestic intelligence. In turn, Cummings asked Director Hoover for recommendations.

In a long memorandum to the attorney general, Hoover described the "present purposes and scope" of FBI investigations "together with suggestions for expansion, and such further coordination as may be effected along this general line." The director then detailed FBI investigative methods and the categories of files contained in the bureau's Intelligence Section. He described this information as "dealing with various forms of activities of either a subversive or a so-called intelligence type," adding that the index contained "approximately 2500 names . . . of the various types of individuals engaged in activities of *Communism, Nazism, and various types of foreign espionage*." [Italics added.]

[12] *SDSR*, p. 396. The numerous errors in Hoover's September 10 memo—his reference to one conference on September 1 whereas there had been two conferences on August 24 and 25—combined with the thrust of his briefing of the attorney general about these conferences and how this decision was made further suggest that Director Hoover's role was not simply a trusted subordinate merely carrying out the orders of his superiors. Apparently, the FBI director exploited the general desire that this decision be kept confidential, that there be no written record, and the expectation on the part of senior officials that he would act in good faith when communicating and implementing these decisions to institute a far-reaching surveillance program. The suggestion of duplicity and an attempt to maneuver responsible superiors rests not only on the contrasting language of Hoover's August 24 and 25 with his September 5 and 10 memoranda but also on Attorney General Cummings' earlier response to Secretary of War George Dern's January 1936 proposal. A February 19, 1938, memorandum by Cummings of this conversation records the attorney general's impression of this matter that "there was no particular urgency." Ibid., p. 393, n.67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Director Hoover then advised against seeking legislative authorization for these activities or for the expansion which he recommended on the premise that

> Such expansion . . . as may be desired and may become necessary can be covered, . . . under present provisions existing in the annual appropriations bill of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, . . . this provision is believed to be sufficiently broad to cover any expansion of the present *intelligence and counter-espionage* work which it may be deemed necessary to carry on.
>
> . . . In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of the present structure of *intelligence* work, it is believed imperative that *it be produced with the utmost degree of secrecy in order to avoid criticisms or objections* which might be raised to *such an expansion* by either *ill-informed* persons or individuals *having some ulterior motive.* The word *"espionage"* has long been a word that has been repugnant to the American people and it is believed that the structure which is *already in existence is much broader than espionage or counter-espionage,* but covers in a true sense *real intelligence values to the three services interested,* namely the Navy, the Army, and the civilian branch of the Government—the Department of Justice. Consequently, it would seem undesirable to seek only special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a *special counter-espionage drive of any great magnitude.* [Italics added.][13]

Although Hoover's memorandum referred to "subversive activities" and described FBI filing categories which could only have suggested that these investigations focused on domestic activities and beliefs, Attorney General Cummings' cover letter of October 20, 1938, to the president accompanying this Hoover memorandum did not describe the existing investigations or proposed expansion as covering "subversive activities" but referred to the president's interest in the "so-called espionage situation." Whether or not the attorney general had read Hoover's memorandum closely, whether he was influenced by the September 10, 1936, briefing, or whether he accepted the consistent reference to "espionage" in Hoover's memorandum, his letter of October 20 offered a distinctively different description of ongoing investigations and the planned expansion.

This explanation assumed crucial importance during a meeting on November 2, 1938, between Hoover and the president. We do not know whether Roosevelt read only Cummings' letter or had also closely reviewed the Hoover memorandum. In memoranda of November 1 and 7, 1938, the director recorded telephone contacts from the president's secretary, Stephen Early, informing him of Roosevelt's desire for a November 2 conference. Hoover's memorandum about that conference reads:

> the President advised me that he had this day communicated with the Director of the Budget, . . . and instructed him to include in the Appropriation estimates $50,000 for Military Intelligence, $50,000 for Naval Intelligence, and $150,000 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to handle *counter-espionage activities.*

[13] *HIA*, pp. 565–566.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> He stated that he had approved the plan which I had prepared and which had been sent to him by the Attorney General, except that he had not been able to grant the entire amount of money indicated as necessary [*an increase* by $35,000 each for the military services and by $300,000 for the FBI] for each of the three agencies. . . . [Italics added.]

Roosevelt's descriptive phrase "counterespionage" plus the considerably scaled-down appropriation recommendations further suggest that the president and the FBI director had two different types of programs in mind.[14]

Yet, even Hoover's limited success in this area proved ephemeral. Insofar as the statutory basis for FBI "counterespionage" investigations required State Department direction, Hoover became concerned in March 1939 about this department's efforts to coordinate domestic intelligence investigations. In a March 16, 1939, memorandum to Cummings' successor as attorney general, Frank Murphy, Hoover submitted a copy of the bureau's 1938 program which he described as "intended to ascertain the identity of persons engaged in espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage of a nature not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes"—and, significantly, not as investigations of "subversive activities" or radical political and trade union activities. Acknowledging that under the existing program "the specific authorization of the State Department" was required, Hoover expressed concern that State would allow other federal investigative agencies to conduct domestic investigations. Accordingly, the FBI director recommended that the attorney general direct other federal investigative agencies to forward to the FBI, rather than to the State Department, information "relating to espionage and subversive activities," ostensibly to avoid the confusion and the violations of individual rights that had occurred in the World War I period. The State Department complied, but its continued interest and the inauguration of a cumbersome committee system under the direction of the assistant secretary of state, George Messersmith, had made impossible an easy resolution of this matter.

At Hoover's urging, Attorney General Murphy wrote Roosevelt on June 17, 1939, to urge the abandonment of this interdepartmental committee and the "concentration of investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters" in the FBI and the military intelligence services. The president complied in a June 26, 1939, authorization memorandum, though in a separate memorandum he directed the State Department to continue its "intelligence work." Significantly, the president's confidential memorandum of June 26 described the purpose and extent of investigations to be conducted by the FBI and the military intelligence services as involving only "espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters," "matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage," or "data, information, or material that may come to their [the heads of all other investigative agencies] notice bearing direct-

[14] *SDSR*, pp. 397–399; *IARA*, pp. 25–27; *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 563–567. Hoover's memorandum of his November 2 conference with the president is reprinted in ibid., p. 567.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly or indirectly on espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage." Nowhere in this directive had Roosevelt referred to "subversive activities"—not surprising since Hoover or Cummings had described FBI investigations to the president and to Attorney General Murphy as pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage. The June 26 directive, by providing a shift away from reliance on the appropriations provision, confined FBI investigative authority (as that of the military intelligence services) to violations of federal statutes.[15]

Director Hoover, not resigned to this restriction on FBI investigative authority, sought to exploit the changed political atmosphere created by the outbreak of the European war following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. In a September 6, 1939, memorandum to Attorney General Murphy, Hoover referred to New York City police officials' creation of a special squad and the likelihood that private citizens would transmit information concerning sabotage to the New York City police. Recalling indirectly the vigilante activities of the World War I period, Hoover recommended that President Roosevelt at "the earliest possible moment" should "issue a statement or request addressed to all police officials in the United States and instructing them to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, *subversive activities* and neutrality regulations." [Italics added.] To assist the attorney general, Hoover submitted a draft memorandum to this effect. Upon receiving Hoover's memoranda (both the recommendation and the proposed presidential statement), Murphy conferred with FBI Assistant Director E. A. Tamm. In a memorandum dated that same day, Tamm stated that the attorney general had informed him that the president intended to issue "the order" that day, that he (the attorney general) had prepared the statement trying to "make it as strong as possible" and had based it on the memorandum sent to him by Hoover, and that in the statement the president "requested all local law enforcement officials to *cooperate* with the FBI in the drive against espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities*, and violations of the neutrality law." [Italics added.][16]

Had Hoover's purpose been to secure formal presidential authorization to permit the FBI to investigate "subversive activities," this effort failed. President Roosevelt's September 6, 1939, statement had provided no such authority, stipulating that:

> The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice *to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.*
>
> This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility.

[15] *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 567–570; *SDSR*, pp. 400–403.

[16] *SDSR*, pp. 403–404; Hoover's and Tamm's memoranda are reprinted in *HIA*, Vol. 6, pp. 570–572, Hoover's is reprinted on pp. 570–571 and Tamm's on pp. 571–572.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> To this end, I request all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to *turn over to the nearest representative* of the Federal Bureau of Investigation *any information obtained by them relating to* espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities*, and violations of the neutrality laws. [Italics added.][17]

Issued in part to ensure that investigations involving espionage would be effectively conducted and coordinated, the statement had a further purpose: to avert the recurrence of sweeping and vigilante-type investigations focusing on dissident politics. That same day, Attorney General Murphy held a press conference to publicize the statement, adopting this emphasis:

> *Foreign agents and those engaged in espionage* will no longer find this country a happy hunting ground for their activities. There will be no repetition of the confusion and laxity and indifference of twenty years ago.
>
> We have opened many new FBI offices throughout the land. Our men are well prepared and well trained. At the same time, *if you want this work done in a reasonable and responsible way it must not turn into a witch hunt.* We must do no wrong to any man. [Italics added.][18]

Just what authority had Roosevelt's statement granted the FBI? The president had directed the bureau to perform two quite separate functions. In his first paragraph, Roosevelt had affirmed the FBI's responsibility to take charge of specified investigations (espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality laws), and those enumerated involved violations of particular statutes. The last paragraph could properly be described as a recipient, as opposed to an investigative, authorization. The president had simply urged law enforcement officials to refer to the FBI the results of their investigations. Roosevelt had not, however, directed the FBI to investigate "subversive activities" but only to receive such information from these sources (to file or refer to the appropriate federal agency).

Nor did the January 3, 1943, statement (on "police cooperation") authorize FBI political surveillance. The president then stated:

> On September 6, 1939, I issued a directive providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility. . . .

[17] The statement is reprinted in *HISC*, pp. 3336–3337, and *SDSR*, p. 404.

[18] *SDSR*, pp. 404–405. Moreover, both when issuing an executive order and proclaiming a national emergency on September 8, 1939, and in a subsequent press conference, President Roosevelt defined the FBI's additional duties as permitting "the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations" and as protecting the nation from "some of the things that happened" prior to United States involvement in World War I. The president specifically listed "sabotage," "a great deal of propaganda by *both belligerents*, and a good many definite plans laid in this country by *foreign governments* to try to sway American public opinion." [Italics added.] Ibid., p. 405; *IARA*, p. 27, n.19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> I am again calling the attention of all enforcement officers to the request that they report *all such information* promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, *which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency* with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.
>
> I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information *relating to espionage and related matters* to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner. [Italics added.][19]

Did the 1943 statement supersede that of 1939? Significantly, the term "subversive activities" is not even included in this statement. Once again, the 1943 statement defined the FBI's responsibility to correlate information received from law enforcement officials. The 1943 statement also included a presidential request that "patriotic organizations and individuals" report to the FBI information "relating to espionage and related matters." This addition seems to be further evidence that, when issuing the statement, the president's principal concern had been to avert vigilante activities rather than to expand FBI investigative authority.

A Proposed 1948 Directive

The relationship between the 1939 and 1943 statements becomes important when we consider an August 17, 1948, memorandum from Attorney General Tom Clark to President Harry Truman. To his memo, the attorney general appended a draft of "a statement concerning investigations in the internal security field" observing that this "appears to be the appropriate time for a third [statement]." Had it been issued, this Justice-proposed statement would have significantly expanded FBI surveillance authority. Yet, when submitting the measure to the president, the attorney general implied that it merely reaffirmed Roosevelt's 1939 and 1943 directives. Why then was a new statement needed? To answer this we must first discuss the time context and how the administration's political concerns encouraged the attorney general and FBI personnel to act in a duplicitous manner.

By mid-August 1948 the nation was in the midst of an intensely partisan presidential campaign. During the first week of August, moreover, two Republican-controlled congressional committees (the House Committee on Un-American Activities and a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments) initiated dramatic and widely publicized hearings. In these hearings, conservative congressmen sought to create the impression that a serious internal security problem existed to which the Truman administration was indifferent. Desirous of muting this effort, the president at first depicted these investigations as a "red herring" designed to divert public attention from

[19] The statement is reprinted in *HISC*, p. 3337.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "reactionary" record of the Republican Eightieth Congress. As a further aspect of this strategy, the White House began drafting a presidential speech and preparing position papers establishing the administration's solid anti-Communist credentials and the partisan irresponsibility of its critics.[20]

The administration's partisan objectives and perceived vulnerability thus provided the background to Clark's August 17 proposal. Seemingly no more than a call to interested citizens and law enforcement officials to refer information relating to "subversive activities" to the FBI, the statement implied that this was the responsible and effective way of dealing with subversive threats. FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd argued this point during a September 20, 1948, meeting that he later initiated with White House aide Stephen Spingarn. Spingarn's memo of that meeting records Ladd as claiming that the "purpose of the statement was to spike vigilante activity in the internal security area by private organizations and persons, making it clear that the FBI is the proper agency to handle such matters and that any information obtained on the subject should be reported promptly to that organization."[21] A further implication was that proceeding in this manner would provide a striking contrast to the efforts of those (Republican conservatives) who sought to exploit the "subversive" issue to gain publicity and partisan advantage.

The statement Clark proposed, however, read:

> On September 6, 1939, and again on January 8, 1943, a Presidential directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should *take charge of investigative work* in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities, and in similar matters*. It was requested that all law enforcement officers in the United States, and all patriotic organizations and individuals, promptly turn over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information concerning these matters.
>
> *The Federal Bureau of Investigation has fully carried out its responsibilities with respect to internal security of the United States under these directives.* The cooperation rendered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with the directives has been of invaluable assistance to it.

[20] Memo for Clark Clifford, August, 9, 1948; memo, George Elsey, August 16, 1948; draft speech, August 18, 1948; Elsey notes, August 26, 1948; all in George Elsey Papers, Internal Security-Congressional Loyalty Investigations (2), Harry S. Truman Library (herafter cited as HST). Democratic National Committee, "Files of the Facts, V, Loyalty and Subversive Activities," Elsey Papers, 1948 Campaign Reference Material-Loyalty, HST. Memo, Elsey to Clifford, August 16, 1948, Clark Clifford Papers, Loyalty Investigations, HST. Truman's "red herring" press conference remark and other critical comments on congressional investigations are in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, D. C., 1964), pp. 186–190, 431–435, 457–461, 844–845, 882–888, 925–930, 959–962, 963–966. Presidential platform material prepared by Stephen Spingarn, October 13, 1948; memo, Spingarn to Attorney General Clark, September 9, 1948; memo, Spingarn, September 10, 1948; Department of Justice, press release, September 29, 1948; all in Stephen Spingarn Papers, White House Assignment, HST.

[21] Memo, Spingarn to Clifford, September 21, 1948, Truman Papers, Of 10-B, FBI, HST.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> I wish to emphasize at this time that *these directives continue in full force and effect.*
>
> *Investigations in matters relating to the internal security* of the United States to be effective must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis, *and by a single central agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the agency designated for this purpose.* At this time again, I request that all information concerning any activities within the United States, its territories or possessions, *believed to be of a subversive nature,* be reported promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [Italics added.][22]

Upon close analysis, this statement was not so innocuous nor was the FBI's interest in its issuance merely to quash vigilante activities. Although worded as a simple reaffirmation of earlier Roosevelt directives, the proposed statement *for the first time* would have included "subversive activities, and in similar matters" within the FBI's "take charge of investigations" authority. Moreover, the proposed statement's fourth paragraph defined the FBI's responsibility not as a correlating agency but as "the single central agency" empowered to receive information either "relating to the internal security" or "believed to be of a subversive nature" and thus having the responsibility to act upon and investigate these charges. Furthermore, in contrast to first paragraph, this wording constituted a formal and separate authorization to investigate "subversive activities." It thus would have significantly expanded the FBI's investigative authority.

Truman did not, however, issue the proposed statement; the press of the presidential campaign and the White House's decision to refer this proposal to the National Security Council (NSC) averted formal action on this request in 1948. Since April 1948, moreover, the NSC had been reviewing the internal security activities of those federal agencies which had national security responsibilities with the objectives of establishing clear lines of authority, minimizing overlap, and ensuring coordination and cooperation.

Because one purpose of this proposed statement had been to establish the FBI's central role in internal security matters, the White House decision to refer the proposal to the NSC ensured that it would not be issued. Assigned responsibility to study the 1948 proposal, Admiral Sidney Souers, executive secretary of the NSC, drafted an alternative statement. His draft reflected his assumption that the September 6, 1939, directive had indeed authorized the FBI to take charge of investigations in matters relating to "espionage, sabotage, and subversion." Souers merely deleted those provisions of Clark's August 17, 1948, draft affirming that the FBI was the "single central agency" having investigative responsibility "in matters relating to the internal security."[23] Souers' al-

[22] Memo, Attorney General Clark to Truman, August 17, 1948; draft statement by the president, undated; the record of Spingarn's meeting with Ladd is from memo, Spingarn to Clifford, September 21, 1948; all in Truman Papers, OF 10-B, FBI, HST.

[23] Memo, Pat Coyne, April 8, 1949; memo, Spingarn to Clifford, April 11, 1949; memo, Spingarn, April 11, 1949; memo, Spingarn to Clifford, April 22, 1949; all in Spingarn Papers,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ternative draft, however, was not issued. Instead, executive personnel debated at length internal security coordination and responsibilities. Finally, on March 22, 1949, the NSC recommended that the president approve a directive creating two committees within the NSC—the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (headed by the FBI director and including the directors of the Army, Air Force, and Navy intelligence divisions) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and from the military services)—to coordinate work in the internal security area. The executive secretary of the NSC would supervise the work of these committees. On March 23, 1949, President Truman approved this directive.[24]

President Truman's Directive

If stymied in 1948 in this effort to secure formal presidential authorization to investigate "subversive activities" (which the bureau had already been investigating despite the absence of such formal authorization), FBI Director Hoover did not abandon hope. Working through the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (which he headed) and exploiting the political atmosphere created by Senator Joseph McCarthy's dramatic charges that a serious internal security problem existed Hoover (as chairman of the ICC), on July 5, 1950, recommended to the NSC that a new "presidential statement be issued *to bring up to date and clarify prior Presidential Directives* which were issued September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, outlining the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities and related matters.*" [Italics added.][25] The political climate seemed opportune for such a request. In the summer of 1950, political reasons made it attractive for the Truman administration to establish its vigilant anticommunism and at the same time seek to identify Senator McCarthy's efforts as partisan demagoguery.

Simultaneously, on July 11, 1950, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath wrote White House Special Counsel Charles Murphy enclosing a copy of the proposed statement which he urged the president to issue. McGrath specifically claimed:

National Defense-Internal Security (2), HST. Souers draft statement by the president, undated, Truman Papers, OF 10-B, FBI, HST. Letter, Elsey to Souers, August 19, 1948; memo, Elsey to Murphy, August 26, 1948; memo, Elsey to Clifford, August 27, 1948; all in Elsey Papers, Internal Security-Congressional Loyalty Investigations (2), HST.

[24] Memo, Pat Coyne, April 8, 1949; memo, Spingarn to Clifford, April 11, 1949; memo, Spingarn, April 11, 1949; memo, Spingarn to Clifford, April 22, 1949; all in Spingarn Papers, National Defense-Internal Security (2), HST. Memo, Pat Coyne, April 14, 1949, Clifford Papers, National Military Estimate Security Council, HST.

[25] The Hoover letter remains classified. The quote is from the attorney general's letter to White House special counsel Charles Murphy. Letter, Attorney General McGrath to Murphy, July 11, 1950, Murphy Files, National Security Council, HST.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The effect of issuing this statement now will be to remind all agencies, patriotic organizations and individual citizens that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with responsibility *for investigating* all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities and related matters*, and that it is also *the agency charged with the responsibility of being the central coordinating agency* for all information relating to the same matters. [Italics added.]

Issuance of the statement "at this time," McGrath concluded, would be "most helpful"; the attorney general further implied that this proposal essentially reaffirmed earlier directives, with slight changes to bring them "up to date and clarify."[26] Whether the attorney general was aware of the 1948 effort or not, the Hoover (IIC) recommendation renewed this earlier request, whose purposes had been to secure formal authorization for FBI investigations into "subversive activities and related matters" and to establish the bureau as the "central coordinating agency" in the internal security field.

Special Council Murphy did not automatically refer McGrath's request to the president but first had White House aide George Elsey study the matter. In this assignment, Elsey did not contrast the 1950 statement with those of 1939 and 1943 or review the proposal in the light of the 1948 effort. Instead, he focused exclusively on the fact that this measure was properly before the NSC, adding that "the Department of Justice should not have attempted an end run to the White House at a time when their proposal is in the NSC." Elsey urged Murphy to refer McGrath's letter to the NSC, requesting that the council study this proposal and report back (to Murphy) when "ready to make a recommendation to the President." To this effect, Elsey drafted a memorandum for Murphy's signature addressed to James Lay, executive secretary of the NSC. Murphy acceded to Elsey's recommendation and signed the memorandum on July 13, 1950.[27]

After consideration, the NSC recommended that the president issue a modified version of the Hoover (IIC) proposal. (Lay did not, however, advise the White House staff of this decision and the president issued the statement without the staff having independently reviewed it.) Truman issued this statement on July 24, 1950, though the NSC's proposed heading ("Information Relating to Domestic Espionage, Sabotage, Subversive Activities and Related Matters") had been altered to read simply "Statement by the President":

[26] Ibid.

[27] Memo, Murphy to Lay, July 12, 1950; memo, Elsey to Murphy, July 12, 1950; both in Murphy Files, National Security Council, HST. The administration's concern about Senator McCarthy's impact led it to consider drafting internal security legislation and establishing a special presidential commission on loyalty, and to assess how best to establish its solid anti-Communist credentials and respond to Senator McCarthy. See, memo, Spingarn, July 21, 1950, and memo, Spingarn, July 22, 1950, in Spingarn Papers, National Defense, Internal Security-Individual Rights (1), HST. Memo, Spingarn, August 11, 1950, Murphy Files, Internal Security, HST. Memo, Spingarn to Hopkins, May 11, 1950, Spingarn Papers, Loyalty Commission, Civil Rights (1), HST. See, also, Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security, and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era," in Barton Bernstein (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 229–231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, a Presidential directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice should *take charge of investigative work in matters relating to* espionage, sabotage, *subversive activities and related matters.* It was pointed out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive manner on a national basis and all information carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion. I should like to again call the attention of all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, to the request that they report all information in the above enumerated fields promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of *correlating* this material and referring matters which are under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in this field to the appropriate agency.
>
> I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this same manner. [Italics added.][28]

The NSC recommendation considerably modified Hoover's original proposal by playing down the bureau's role from "central" agency to one that coordinated and referred to the appropriate agency whatever information it received from law enforcement officers, patriotic organizations, and citizens. Apparently, however, the NSC either had been unaware that the 1939 and 1943 directives had not authorized the FBI to investigate "subversive activities and related matters" (not having reviewed carefully these directives and accepting this representation at face value) or simply had assumed that the bureau had or should have had this authority.

The FBI and the Department of Justice quickly exploited this presidential statement (the FBI in a July 26, 1950, press release and the Department of Justice in one on July 28, 1950) in efforts to intensify public anxieties about the internal security problem confronting the nation and to emphasize the FBI's investigative responsibilities. In its release, the FBI enunciated an expansive view of what constituted subversion:

> The forces which are most anxious to weaken our internal security are not always easy to identify. Communists have been trained in deceit and secretly work toward the day when they hope to replace our American way of life with a Communist dictatorship. They utilize cleverly camouflaged movements, such as some peace groups and civil rights organizations, to achieve their sinister purposes. While they as individuals are difficult to identify, the Communist Party line is clear. Its first concern is the advancement of Soviet Russia and the godless Communist cause. It is important to learn to know the enemies of the American way of life.[29]

[28] Statement by the president, July 24, 1950, Truman Papers, PPF 1-F January–July 1950, HST. Memo, David Bell to Spingarn, Elsey, Murphy, July 24, 1950, Elsey Papers, Central Intelligence, HST.

[29] Statement, FBI Director Hoover, July 26, 1950, Eleanor Bontecou Papers, Internal Security File FBI (1), HST. Department of Justice Release, July 28, 1950, Spingarn Papers, National Defense . . . Vol. 2, Folder 3, HST.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

The issuance of the July 24, 1950, statement raises two important questions: What authority had this directive granted and did it specifically include "subversive activities" within the FBI's investigative responsibilities? What can we conclude about executive oversight over the bureau? First, even if we concede that the president has "inherent" powers to authorize investigations of "subversive activities and related matters," because the sole reference in the 1950 directive had indicated, erroneously, that this had been authorized in earlier (1939 and 1943) directives, this could not be construed as a new formal authorization. Second, the nature of NSC review and acceptance of the IIC claim that in 1939 and 1943 directives had provided such authority indicates indifferent, if not sloppy, staff work and supervision.

President Eisenhower's Directive

While the White House was not aware that earlier directives had not provided such authority, and further that the 1950 statement provided questionable authority, FBI Director Hoover was.[30] Apparently, Hoover recognized the potentially vulnerable status of the FBI's "subversive activities" investigative authority. The election of the conservative anti-Communist Eisenhower administration in 1952 thus provided both an opportunity and a dilemma for the bureau. The opportunity derived from the candidate's pledge to institute more effective

[30] This claim is indirectly confirmed by the testimony of FBI Assistant Director Wannall of 1974 and by an August 7, 1973, effort of FBI Director Clarence Kelley proposing that an executive *order* (and, significantly, not a directive) be issued outlining FBI domestic surveillance authority. In his 1974 testimony, Wannall maintained: "While I feel the Presidential directives have, over the years, adequately located the *correlation* functions over subversive activities in the FBI, and the above statutes have provided adequate and sound statutory foundations for the FBI's internal security investigations, we in the FBI are well aware that many feel *the directives and statutes are dated and therefore their basis as confirming authority is diluted* . . . the most effective way for the FBI to . . . [protect] the Nation's security against internal subversion . . . *is for Congress to statutorily reaffirm our traditional role* in and otherwise describe and define that role. In short, Congress can give us a *modern* mandate to deal with current internal security problems." [Italics added.] *HISC*, p. 3571. Wannall's position that congressional legislation would be desirable and assist the FBI in meeting its responsibilities was a bit disingenuous. It followed an August 7, 1973, effort to obtain such formal authority through executive order—an effort that failed owing to the enveloping Watergate issue. Kelley's August memo has not been publicly released. It is paraphrased, however, in a September 12, 1973, memo from Attorney General Elliot Richardson to Kelley: "I have your memorandum of August 7, 1973, which recommends the issuance of an Executive *order* concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. Your memorandum indicates that the proposed order is designed to accomplish several objectives: (1) *to establish that the FBI has been instructed to engage in domestic intelligence operations;* (2) to supplement the statutory authority of the FBI *by delegating* any constitutional power the President *may have* in this area; and (3) to direct the Attorney General to establish guidelines for domestic intelligence." [Italics added.] U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure et al., *Joint Hearings on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance—1974*, 93d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1974), pp. 31–32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

internal security procedures and his possible dependence on the bureau for information about ongoing programs and authority. The dilemma stemmed from the possibility that the new administration might be more jealous of its prerogatives and careful in its oversight function.

Developments in 1953, however, soon established that any such concerns were groundless. By the end of Eisenhower's first year in office, the bureau had secured a "reaffirmation" of the 1950 directive's *interpetation* of the 1939 and 1943 directives. Released on December 15, 1953, this statement's timing again must be understood in relation to potential political problems confronting this Republican administration: the possibility that congressional investigators might seize on the internal security issue to the political embarrassment of the White House.

As early as January 28, 1953, FBI Director Hoover had sought to establish the bureau's investigative authority. In a lengthy memorandum to Sherman Adams, the assistant to the president, Hoover described in detail how the FBI functioned and submitted a series of memoranda and documents outlining the bureau's responsibilities and authority. One such memorandum affirmed that by presidential directives in 1939, 1943, and 1950 the FBI had been authorized to "take charge of investigative work in matters relating to . . . subversive activities and related matters." To document this claim, Hoover appended to the memorandum a copy of Truman's July 24, 1950, statement; copies of the 1939 and 1943 statements, however, were not included.[31]

Then, on December 15, 1953, President Eisenhower issued another statement on FBI authority:

> On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
>
> The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act. . . . I am requesting that all enforcement officers, both Federal and State, report all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
>
> I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner.[32]

[31] *IARA*, p. 46.

[32] The statement is reprinted in *HISC*, pp. 3337–3338. At a May 13, 1954, NSC meeting Attorney General Brownell would urge the president to issue a suggested statement (as recorded by the president's press secretary) "reemphasizing the need for the citizens of this country to report to the FBI any spying in this country." Rather than issue a formal statement, the president expressed his intent to raise the matter during a press conference. May 13, 1954, entry, Hagerty Papers-Diary Entries, May 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as DDE).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This statement differed from earlier directives principally because it cited FBI responsibility to investigate violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It was not, however, a grant of new authority; the 1946 act in fact had specifically stipulated this as the bureau's responsibility.[33] Law enforcement officials and patriotic organizations and individuals were simply urged by this statement to refer to the FBI any information they gained concerning violations of the Atomic Energy Act.

What motivated this appeal? On December 2, 1953, the president had been apprised that an FBI report on atomic scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer (a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission) raised serious questions about his security clearance status. This FBI report on Oppenheimer caused great concern within the administration; Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson described it as "the worst one so far." Administration personnel, however, were equally concerned that Senator McCarthy might attempt to exploit the Oppenheimer case to raise doubts about the effectiveness of the Eisenhower administration's security measures. On December 1, 1953, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss confided to Secretary of Defense Wilson his fear that Senator McCarthy "knows about [the Oppenheimer file] and might pull it on [the administration]." Strauss' fear was not groundless. In July 1953, Senator McCarthy had considered investigating the AEC and, accordingly, inquired of Director Hoover about the possibility of taking up the Oppenheimer case. Warning the senator against proceeding, Hoover further advised McCarthy that the FBI would not make available to McCarthy's committee (the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations) FBI files relating to atomic energy matters. Following this meeting, Hoover had concluded that the senator had been successfully contained.[34]

While not sharing Strauss' concern about McCarthy, Eisenhower had concluded that the Oppenheimer case should be brought to the attention of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (who also served as a political advisor to the president). This December 2, 1953, decision did not end the matter. At the time the administration was assessing how to handle the charges raised privately against Oppenheimer, a dramatic public debate was occurring centering on the Eisen-

[33] The text of the 1946 act was reprinted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Atomic Energy Legislation Through 91st Cong., 2d sess.*, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C., 1971). Section 10 (5C) (p. 265) specifically requires that "All violations of this Act shall be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice."

[34] Telephone calls, December 2, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 3, Phone Calls July–December 1953, DDE. Note for diary, December 2, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 2, DDE. Diary November 1953, DDE. Jack Holl, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Origins of the Government's Security Case," unpublished paper delivered at the American Historical Meeting, December 28, 1975, p. 12. (The author expresses his appreciation to Dr. Holl for providing him with a copy of his paper.) Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington, Ky., 1970), p. 216. *The New York Times*, July 10, 1953, p. 1; August 11, 1953, p. 12. Richard Fried, *Men Against McCarthy* (New York, 1976), pp. 272–274.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hower administration's attempt to impugn President Truman's handling in 1946 of FBI reports about Treasury Department official Harry Dexter White.

In a November 6, 1953, Chicago speech, the attorney general had purposefully resuscitated the White case. Ostensibly seeking to establish the increased authority granted to the FBI and the Eisenhower administration's more effective internal security procedures, Brownell had cited Truman's 1946 handling of FBI reports on White as indicative of these changes. Brownell's oblique charge of incompetence, if not disloyalty, led the former president to respond aggressively: he first defended his administration's disposition of the White case and then accused the Eisenhower administration of McCarthyism. In response, the attorney general accompanied by FBI Director Hoover would repeat these charges during testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Because of Truman's attack on McCarthyism, moreover, Senator McCarthy in turn demanded and received equal time over radio and television to respond to the former president. The Eisenhower White House, however, did not welcome McCarthy's response. The senator's speech, White House aide C. D. Jackson, concluded, was not only an attack on Truman but a declaration of "war on Eisenhower" and a challenge to the president's leadership of the Republican party.[35]

The McCarthy speech simply brought to a head a long intra-administration debate over how best to respond to the Wisconsin senator. Some advisors had urged the president to challenge the senator directly: a policy of appeasement of the Wisconsin senator, they argued, would wreck the Republican party and lead to defeat in the 1954 and 1956 elections. On December 2, the president rejected this advice, declaring that he would not "get into the gutter" with McCarthy.

That very night, however, Secretary of Defense Wilson telephoned the president to inform him of the Oppenheimer charges and of Strauss' conviction

[35] Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York, 1972), pp. 333–335. Holl, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," p. 12. Speech, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Chicago, Ill., November 6, 1953, Murphy Files, Truman-Brownell, HST. Brownell's charges were known to the president and, following the furor precipitated by the charge, the administration carefully considered how to retain the initiative. See, telephone calls, November 5, 1953, November 11, 1953, November 16, 1953; all in Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 3, Phone Calls July–December 1953, DDE. Minutes to cabinet meeting, November 12, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, Cabinet Minutes, DDE. Press conference notes, November 18, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, Press Conferences, Box 1, Press Conf. 11/18/53, DDE. Letter, President Eisenhower to General Alfred Gruenther, November 23, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 2, DDE Diary, November 1953, DDE. C. D. Jackson Logs, November 27, 1953, Jackson Papers, DDE. Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration* (New York, 1962), p. 135. Holl, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," pp. 13–14. Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 369–372. Telephone calls, December 2, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 3, Phone Calls July–December 1953, DDE. Note for diary, December 2, 3, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 2, DDE Diary, November 1953, DDE. U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, *Hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government*, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Part 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that McCarthy knew about them and might exploit them. While Eisenhower then expressed a lack of concern about McCarthy, he had not yet read the FBI's report on Oppenheimer, nor could the president be certain that McCarthy would not be able to exploit the Oppenheimer case. The Wisconsin senator had already demonstrated his ability to obtain classified security information from sources within the administration—most dramatically revealed in the investigation he had initiated that month of army security procedures at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey (an investigation which could indirectly have atomic energy implications insofar as convicted atomic spy Julius Rosenberg had been employed there during World War II). Nor could the matter be considered on the basis of the quality of information contained in FBI security files: the release of the unsubstantiated allegations contained in such files could create the public impression of a serious problem and/or of administration laxity. The easiest recourse then was to attempt to plug leaks and to isolate the controversial and independent Wisconsin senator. The December 15, 1953, directive had that purpose. Its issuance, moreover, constituted an indirect presidential affirmation of the 1950 interpretation of the 1939 and 1943 directives.[36]

Conclusion

A review both of the content and the background leading to the issuance of the 1939, 1943, 1950, and 1953 directives raises serious questions about presidential oversight of the FBI. Not surprisingly, then, the bureau would without formal authorization initiate a series of counterintelligence programs whose stated purpose was "to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities" of various dissident groups—the Communist party (1956), Socialist Workers party (1961), white hate groups (1964), black nationalist groups (1967), and the new left (1968). To achieve these objectives, the FBI distributed anonymous and fictitious materials designed to cause internal dissension, employed *agents provocateurs* to disrupt these groups, disseminated nonpublic information to the press to develop public opposition to them, pressured employers to fire members of these targeted organizations, sought to counter the political efforts of these organizations' members and to influence court decisions to their detriment, and pressured public institutions to deny meeting places to such organizations.[37] No more surprisingly, these programs were initiated at the authorization of the FBI director without the knowledge or consent either of the various

[36] Telephone calls, December 2, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 3, Phone Calls July–December 1953, DDE. Note for diary, December 2, 3, 1953, Eisenhower Papers-Diary, Box 2, DDE Diary, November 1953, DDE. C. D. Jackson Logs, November 27, 1953, Jackson Papers, DDE. Adams, *Firsthand Report*, p. 135. Holl, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," pp. 13–14. Griffith, *Politics of Fear*, pp. 217–220, 244–249, 260. Latham, *Communist Controversy*, pp .326, 403.

[37] *SDSR*, pp. 3–77; Berman and Halperin, *Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies*, pp. 5–6, 26–31; Cotter, "Notes toward a Definition of National Security," pp. 13–15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attorneys general or presidents. Richard Cotter, the former chief of the Research Section of the FBI's Intelligence Division, describes just how this program was authorized:

> The Bureau was able to initiate an extensive, risky, and highly questionable operation without *consulting* with the Attorney General. *The Cointelpro project required only the recommendation of the Assistant Director in charge of Intelligence Division and the approval of the FBI Director.* [Italics added.][38]

The COINTELPRO was designed to use FBI resources to discredit dissident organizations. It was based on the recognition that information gained through bureau investigations could not be used to prosecute individuals or groups under the law either because the targeted organizations were not engaged in provable illegal activities or because the evidence gained could not be used in a court of law. The COINTELPRO, as such, constituted a flagrant abuse of power by FBI personnel and demonstrates these FBI officials' indifference to legal and constitutional prohibitions. That such a program had been instituted is disturbing; that this program had been initiated without responsible authorization and direction is even more alarming. Given the potential that zealous investigative officials operating secretively and on broadly defined authority might abuse power, at the least, responsible elected and/or confirmed officials should have provided specific direction and effective oversight.*

[38] Cotter, "Notes toward a Definition of National Security," pp. 14–15. Berman and Halperin, *Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies*, p. 6, cite the Justice Department report of November 18, 1974, *FBI COINTELPRO Activities*, prepared by Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson, as concluding that none of the various FBI COINTELPROs were authorized by the attorney general or the president. Assistant Attorney General Maroney's 1974 testimony (given before the report) apparently confirms this view. In his testimony, Maroney referred to a recent order of Attorney General William Saxbe that the Justice Department make a complete review of the COINTELPRO. Referring to the recently concluded successful suit by NBC correspondent Carl Stern under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain the FBI's complete files relating to its activities directed against the so-called New Left, Maroney erroneously claimed that "the so-called Cointel program . . . was a program operated for about 3 years and discontinued in 1971." In testimony later that day, Maroney pointed out, "As I understand it, the program was not known outside the FBI at the time." *HISC*, pp. 3533, 3545.

* The author expresses his appreciation to Marquette University and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for support of his research.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Competition for Certainty: The Polls and the Press in Britain

SANFORD L. WEINER

On the morning after the February 1974 General Election in Britain, *The Times* commented bitterly that "once again, as in 1970, the message of the opinion polls, which with scarcely an exception had shown the Conservatives fairly comfortably in the lead throughout the campaign, proved to be a snare and a delusion." This article will attempt to explain this result by analyzing the organizational pressures that influence the conduct of election polls and their interpretation by the press. The highly competitive environment for British political polls creates strong pressures for them and their consumers to derive certainty and significance from ambiguous information. The result is that a tightly knit political elite collectively reinforces its expectations with the aura of "science."

Introduction: Polls as Political Indicators

Polling is a specialized form of political indicator. Journalists and politicians have adapted the social survey to provide data on the state of the electorate at any given time. Three major British polls follow the American practice of monthly surveys between elections. These surveys have even greater political salience in Britain, because of the prime minister's power to call an election at a time of his choice. Every month's lead in the polls is thus a potential victory.

Polls share many of the characteristics of economic and social indicators. In particular the consumers of all these indicators tend to place great reliance on their precision, since they appear to embody "scientific" techniques and their

SANFORD L. WEINER is a graduate student in political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He spent last year as a visiting fellow at the Centre for Studies in Social Policy, London.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

results are expressed in quantitative form. Their attraction for busy politicians, among others, lies in the illusion of simple, unambiguous data.[1]

In theory, polls should be easier to produce than less explicit indicators. No poverty indicator, for example, can overcome the lack of social consensus about which groups should be considered poor. Similarly, the unemployment rate is a function of what we consider to be "actively looking for work." Compared with these indicators predicting an explicit quantitative result such as the number of votes cast ought to be straightforward.

In practice no indicator has meaning apart from the concepts that underlie it and the interpretations placed upon it. The interpretations, in turn, are directly influenced by the environment of organizational pressures in which the data are collected and understood.

Political polling in Britain is a particularly good case in which to study the interpretive process in action, for the data are unusually ambiguous and the pressures are unusually strong. Rose has pointed out that even if normal sampling error was the only problem for the polls, their results would be unambiguous only for landslide victories.[2] This is because the postwar winning margin has been consistently small, especially compared to American results. The largest margin, in 1945, was only 9.5 percent and in the nine elections since, the average has been 3 percent.[3] With the sampling practices now employed, the outside error margin for the pollsters' estimate of party lead is 3–5 percent.[4] Though in theory the polls could usually expect to better this, a detached analyst could never be sure of predictions from such figures. For the "noise" in the polling system will often overwhelm real changes in party support.

How are ambiguous numbers transformed into firm predictions, and why are they given such prominence? An examination of the organizational pressures at each stage of the polling process will answer these questions by describing first the highly competitive journalistic marketplace and the impact of this environment on polling practice; then the treatment of the data as exclusive, hard news by the newspapers and the impact of the press on the political elite; and finally the impact of the polling bandwagon on the pollsters themselves during the high pressure week before Election Day, and the spurious feedback that results.

[1] Richard Rose, "The Market for Policy Indicators," in A. Shonfield and S. Shaw (eds.), *Social Indicators and Social Policy* (London, 1972).

[2] Richard Rose (ed.), *The Polls and the 1970 Election*, University of Strathclyde Survey Research Centre Occasional Paper No. 7, 1970; and Alan Stuart in Market Research Society, *Public Opinion Polling on the 1970 Election* (London, 1972), pp. 37–41.

[3] Calculated from Louis Harris International (London), "Harris and ORC Election Surveys, October 1974," p. 50. In contrast the winning presidential margins over the period 1952–1972 have averaged about twelve points.

[4] Northern Ireland is excluded from samples entirely. All electoral and polling figures cited include only England, Scotland, and Wales.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Environment for Polling Organizations

"Polls have their origins in journalism . . . as creatures of the press [they] came into being and continue in being to provide news stories for newspaper readers."[5] Pollsters established their credibility and utility by competing with political journalists in picking election winners. In America the *Literary Digest's* straw poll, despite five previous successes, fell victim to the shift of voting patterns in its 1936 presidential prediction. George Gallup made his reputation that year by challenging the *Digest* and correctly forecasting the Roosevelt landslide.[6] The British Gallup company acquired its own reputation predicting the 1945 Labour victory.[7] In both cases the pollsters' margins of error were substantial but they were pleased to accept the journalistic definition of accuracy—coming out on the winning side.

The tension between academic survey techniques and the pressures of journalism has remained the prime characteristic of polling organizations. While the pollsters are indeed concerned with the "scientific measurement" that their promotion suggests, their concepts and operations are constrained by journalistic conventions and resources. Polls must produce *news*—items of immediate interest such as explicit election forecasts—with limited time, staff, and money. Two British pollsters have described these constraints in bittersweet fashion:

> The requirements of the sponsor must impose severe limits on the scope of the inquiry. . . . Whether a poll is a good poll or not will in their eyes depend on its results in terms of its impact on or interest to readers or politicians, rather than the perfection of its design or the depth of understanding which it reaches. Because of the nature of the medium and its audience the newspaper is concerned with the sweeping statement, the firm conclusion and the clear-cut perspective, rather than the nuances and shading which are the almost inevitable consequences of deeper inquiry into any field.[8]

However, the specific environment for polling organizations varies significantly on each side of the Atlantic. To understand the considerably different orientation of British and American pollsters we must look at how each perceives its market for information.

In the United States, the Gallup Organization is long established, independent of the press, and syndicates its findings to several hundred daily news-

[5] Frank Teer and James Spence, *Political Opinion Polls* (London, 1973), p. 21.

[6] The *Digest's* two million "ballots" were drawn from telephone directories and automobile registrations. The inherent class bias only became important with the class-based realignment in 1936. George Gallup, *The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide* (Princeton, N. J., 1972).

[7] British Gallup is loosely affiliated with its American counterpart, but its ownership, management, and polling techniques are quite different. The British Harris company is owned by its American namesake, but separately managed.

[8] Teer and Spence, *Political Opinion Polls*, p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

papers for a small weekly fee.[9] Gallup's major rival, Louis Harris, is also well established and uses a similar distribution system. For any particular newspaper, poll findings will be topical and important news, but entirely nonexclusive, like any other wire-service story. The two polls provide what is almost a standard information service for a broadly based market. They have little incentive to flamboyantly promote their work to attract a few additional newspapers.

The market situation in Britain could not be more different. Five major polling organizations conduct exclusive—and thereby expensive—surveys for five major national newspapers.[10] Both the pollsters and the newspapers are engaged in continuing intense competition for business. Only one poll as presently organized had campaign experience before 1970.[11]

As a result each poll is marketed to its newspaper sponsor (and thence to its readers) as the definitive, scientific, and exclusive advance word on the election result. To fulfill the headline promise of "First with the action," or "The poll everyone has been waiting for," the problems of interpretation, sampling, and the close party balance must all be subsumed to a clear-cut, competitive prediction. As one pollster expressed it: "the prime news story is the likely outcome of the election. Despite the technical limitations . . . the gap between the two major parties . . . is the one finding from an opinion poll that summarises the whole progress of the campaign to the journalist."[12] Furthermore the news value of the final prediction is enhanced if it is expressed as an expected parliamentary majority: "Our main sponsors, the newspapers and T.V., are continually pressuring us to forecast seats, and are likely to supply their own forecasts in the face of our resistance."[13]

The more competitive British market then, inspires more extravagant claims for the product. The pressures of the journalistic environment extend beyond the marketing of polls, however, to the ways polling organizations gather and analyze their data.

[9] In the late 1960s, the fee varied from $15–$350 per paper. Leo Bogart, *Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion* (New York, 1972), p. 22.

[10] The major nationwide polls and their places of publication are:

Gallup	*Daily Telegraph*
Louis Harris International	*Daily Express*
Opinion Research Centre (ORC)	*The Times*
National Opinion Polls (NOP)	*Daily Mail*
Business Decisions	*Observer*

ORC also published some of its findings in the *Evening Standard*, an afternoon tabloid not competitive with the morning papers.

[11] While they employed experienced individuals, as organizational units for public polling they are all quite recent: Business Decisions was new in the 1974 election; Harris and ORC in 1970. Gallup has altered its ownership and management since 1970. Only NOP dates to 1959.

[12] J. H. Barter and J. F. O'Brien, "Pre-election Polls—Perils of Prediction," *Journal of the Market Research Society*, 16 (October 1974), 271.

[13] N. L. Webb and R. J. Wybrow, "Polls in a Changing World," ibid., p. 265. Webb manages British Gallup, the one poll which has always resisted the pressure to make seat projections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Internal Organization of the Polls

"We didn't lick this one and I would say that we are no nearer than before the election."[14]

Michael Lipsky has described organizational behavior which he calls "incremental concretization." Under intense scarcity of time and resources, the Kerner Commission's preliminary investigations into the causes of urban rioting were never followed up. Instead, "what started out as a 'first cut' at the data became virtually the 'only cut.' "

> This process may be characterized as the gradual adaptation and molding of initial analyses tentatively hazarded upon admittedly shaky data into increasingly "harder" analyses. This is accomplished by ignoring the qualifications and caveats upon which the original investigations were based, although no new evidence has been introduced to make the findings more reliable. In the process of writing, each version becomes a little sharper, a bit more definitive, as writers and editors strive for a hard tone.[15]

Through an analogous process, survey data about the electorate are transformed into predictions about voting and parliamentary majorities. For the polling organizations, there are several key areas of judgment within this process that are ordinarily obscured. These include the operational procedures for drawing a sample, the treatment of undecided respondents, and adjustments for differential turnout. Facing major uncertainties in each of these areas, pollsters instinctively seek out rules of thumb for assistance. These help satisfy both halves of the journalistic environment: the need to work with severely restrained resources and the demand for explicit results. But these short-run advantages mask serious longer-run problems.

Creating the Sample

No real world sampling design approaches the neat abstractions of textbook theory. But British pollsters, seeking several thousand representative political men in periods as short as forty-eight hours, have to compromise more than most. Sampling precision for voting purposes depends first on the size of the sample, but this factor is subject to sharply diminishing returns. (Samples must be four times as large to reduce the expected error by half.) Pollsters usually accept the 2 percent error expected in random samples of about 2000. However, it is highly impractical to choose 2000 people purely at random from 50–100 million. In practice, all pollsters select a representative set of election districts to use as sampling points. At each chosen point, one or two interviewers carry

[14] British Gallup's Henry Durant on turnout, 1950. Quoted in S. J. Eldersveld, "British Polls and the 1950 General Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1951), 119.

[15] Michael Lipsky, "Social Scientists and the Riot Commission," *The Annals*, 394 (March 1971), 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out ten to twenty interviews apiece, usually covering only single neighborhoods —the territory one person can reach.[16]

For any given sample size, each pollster must choose how many sampling points to use. The degree of "clustering" about each point has a great impact on both costs and accuracy. Larger interview clusters—that is, fewer total points—are cheaper and faster, but less accurate, because the fewer neighborhoods covered contain less overall variation. In addition, a larger workload increases the time pressure on the individual interviewers and thus threatens quality control.

In America, Gallup draws samples from small precincts whose characteristics are well known, since they are relatively homogeneous. Gallup uses 300 sampling points for 3000 interviews—a cluster ratio of 10:1. In Britain, records of past voting behavior (for a properly balanced sample) are available only for entire constituencies. These are much larger (30,000–50,000 voters) and often heterogeneous districts. This built-in handicap heightens the need for additional sampling points. Despite this, British polling organizations tend to rely upon far fewer sampling points and thus much larger cluster ratios. Only British Gallup approaches the American practice (Table 1).

TABLE 1

Sample Clusters of Largest Sample, February 1974

	Sample Size	*Sampling Points*	*Cluster Ratio (Size/Points)*
Gallup	2,700 Q	270	10:1
NOP	3,200 R	200	16:1
ORC	1,700 Q	105	16:1
Harris	2,400 R	186	13:1
Business Decisions	1,050 Q	50	21:1

Q = quota.
R = random.

This cluster effect has a serious impact on accuracy. The American survey design produces errors around 40 percent above the theoretical standard of a pure random sample; the British random samples are 50–75 percent above.[17] The others do not even use proper random samples. To economize, they approxi-

[16] Pollsters usually stratify the country by region, prior voting behavior, and urbanization, and then seek points that make up a national profile. They improve their accuracy a bit by sampling with these strata. Interviewers are commonly part-time, middle-class housewives. In random samples they use selection rules such as every tenth name on a voting list, or every fourth house on a block. For the problems in evaluating cluster samples see the appendix to D. Butler and D. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (London, 1969).

[17] Paul Perry, "Election Survey Methods," Supplement to *Gallup (U.S.) Political Index*, December 1965, p. 3. Teer and Spence, *Political Opinion Polls*, p .31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mate them with quota samples which bring yet higher errors.[18] So operational procedures that are useful to limit time and expense add considerably to the imprecision of the sampling itself.

The Undecideds

In any typical political poll, 15 percent or more of those contacted are unwilling to state a preference at first. These "Undecideds," "Don't Knows," and "Won't Says" are the first major issue of judgment in matching survey returns to prospective voting behavior, and there is no obvious way to treat them. Most pollsters ask the undecided group if they are "leaning" in some direction, and count these tentative preferences equally with strong ones. This first simplification reduces the pool of undecideds by half.

British pollsters, however, go much further in their desire to minimize the complexities of the problem. Several polls instruct their interviewers to press undecided voters firmly for some preference, however fleeting. This practice does reduce the recorded undecideds but at the price of much greater variation among interviewers. For it is not possible to estimate how forcefully any one interviewer has pressed or if they all evaluated similar doorstep responses in a similar way.

The complex problem posed by the remaining undecideds (5–10 percent) can be avoided if they are excluded from the survey results entirely. The American polls stopped this practice twenty-five years ago but it remains standard procedure in Britain. The British pollsters argue that a disproportionately large number of the undecided group do not vote at all, and that the remainder would have to divide in a radically different proportion to materially affect the election.[19] Yet the limited retrospective studies indicate that as many as two-thirds of the undecideds *do* vote, and they can have significant influence on the accuracy of the poll, if not on the election itself. For by excluding them, the pollsters implicitly assume that the undecideds—the most volatile group of all—will vote exactly like the remaining survey group.

Excluding the undecideds in this way not only simplifies the operational problem but also enhances the journalistic presentation of the results. The voting percentages are recalculated only as a proportion of those stating a choice (Table 2). So the results appear firmer—no one seems undecided—but again at the cost of obscuring important information. For it is often significant when net party gains, as in this example, are drawn from the undecideds as well as from the

[18] In quota sampling interviewers are free to select their own respondents, so long as they fill a number of age/sex/class quota cells that in the aggregate are supposed to mirror a randomly selected population. Quota samples are substantially cheaper to conduct, but much more leeway is left for interviewer biases, especially in judging social class. "For quota samples the corresponding errors could be as much as 50% higher." Market Research Society, *Public Opinion Polling*, 9. British Gallup employs both types as described in Section V.

[19] See Teer and Spence, *Political Opinion Polls*, chap. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

NOP, February 1974

	Survey I		*Survey II*	
	Raw Figures	*Published Figures*	*Raw Figures*	*Published Figures*
Conservative	39.2%	43.5%	37.1%	40.1%
Labour	34.1	37.8	34.5	37.3
Liberal	15.3	16.9	19.2	20.7
Other	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9
Undecideds*	9.8	–	6.8	–
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Data are drawn from J. H. Barter and J. F. O'Brien, "Pre-election Polls—Perils of Prediction," *Journal of the Market Research Society*, 16 (October 1974), 273–274.

*Includes will not vote.

other parties. No such information can be gained from the published figures. In addition the published data may increase the apparent volatility during election periods since each party's stated percentage includes 2–4 percent who are actually undecided.

American polls now take the undecideds more seriously. All published figures include that group as a regular category. For the final survey, Gallup first screens out the third of the group who are least likely to vote, using its turnout scale (described below). The organization has also trained its interviewers to have respondents "vote" on paper, using a simulated ballot box. These two techniques reduce the undecideds by more than half (Table 3). The remaining pool is

TABLE 3

Gallup, Percent Undecided in Final Survey (nonsouth)

	Total Sample	*After "Leaning Question"*	*"Likely Voters" Only*	*After Secret Ballot*
1956 president	14.5	8.5	7.5	3.0
1958 Congress	16.6	8.1	4.7	3.4
1960 president	12.9	7.5	5.1	3.0
1962 Congress	14.8	7.8	5.6	3.3
Mean	14.7	8.0	5.7	3.2

SOURCE: Data are drawn from Paul Perry, "Election Survey Methods," Supplement to *Gallup U.S. Political Index*, December 1965, p. 6.

allocated on the basis of replies to a series of issue questions, not merely proportionally (Table 4).[20] In Britain, only British Gallup takes the trouble to use the ballot box.[21]

[20] Except for Table 4, all American Gallup data as reported exclude the South.

[21] In its February 18–21, 1974 survey British Gallup found 8 percent undecided, without a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

Gallup, November 1968

	Final Survey	*Undecided Allocated*	*Actual*
Nixon	42%	43%	43.5%
Humphrey	40	42	42.9
Wallace	14	15	13.6
Undecided	4		

SOURCE: Data are drawn from a Gallup (U.S.) press release.

Turnout

Having dealt with the undecideds, pollsters have to make another choice concerning voter turnout. Turnout often is related to both class and party affiliation, so differential turnout among the various groups sampled can influence the effective party balance. Yet this is another complicated behavioral choice that may affect accuracy more than the election itself. Pollsters have only reluctantly been persuaded to devote their scarce time to it.

Again the simplest rule-of-thumb is to ignore the problem completely and hope that on average it does not matter very much. Through 1970, neither of the established polls, Gallup or NOP, made any adjustment for turnout. This probably explains why both consistently overestimated the Labour vote over the previous decade (Table 5), since in most cases we would expect working-class Labour supporters to vote proportionately less.

TABLE 5

Labour Share of Vote, Percent Overestimate

	Gallup	*NOP*
1959	1.9%	−0.4%
1964	1.2	2.6
1966	2.3	1.9
1970	5.2	4.3

In 1970 ORC, in its first public campaign appearance, introduced a very simple turnout correction for its final survey. Respondents were asked one question about their likelihood of voting, with five possible answers. Then only the voting choices of those "absolutely certain" and half of those "fairly certain" were included in the final calculations—reducing the Labour margin by an extra 1 percent. These proportions were used because they produced an overall turnout

ballot box. For its final surveys the figure would have ordinarily fallen slightly. Using the ballot box it dropped to 3.5 percent. The remainder were still excluded. *Gallup (U.K.) Political Index*, February 1974, p. 236.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

figure (72 percent) which matched that of the prior election. Since this procedure helped produce ORC's comparative "success" in 1970 (discussed later), all other polls adopted a similar rule-of-thumb in 1974.

Yet again, they found simplicity deceptive. In February, the turnout question inspired a 1–2 percent anti-Labour correction, which postelection studies found to be unjustified. The single question does a fair job of predicting overall turnout (which jumped to 79 percent) but is poor at capturing the complex behavior that determines which groups will actually vote. Even on its own terms the question is problematic. NOP found that more than half ot those who were "certain not to vote" before the election, claimed they actually did in postelection reinterviews, a marked shift even from 1970 (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

Accuracy of Single Turnout Question

Preelection Response		*Certain Not to Vote*	*Not Very Likely to Vote*	*Quite Likely to Vote*	*Very Likely to Vote*	*Certain to Vote*
% claiming to have voted, postelection	1970:	12 (5%)	42 (4%)	48 (7%)	92 (9%)	95 (75%)
	1974:	54 (4%)	71 (2%)	79 (5%)	84 (6%)	96 (82%)

SOURCE: Data are from Barter and O'Brien, "Pre-election Polls— Perils of Prediction," p. 277.
NOTE: Figures in parentheses show percentages of original survey respondents giving each answer.

American Gallup found that combinations of three questions are needed to predict the overall turnout and that as many as nine are useful to decide *who* will turn out. Using these questions concerning knowledge of and interest in the election, and past voting behavior, as well as the usual plan to vote, Gallup computes a score for each respondent on a twenty-point scale. Then the overall turnout ratio is used as a cutoff point to identify the specific "likely voters." This sophisticated procedure produces much more reliable indicators of actual voting behavior. For example, Gallup's average predictions for the overall turnout rate are correct to about 1 percent.[22] (The Gallup data are not costless, though. The technique requires sample sizes up to 50 percent larger, and proportionately more expensive.) Since the questionnaire design is rather standardized, British pollsters in fact ask many questions similar to those in the Gallup scale, but they are never systematically evaluated.

[22] One problem with the single question is its lack of stability. The percentage "certain to vote" shifts significantly even in the last few days. The Gallup scale is effective even when used on the next to last survey, two weeks before election day. This allows plenty of time for the entire sorting procedure to take place. For descriptions of the technique see Perry, "Election Survey Methods," and Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, *Polls, Television and the New Politics* (New York, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 7

Deviation of Final Gallup Poll from Election Results (percent Republican of nonsouth, two-party vote)

	1950	*1952*	*1954*	*1956*	*1958*	*1960*	*Mean*
Total survey	−4.7	−3.6	−4.9	+2.8	−3.5	−0.3	3.3
Planning to vote	−3.5	−2.6	−3.2	+2.6	−2.3	−0.5	2.5
After turnout correction	−0.3	−1.5	−0.5	+3.1	−0.2	+0.1	1.0
With secret ballot				+1.6	+0.2	+0.1	0.6

SOURCE: Data are from Paul Perry, "Gallup Poll Survey Experience, 1950 to 1960," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (1962), 275.

The cumulative improvement in accuracy achieved at each stage by Gallup's treatment of undecideds and likely voters can be seen in Table 7.

From Votes to Seats

In a parliamentary electoral system, the most prominent summary political indicator is the governing party's margin of MP's over all other parties, and especially over its chief opposition. This "Government majority" of parliamentary seats is the conceptual shorthand used by politicians and journalists when they anticipate election outcomes, and we have already noted the pressure on pollsters to translate their data on mass voting behavior into parliamentary terms.

Expressing their findings in the form of seats to be won adds the final increment of concreteness to the pollsters' reports, but the cumulative effect is to make these projections almost completely unreliable. For in the British system, very small shifts in the relative vote for the two major parties often produce sizable changes in the number of seats held, and even greater shifts in effective control of Parliament.[23] The system is also quite sensitive to the geographical distribution of the party vote. In 1964, a 1.9 percent lead in votes brought Labour to office with a bare majority of four seats, while in 1970 the Tories gained a solid working majority with only 2.4 percent more votes than Labour.[24]

This system becomes a mine field when pollsters attempt to employ the usual

[23] The major reason for these shifts is the use of single-member constituencies. See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn., 1971).

[24] Richard Rose has made a similar point: "The logic of converting votes into seats and seats into victory for one side or the other is assumed to follow mechanically from a statement of popular preferences. Yet there is nothing inevitable in the process. . . . The relationship between votes and seats is empirical and contingent." "The Polls and Election Forecasting in February, 1974," in H. R. Penniman (ed.), *Britain at the Polls*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 123, 126.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule-of-thumb for changes in the party lead. "The pollsters had simply applied the formula supplied by the psephologists. Each 1 percent of the gap between the two main parties was said to be worth 18–20 seats majority."[25] So a fragile 3 percent lead for either party, easily the product of all the simplifying assumptions about sampling, undecideds, and turnout, now becomes a likely major victory—sixty seats in the House of Commons.

Furthermore, pollsters, in common with other political commentators, have implicitly assumed that the "normal" conditions of British politics would always prevail. When as in 1974, the two parties no longer gathered 90 percent of the vote, and there were significant third-party and regional differences, no seat calculations that focused on the nationwide major party fight could hope to be adequate. Since the constituency boundaries had also been redrawn for this election, the formulas drawn from oversimplified past experience were a mirage of stability.[26]

In each of the areas discussed in this section, polling organizations have to make some choice if only to get on with their jobs. My contention is that the combined pressures to do their job cheaply and swiftly, and to compete to produce results suitable for newspapers, lead to excessive simplification at each stage. The "increasingly harder analyses" produced embody assumptions that increasingly undermine the reliability of the data.

The data collected and analyzed within polling organizations gain their final political significance when they are passed on to newspapers. Here they are subject to the direct organizational pressures of journalism.

The Polls and the Press

"The manner in which the pre-Election polls were analyzed, presented and published for public consumption contributed materially to the widespread misinterpretation of the results of the polls and to the great public reaction to their failure to pick the winner."[27] When polling data enter the journalistic world, they are subject to a new set of influences as they are processed through the newspaper organization itself. These stem largely from the way newspapers value polls. The attitudes of newspapers and their reporters derive from the dual organizational problems they face. These are, first, the daily routine of gathering enough information to fill a paper and, second, the competitive pressure to have stories the other papers do not. Leon Sigal has described the mood:

> Their organization's insatiable demand for news dominates the incentives of all newsmen. Every day editors have a sizeable news hole to fill. Every day they

[25] Barter and O'Brien, "Pre-election Polls—Perils of Prediction," p. 281.

[26] Gallup has always refrained from seat projections. Having been badly burned twice in an area where they had comparatively little expertise, the other polls refrained from projecting seats in the October 1974 election. Since the demand for prediction remains, this function has now reverted to political journalists. Some polls also began giving the total proportion of undecideds separately, but they were still excluded from the voting calculations.

[27] SSRC Report (U. S.) 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> want something new and original for page one. The overriding organizational imperatives for reporters are to get news and to get it first. . . . Getting news first, in practice, means getting exclusive stories which one reporter alone obtains.[28]

London has retained far more daily newspapers than any major American city, partially because they draw upon a national market. Yet, though there have been individual exceptions, total circulation has been falling since the arrival of television in the mid-1950s. The resulting financial pressures and competition for each other's readers, have strongly heightened the editorial competitiveness. As a *Guardian* executive described it: "Fleet Street, rightly or wrongly, sensibly or ritually, continues to believe that late, hard, preferably exclusive news sells papers."[29]

For newspapers, polls are a means for satisfying the demand for hard, exclusive news. Polling data are particularly useful because if appropriately packaged, they become a newspaper exclusive that requires no special reportorial initiative and can be scheduled in advance.

This is why newspapers are willing to pay the comparatively sizable sums required to have their own poll. A single, complete random survey can cost the sponsor up to £5000 ($12,500). In the three-week February campaign some newspapers spent more than £20,000 ($50,000) and their collective expenses went over £100,000 ($250,000).[30] In fact, the costliness reinforces the newspapers' attitudes toward polling data. Anything that expensive can only be justified if it is not only exclusive but important, hard, certain information.

News stories of this character usually are assigned to senior political reporters for write-up. Despite their status, these men have the wrong skills to produce a critical evaluation of written, statistical data, for they are trained to piece together stories from conversations with successive politicians. They "rely in general upon the personal approach. Documents are scanned, but on the whole the written word is valued much less than the spoken word."[31] This problem is accentuated by the traditional isolation in Britain of those with any sort of statistical background. On newspaper staffs, such reporters pursue a separate career ladder in the business and finanical department. As a result, "some lobby correspondents' ignorance of economics and finance and their lack of simple numeracy seemed to be fairly complete."[32]

When faced with a statistical report, most political reporters give it all the scientific credence of the uninitiated. Though they disparage experts, their stories convey uncritical acceptance of expertise: the supposed importance of polling data grows larger in their hands.

[28] Leon Sigal, *Reporters and Officials* (Lexington, Mass., 1973), pp. 52–53.

[29] Peter Preston, the *Guardian*, August 28, 1974, p. 14. See also Rudolf Klein, "The Powers of the Press," *The Political Quarterly*, 44 (January 1973), 33–46. On the financial problems see the *Economist*, April 6, 1974, pp. 66–67.

[30] *The Times*, March 2, 1974.

[31] Jeremy Tunstall, *The Westminster Lobby Correspondents* (London, 1970), p. 27.

[32] Ibid., p. 108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Write-up conventions do not improve the situation. In reaction to past competitive excesses, the norms of American journalism stress neutral reporting by detached observers. In Britain, senior reporters see themselves as political insiders, and they retain a personal, subjective style. Not-for-attribution stories, a controversial practice in Washington, are the accepted way at Westminster. These stories often feature political predictions as evidence of their privileged status: "For the individual journalist, the accurate anticipation of subsequent announcements is seen as the ultimate validation of his news gathering ability and the quality of his information."[33] So the stories reporting the polls only strengthen the tendencies to simplify and exaggerate the meaning of the findings.

Some polling organizations have begun writing portions of the interpretive stories themselves. Yet, except for Gallup, their work has been subject to the same journalistic pressures and expectations. They have substituted so well in the political reporters' role that there has been no effective difference in the tone of the stories: "In the end Labour failed to capitalise on Conservative failures because in Harold Wilson they had a party leader who could not begin to attract the personal following he had in former years and who seemed to most voters to lack the spark of even 1970."[34] That overpessimistic prediction was written by the Harris Poll itself.

Once written, poll stories are also subject to the well-known traits of headline writers. Their job, especially on the mass-circulation papers, is to encapsulate and dramatize. A page-one poll story is often prime material.

Finally, much of the collective impact of poll results comes when they are related by other newspapers and on broadcast news programs. These secondary reports contain only the percentages for each party. None of the qualifications that may have found their way into the original stories remain.[35]

So newspapers provide context and meaning for polling data in a way highly colored by their own organizational needs and perspective. One more layer of interpretation, but no greater clarity, has been added.

[33] Ibid., p. 80.

[34] Harris Poll, *Daily Express*, February 28, 1974.

[35] There are also a large number of American state and local newspapers where the organizational environment creates the same incentives. The tabloid *New York Daily News*, for example, began its own statewide "Straw Poll" (a very crude precurser to quota polling) in 1928. New York then had a half-dozen very competitive papers much like London today. The *News* poll developed its own flamboyant style which it retained into the 1960s. The poll reports became widely followed by local politicians, since the paper constantly stressed its accuracy in "picking the winner." The data for the one survey were collected over several weeks and published in sections to provide a "day-to-day build up of interest and suspense" and a parallel circulation boost. The poll's prescientific methodology, lack of turnout controls, and wide margins of error were all obscured by stories that left no room for doubt. "Straw Poll results forecasting future events are reported in much the same style as the facts developed in yesterday's murder trial." Only after being badly burned in its 1966 predictions did the *News* adopt random sampling. Charles Roll, Jr., "Straws in the Wind: The Record of the *Daily News* Poll," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1968), 260, 256.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At this point, a look at the campaign period itself will reveal the mutual interaction between the processes of polls and the political world at large.

The Polls in the Campaign: February 1974

"At election time, under close scrutiny from politicians and journalists, and needing to get the answer right in a competitive situation, pollsters can be relied to do their damnedest."[36] Critics of the polls often find their hectic activity during the final week of the campaign to be their least justifiable characteristic. Why should polls and newspapers devote so much of their resources to finding out what everyone will know two or three days later?

Because polls are commissioned for their news value, this concentrated effort should be no surprise. Curiosity and interest in an election rise as the voting day gets nearer. Especially in close races, readers are drawn to stories during the last week that anticipate the winner. Newspapers schedule their poll reports with this in mind.

The final published poll is also the only one which will be compared with the actual result. So polling organizations, besides providing timely news, take special care with the one projection that can provide retrospective validation for their entire effort. Their overall reputation for the next five years (in their non-political business as well) can be shaped by forty-eight hours' work.

Creating the Bandwagon

These pressures usually build slowly from the time an election is considered likely. However, February 1974 was a time of crisis. Locked in an impasse with the miner's union, Edward Heath decided upon a general election to renew the authority of his government. While the election itself had been partially anticipated, the timetable took pollsters and others by surprise. Heath had allowed only twenty-one days for the campaign, the legal minimum, and at least a week shorter than usual.

So the pollsters found themselves severely constrained by time. The polls that employed quota surveys, Gallup and ORC, had their interviewers in the field less than twenty-four hours later. (Gallup would have its interviewers at work every day of the campaign.) Random surveys take longer to arrange and to carry out, so the Harris Poll found that they would be able to squeeze in only two full random surveys. They hurriedly arranged for two "quickie" quota polls of their own to fill in the gaps.

Quality control and accuracy were the losers. The first Harris quota poll came up with an eleven-point Tory lead which even its staff found doubtful. Gallup's first poll was better planned, but was too large to be finished in the four days allotted. Twenty percent of the potential interview data were still missing when the poll report went to press on February 14, exactly one week from the start.

[36] David Butler, *The Canberra Model* (London, 1974), p. 111.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All of the first round of polls reported Conservative leads, and it was this unanimity which the press conveyed to the waiting politicians and other political observers.

Most politicians have few independent sources of information about public opinion. "Their methods are primitive and unreliable. Usually the method involves asking the views of people whom they meet."[37] This is particularly true during a campaign when most of their personal contacts are partisans. So British politicians are particularly dependent on the habit of mind Sigal found in Washington—using the contents of the press as an indicator:

> What news stories say about public opinion can directly affect officials' perceptions. Because of the difficulty of ascertaining public opinion on any given issue, officials rely on the opinion of commentators and editorial writers for a "quick reading of the public mind." As a consequence, the press not only shapes and represents public opinion but also *is* public opinion in the eyes of officials.[38]

When the message conveyed by the press and the polls matches the prior expectations held by politicians, the impact is all the greater. "I am only completely convinced by the findings of the Gallup Poll," wrote Richard Crossman, "when they confirm my own impressions of what the public is thinking." In February, the first and then the second round of poll reports confirmed the conventional wisdom: when the party in power calls an election at a time of its own choice, it will remain in power. In each of the four campaigns from 1966 on, the widespread expectation has been for a stable or increased government majority.

It is important to realize that the remarkably compact and centralized British political elite is mirrored by an equally closed group of senior political editors. "The lobby suffers, too, from the characteristic English tendency to 'clubbability' and can all too easily become part of the parliamentary establishment, a tendency encouraged by the fact that it lives and works at Westminster."[39]

In interaction largely with each other they constantly elaborate a consensus view of the political future. The politicians feed back their own expectations, now fortified by poll reports. Together, politicians and reporters create an enlarged version of the elite bandwagon Mervin Field described in 1970.

> A bandwagon of sorts did exist during the campaign and had a powerful effect on the political and communications establishment. Once the thing got rolling, the politicians, political writers and pollsters themselves were overcome by inhaling the powerful exhaust fumes from this peculiar bandwagon . . . they completely ignored poll evidence available to them that . . . could have led to the conclusion that Labour was by no means a sure victor in the election [and] that the election would be closer than most people were led to believe.[40]

[37] Richard Rose, "Political Decision-Making and the Polls," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 15 (1962), 193.

[38] Sigal, *Reporters and Officials*, p. 135.

[39] Ian Waller, "The Press and the Politicians," in R. Rose (ed.), *Studies in British Politics*, 2d ed. (New York, 1969), pp. 211–212.

[40] M. D. Field, "A Transatlantic View," in Rose, *The Polls and the 1970 Election*, p. 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 8

Average Error on Party Lead
(major polls, 1955–1974)

1955	1.1%
1959	1.0
1964	1.0
1966	4.0
1970	5.3
1974 (Feb.)	3.0

The bandwagon was much the same in 1974 except that it was now those Tory upset winners who were sure to remain in the government. To see the full extent of the bandwagon in action we must return to the pollsters in their final week of judgment.

The Once and Future Choice

Major innovation in organizations, especially that which threatens operating assumptions, tends to be rare. It often takes the stimulus of a severe organizational trauma—such as dramatic failure in public—to effect radical change. This has been the experience for polling organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. American Gallup once professed all the assumptions that were unquestioned in Britain before 1970. Undecideds were excluded, turnout was ignored, and late changes of opinion went unrecorded by pollsters who finished work ten days before the campaign ended. These practices combined to produce Gallup's own 1948 banner headline: "Final Gallup Poll Shows Dewey Winning Election with Wide Electoral Vote Margin." When Dewey's margin turned out to be negative, all those practices came under sustained attack and Gallup began developing the more sophisticated techniques now in use.

Unfortunately for the British polls, which began with already outmoded techniques, public failure has come much later and its stimulus has been misdirected. During the polls' formative years the electorate was remarkably stable and regular, and the original techniques became ingrained. Only the increasing volatility of the electorate since 1966 has exposed the problems inherent in those simple assumptions (Table 8).[41] However, the errors in 1966 were on the side of the victors, so little attention was paid.[42]

Though their statistical error was only slightly higher in 1970, the polls and

[41] Data on earlier years from the *Economist*, September 7, 1974, p. 14.

[42] "The British polls failed to take full advantage of American experience under the assumption that elections in Great Britain involve factors different from those found in U.S. elections. As it turned out, the 1970 failure of the polls in the Wilson-Heath contest was almost an exact replay of the 1948 experience in the United States." Gallup, *The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide*, p. 201; and George Gallup, "The Gallup Poll and the 1950 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1951).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 9

Final Polls, June 1970

	Actual	*ORC*	*Harris*	*NOP*	*Gallup*
Conservative	46.2%	46.5%	46.0%	44.0%	42.0%
Labour	43.8	45.5	48.0	48.1	49.0
Liberal	7.6	6.5	5.0	6.4	7.5
Others	2.4	1.5	1.0	1.3	1.5
Conservative lead	2.4	1.0	−2.0	−4.1	−7.0

their press commentators were caught spectacularly far on the wrong side of the Heath upset victory. Their error was increased by scheduling the final surveys too early to detect the apparent turn of the tide in the last week (Table 9).

ORC was the one glaring exception. Their final full survey showed the same substantial Labour lead (Table 10).[43] But they had reinterviewed a small portion of the sample on the two days before the election. Though they only reached

TABLE 10

ORC Final Survey, June 1970 (sample sizes in parentheses)

	June 13–15 (1,580)	*Reinterviews June 16–17 (257)*	*Reinterviews as Published (with turnout correction)*
Conservative	42.0%	45.5%	46.5%
Labour	46.5	45.5	45.5
Liberal	10.0	7.5	6.5
Others	1.5	1.5	1.5
Conservative lead	−4.5	.0	1.0

257 people—hardly enough for a precise reestimate—the magnitude of the shift was dramatic. When the new results were extrapolated to the whole sample, the Labour lead had completely vanished. ORC then adjusted the results for turnout as well (using the crude method described above), and their original prediction reversed to show a Tory victory. As a result of these last-minute changes, which altered their "final" party lead by a full 5.5 points, ORC won its (oft-proclaimed) laurels as "the one polling organization which correctly predicted the result of the last election."

The other polls however drew the wrong lesson from their defeat. ORC's victory seemed to show that some new turnout factor and any sort of down-to-the-wire survey could make the difference. Above all, major corrections to the raw

[43] Data from Teer and Spence, *Political Opinion Polls*, p. 197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 11

NOP Raw Data, Final Surveys, February 1974

	New Survey Feb. 25–26 (832)	*Reinterviews Feb. 25–26 (1,008)*	*Phone Survey Feb. 27 (245)*	*Published Estimate (including turnout)*
Conservative	39.2%	39.4%	40.5%	39.5%
Labour	37.1	36.7	34.9	35.5
Liberal	21.7	21.8	21.0	22.0
Others	2.0	2.1	3.6	3.0
Conservative lead	2.1	2.7	5.6	4.0

data were justified if they brought the published prediction down on the right side of the line.[44]

Given the state of the art in Britain, the choices waiting to be made are great. Each poll now conducts its final full survey on the weekend prior to Election Day. At the same time these data are being processed, for publication on Tuesday or Wednesday, the final spot-checks for "late swing" are being carried out. The polls now accept that their interviewing must continue until the last twenty-four to forty-eight hours, but this reform brings new problems as well. In the time available it is impossible to reinterview more than a relatively small proportion (about one-third) of the earlier sample. If there are doubts about the reliability of the full sample, the poll may conduct a small new survey as well. Both of these spot-checks suffer from small numbers and the inevitable interview/processing errors under the intense pressures.

Table 11 indicates the typical data available as a result of these efforts in the last few days. NOP had both reinterviews and a new poll—with partially differing results—and a tiny telephone poll as well. The poll's management had to decide which of these seemed most reliable, and then if the data justified a correction for turnout.

Each poll's judgment is inevitably shaped by its intimate relationship with the political establishment, and especially with other polls. The extensive formal and historical links between the polls, the press, and the parties give some sense of how intertwined they are in practice.[45]

[44] Even with superior techniques, the American polls also have difficult choices that are far from automatic, as in the tight 1968 presidential race. As the outlook for peace seemed to brighten over the final weekend, Louis Harris watched a three-point Nixon lead dissolve into a three-point Humphrey edge in his daily poll returns. Though the combined survey showed a dead heat, Harris was convinced that he had found a firm trend and published only the Sunday data—with Humphrey in front—as his final projection. Gallup chose to average his data as usual and accurately anticipated the slim Nixon victory. Harris claims that a still later unpublished poll caught the swing back to Nixon on Monday. See Mendelsohn and Crespi, *Polls, Television and the New Politics*, p. 77; and Theodore White, *The Making of the President 1968* (New York, 1969), p. 384.

[45] Gallup was the original British poll. NOP was founded by ex-Gallup staffers in coopera-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In America where the links are most distant, George Gallup has testified to the consistent monitoring of the competition: "Obviously, each poll examines carefully the findings of the other polls. . . . It is a competitive world, and every poll hopes to be more accurate than its rivals. . . . The pressure to be 'right' in election polling is great; in fact almost overwhelming."[46]

With the ties far closer and the competition more intense in Britain, the monitoring throughout the campaign can be compulsive. British Gallup, for one example, had consistently shown a closer race than their major competitors. Concerned that they were "out of line" with the others, the Gallup management conducted a detailed critical review of their procedures in the midst of the campaign. Only after the staff had defended their choices in depth were the differing trends accepted.

The last bits of data are not available until very late, so in the end all the pressures fall upon the one or two senior men who must complete their work in a matter of hours.

> The moment of decision comes on Wednesday afternoon, because the client requires the final poll results that evening for publication on Thursday morning, General Election Day. The executives will usually have about *two hours* in which to examine the results of their final survey, arrive at a final prediction of voting behaviour and write their report.[47]

The pollsters admit that they add "trend analysis" into their judgments. Since, for all reasons already cited, any trends found are in the eye of the beholder, this amounts to a statistical proxy for jumping on the Establishment bandwagon which they helped to create.

In 1970 Peter Bartram of the Harris Poll provided a fine description of a poll director's state of mind while making these final choices:

> Although we had found strong evidence of the late Conservative recovery, we were faced by a wealth of conflicting evidence concerning the final result. [This included two different surveys and three possible correction factors.] On the eve of polling day with the other polls strung out in a line giving Labour a lead of between 4% and 12% . . . we settled for a 2% Labour lead. . . . We had insufficient evidence in the light of past polling practice to go out on a limb to predict a clear Conservative victory.

---

tion with the *Daily Mail*, which retains ownership. A NOP pollster together with the *Mail's* political editor started ORC, primarily to do private polls for the Tories (which they have continued while working for *The Times* as well). ORC and the *Express*, in turn, gave birth to Ha:ris (in cooperation with American Harris). Yet another NOP offshoot, Market and Opinion Research does Labour's private polls. Business Decisions now has minority-owners-in-common with Gallup. ORC and Harris have become dual subsidiaries of American Harris. Market and Opinion has also been financially restructured.

[46] Gallup, *The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide*, pp. 152, 125.

[47] J. H. Barter, "The Problems of Election Polling," *Market Research Society Newsletter*, no. 99, June 1974, p. 8. Italics added.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 12

Business Decisions Final Survey, February 1974

	Raw Data	*Plus Turnout Correction I*	*Plus Turnout Correction II*
Conservative	35.0%	36.0%	37.5%
Labour	37.5	37.5	36.5
Liberal	23.5	23.0	22.0
Others	4.0	3.5	5.0
Conservative lead	−2.5	−1.5	1.0

> And so on election night we were content to rest where we were in comparison to our competitors, predicting a narrow Labour win. . . .[48]

In February 1974, it was a Tory bandwagon. Business Decisions, nervously polling their first election, came out with Labour unexpectedly in front in their final survey. Their first turnout correction still left Labour stubbornly in the lead. Only when they excluded all but the absolutely definite voters did a Conservative lead appear (Table 12). This last was highlighted in their report to the *Observer*. By accident the reporter assigned to write up the story noticed the far different tale in the additional tables supplied. His confusion produced an excellent equivocal report, the only one which mentioned that victory depended on relative turnout.[49]

At the other polls, the hands were more experienced but the perceptions were the same. As shown above, NOP's final survey showed Conservative leads of 2.1 and 2.7 percent. After adding an additional 1 percent for turnout, their final choice raised the party lead to 4 percent. Gallup's reinterviews of its random sample were favorable to Labour's chances. But it had also conducted a final quota sample which was considerably more pro-Tory. The quota sample appeared less reliable though, so when the two polls were *combined* for the final estimate the random survey was given a 2:1 weight. It was this prediction—of a slim Tory edge—that was later acclaimed "most accurate"! (See Table 13.)

None of these qualms surfaced in the published poll reports, which were firmly on the wagon despite evidence to the contrary even stronger than in 1970. Certainly the onrush of antigovernment political and economic news should have given some warning (after all, the consensus about 1970 was that one set of bad trade figures had made the difference).

But the final stories were unyielding. Under the banner headline "A Handsome Win for Heath," the *Mail's* NOP story firmly awaited "a heavily increased majority of 50 to 60 seats." ORC in *The Times* was not to be outdone and fore-

[48] Rose, *The Polls and the 1970 Election*, p. 27.

[49] The *Observer* is a Sunday newspaper, so the final Business Decisions poll was conducted on the Thursday before.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 13

Final Polls, February 1974

	Actual Votes	*Seats*	*ORC*	*Harris*	*NOP*	*Gallup*	*Business Decisions*
Conservative	38.8%	(296)	39.7%	40.2%	39.5%	39.5%	35.0%
Labour	38.0	(301)	36.7	35.2	35.5	37.5	37.5
Liberal	19.8	(14)	21.2	22.0	22.0	20.5	23.5
Others	3.4	(24)	2.4	2.7	3.0	2.5	4.0
Conservative lead	0.8	–	3.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	–2.5

saw a majority of 60–80, "but it could be bigger . . . the Tories might still be pulling away."

The final Harris poll story in the *Daily Express* was representative:

> In the final hours of this campaign, enough potential Liberal voters have come back to the Tory column to insure the Conservatives a solid 5 point lead in today's election . . . a 30–60 seat absolute majority. . . .
>
> In the end the resurgence of Conservative strength can be traced to the stronger showing made on the electorate by the Prime Minister in his final election broadcast compared with that of Harold Wilson, along with growing concern among voters that Labour might pull a last minute upset and squeak out a victory. It is also apparent that the people rejected the prospect of a minority government, the prevailing feeling is that the ruling party must be given a solid majority to work with to solve the grave problems now confronting Britain.
>
> With this victory, the Heath-lead Conservatives will now be firmly committed to a course of moderation for that mandate came through strongly and repeatedly in the polling.[50]

In this particular case, the "resurgence of Conservative strength" discussed by Harris was entirely an artifact of the pollster's assumptions. The article never mentions that a turnout correction was applied *for the first time* to the final published poll. As Table 14 shows, the Liberals actually lost ground equally to both parties in the reinterviews. The apparent net Troy gain in the published figures is due to the sudden introduction of the turnout factor, not to any last-minute changes in opinion—as sampled—at all.

[50] Louis Harris came to Britain for the election and wrote this final story. That, in itself, is some measure of the differential pressures in Britain, since he would have been unlikely to describe any of his American data in such uncompromising terms. To be fair, Harris was also the most honest after the election: "We of the Harris Poll could not have been more mistaken. As the late Mayor of New York, Fiorello la Guardia, once said, 'If you are going to make a mistake, make it a beaut—but always admit it!' So be it with us today."

American Gallup sends out the same nonexclusive story for use by all its subscribers. It is mild and carefully hedged to be as close to a nonprediction as possible.

The British stories improved only slightly in October. The headlines were smaller and the stories a bit less flamboyant, but still remarkably certain. An exception was the *Observer*, which hired academic Michael Steed, who did an excellent analysis of the polling data.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 14

Harris Poll Final Surveys, February 1974

	Feb. 24–25	*Reinterviews Feb. 26–27 Raw Figures*	*Reinterviews as Published (with turnout correction)*
Conservative	38.0%	39.1%	40.2%
Labour	34.5	35.4	35.2
Liberal	25.0	22.9	22.0
Others	2.5	2.5	2.7
Conservative lead	3.5	3.7	5.0

The election itself, of course, produced a slim Tory lead in votes and the first minority government—Labour—since 1929. "Faced with what every market researcher knows to be a fiendishly difficult problem," said a defender of the polls, "to get results as close as these is a very remarkable achievement."[51]

So political polling, potentially a major political indicator, is so distorted by each successive stage in the competition for certainty that it becomes spurious feedback. The political elite remains collectively mired in the dilemma of the Washington bureaucrat: "Listening to the news for the sound of public opinion, officials hear echoes of their own voices; looking for pictures of the world outside, they see reflections of their own images."[52]

Conclusion

Even if polling data as now used are as deceptive as portrayed, is there any real impact on the political system? To fully answer that question would require more information than is now available, especially about the politics of campaign decision making, where we would expect the impact to be greatest. But we can begin by examining some recent cases.

It seems likely that the overconfident losers—Heath in 1974, Wilson in 1970, Dewey in 1948—would have "tried harder" had they realized how precarious their positions were. Yet it is not evident what form this effort would have taken. Would there have been any change of strategy that would have drawn different issues or programs into the public eye? As Rose wrote more than a decade ago: "Parties are coalitions of ideological and material interests, some of which are remarkably impervious to public opinion. To attempt a quick change in a major party policy is to risk upsetting the balance of the coalition."[53] Though the McGovern campaign's sophisticated private polling confirmed the gloomy message of the Gallup polls, there was little significant change in the candidate's

[51] Gerald Goodhart, chairman of the pollsters trade group, March 1974.
[52] Sigal, *Reporters and Officials*, p. 186.
[53] Rose, "Political Decision-Making," p. 198.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stance. Might not a less confident Heath simply have indulged in still more "ideological trench warfare"?[54]

Yet Rose's recent work stresses that the response to political information is contingent: it depends on the attitude of the recipients toward the cost of political change. If W. D. Burnham is correct that the 1974 elections foreshadowed a major realignment of British voting habits and issue cleavages, then politicians will necessarily become more responsive to the new data. The relevant case may be the 1968 presidential campaign, where the polling data showed Humphrey trailing, but the outcome uncertain. This information stimulated a major shift in Humphrey's stance on Vietnam, one that almost brought him victory.

In fact, during the October 1974 campaign the major parties and the Liberals were also seriously divided over the most effective stance to project, but the conflicts were muted by another seemingly inevitable result. If the slenderness of the Labour victory had been foreseen, the intraparty disputes that surfaced after Election Day probably would have broken out earlier. So the same electoral volatility that has made current polling techniques unreliable makes the need for accurate indicators all the greater.

More generally, we need to evaluate the political context that influences the production of all social indicators. The polling organizations are only one explicit case of a widespread phenomenon. For example, experts in the field are aware that police activity has as much impact on crime rates as that of criminals; and that the balance of payments can be estimated in a variety of ways. There is almost no awareness that American unemployment figures are subject to the usual survey errors, or that both nations' cost-of-living indices embody a host of assumptions about trends in the consumer's market basket. Yet all of these "certain" figures have great political salience when they appear in print.

If social indicators are our best means for monitoring industrial societies, we need to be more sensitive to the organizational basis of our perceptual techniques.*

[54] W. D. Burnham, "Britain 1974: How Critical the Election?" M.I.T. mimeo, 1974. A full discussion would require information on the increased attention paid to private polling by both parties in 1974. It is unclear to what extent those polls presented a different picture, and how much credence they were given. It appears that in February ORC's private Tory polls agreed with their public ones in *The Times*. Labour's polls offered more hope than they were finding elsewhere. In October, both parties' data showed a closer race, but not a deadlock.

* The research for this work was partially supported by travel grants from the Harvard Center for European Studies and the M.I.T. Center for International Studies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy *by George W. Ball. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1976.—x, 356 pp. $12.95.*

George Ball has written an analysis of American foreign policy that smashingly attacks Henry Kissinger, rails against intellectuals and college students, and encapsulates the current conventional wisdom that United States foreign policy must reflect the Trilateral Commission's emphasis on the Atlantic community and Japan. The book will receive attention because this senior statesman devastates Kissinger's policies with clear prose, wit, and a concern for human decency.

The volume merits attention, however, because Ball, like Herbert Hoover in the early 1920s, is a liberal whose philosophy probes deeply while containing dangerous contradictions. Hoover knew, for example, that while experts were necessary, the intellectuals' critique of capitalism was to be feared. Ball calls for expertise, but terms Vietnam the intellectuals' war and believes the "virulent politics" of campuses "prepared one for the worst practices of Washington" (p. 11). He does not specify to which university faculty John Mitchell and Maurice Stans belonged. Ball, like Hoover, admonishes us to know our history, then bases his own arguments on historical inaccuracies: "isolationism" in the 1920s was not as simple as Ball believes; it is utterly misleading to indicate that the Marshall Plan welcomed Soviet membership; and the United States turned *off* the oil to Britain during the 1956 Suez crisis before sharing oil with our "allies" (p. 159). He uses Soviet intervention in Angola as proof of Russian expansionism without discussing the previous American and Chinese roles in the area. His view of Angola and Vietnam is interesting since Ball later urges "limited help to local patriots" who fight Moscow or Peking (p. 220). One man's "local patriot," of course, can become another's Diem.

Hoover and Ball are most alike in fearing that Western capitalism is on the skids. In a classic case of killing the bearer of bad news, Ball would again like to blame "a few intellectuals" for helping to give multinationals a reputation for exploitation and bribery (p. 291). Yet he is also realistic and honest, realizing that his political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hopes rest on a viable Western capitalist economy. Ball therefore fears that Europe threatens to move rapidly toward "variegated forms of corporatism or socialism or semisocialism," thus making the reconciliation of United States and European political plans "increasingly difficult" (p. 170). This is the key statement in the book and the reason why he emphasizes United States leadership in the Atlantic community while downgrading Russia and China.

Ball finally sees hope only if we return to the idea of the frontier, "a concept of vast plains, wide distances, where men and women could move at will" (p. 330). This was the standard response until the 1920s and 1930s when Hoover and Roosevelt, among others, realized that the problem was precisely the closing of frontiers and the need for new domestic political arrangements. Ball never considers these alternatives. He might have talked with those intellectuals who grapple with this problem, one that is more fundamental than Kissinger's "Lone Ranger" policies.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy *by Jerome H. Kahan. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1975.—xii, 361 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $5.50.*

Nuclear Weapons and International Behavior *by Henry T. Nash. The Netherlands, A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Company, 1975.—x, 172 pp. $15.00.*

Jerome Kahan wrote *Security in the Nuclear Age* when he was a member of that rather phenomenal stable of strategic defense analysts at the Brookings Institution prior to joining the Kissinger Policy Planning staff in the State Department. The words that come to mind in reading this book are "sensible," "balanced," "tough minded." One would not use words like "soft"—or "hawkish." Like others of his colleagues at Brookings, as well as in the Policy Planning staff, Kahan accepts the indefinite continuation of an adversary relationship with the Soviet Union, the presence of nuclear weapons, and the need for stable deterrence as the basic strategic policy of our era. He has no faith in drastic arms reductions or disarmament–but he is also appropriately critical of strategies of overkill, meaningless superiority, and high-risk brinksmanship.

The recommended policy has three aspects: a secure second strike retaliatory capability; accelerated efforts to negotiate SALT agreements with the Soviet Union; and—the more original element in his analyses—discovery of ways to reduce the significance of nuclear weapons in the arsenals and expectations of the world's powers.

The author makes this recommendation after an excellent description and analysis of modern strategic doctrines involving nuclear weapons, from the early massive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retaliation fantasy, through the flexible response variation, culminating in the mutual assured destruction strategy, appropriately acronymed MAD.

The latest news in the strategic debate in recent years was, of course, Defense Secretary Schlesinger's advocacy of a "limited war-fighting capability" raising once again the possibility of contemplating nuclear weapons as a rational means of achieving military objectives. After rehearsing the familiar arguments of making war more "humane" if it should happen versus opening Pandora's box yet another crack, the author opts for a fire-break between nuclear and other forms of warfare with which most of his colleagues in the arms control community would enthusiastically agree. He develops a good exegesis of the Nixon-Kissinger "sufficiency" doctrine, and correctly concentrates, not on the macabre abstract scenario of nuclear exchange, but on the far more real threat of crisis instability.

In his tightly reasoned argument, Kahan defends the "triad"—underground, airborne, and undersea nuclear missile capabilities—in the name of diversity. The argument is not overpowering, since if all we had ever had was a "dyad," doubtless that is what prudent strategists would be recommending we maintain. At the same time he is critical of the so-called bargaining chip approach to ABM and MIRV—chips which have so far given us only half a win with the ABM, and a permanent headache with the United States unilateral development of MIRV just prior to the first SALT talks.

In sum, this book is a welcome addition to the library that has become unfortunately thin as the earlier generation of arms control analysts ran out of ideas and originality (or perhaps because some arms control began to be actually negotiated). It seems to be ideal as a text for students.

Henry Nash's book *Nuclear Weapons and International Behavior* is quite a different genre—an extremely thoughtful analysis of the way in which nuclear weapons have changed certain historic concepts such as the balance of power, alliances, and warfare itself. The work is theoretical and conceptual in its thrust, which is not to say that it is any less useful or usable than the Kahan book, but simply to indicate the rigor with which Nash has advanced his hypotheses (the behavior of nations has changed in the nuclear era and these behavioral alterations can constitute a positive contribution to efforts to bring about a more stable international environment), and his fidelity to those hypotheses by means of a well-reasoned and historically grounded analysis. The book is relatively brief but thought provoking, and an additional welcome contribution to an increasingly impoverished literature.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream *by Doris Kearns. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976.—xii, 432 pp. $12.50.*

As every reader of this *Quarterly* must know by now, this book has been heralded by fulsome encomia by popular reviewers, been selected for the Book-of-the-Month

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Club, and made the best-seller list. The time has now come for more leisurely and exacting academic evaluation, and in that spirit it can be certified that this is a useful study for political scientists, but an incomplete work in political psychology.

Although publicized as a psychological study, Professor Kearns has, in fact, written a book with five aspects; or maybe it is five books, of somewhat different quality, combined but not integrated as one. All too briefly they are as follows:

1. *The Private Words of Lyndon Johnson.* Seemingly everyone who knew President Johnson has a storehouse of anecdotes revolving around his earthy language and awesome manners, but the late president unquestionably chose to confide in Kearns some of his most private anxieties and haunting dreams. While others are torn between the constraints of confidentiality and the impulses of oneupsmanship and are therefore at something of a loss as to what to do with their stories, Kearns has no such problem—Johnson obviously expected, indeed wished, her to tell all he chose to share with her. Her revelations are fascinating as human interest and extraordinarily useful for analyzing the character of one of our more complex presidents.

2. *The Biographical Record.* Kearns has supplemented her exciting firsthand material with a lackluster chronological biography. Aside from some information on Johnson's adolescence there is little that is original in this "book."

3. *An Analysis of Power and Institutions.* Once Kearns gets Johnson to Washington, she engages in extensive discussions about the logic of power in the different institutions of the House, Senate, and presidency. At this point the role of personality nearly vanishes as she introduces a rational-actor model in which rationality, limited by structural constraints and available resources, is sovereign among actors bent on maximizing their influence. "Personality" and political "style" become little more than forms of "resources" to be appropriately or inappropriately deployed. The tradition of her analysis is an old one, which is having a revival in political science, and her sources for ideas range from Machiavelli to Cambridge colleagues.

4. *A Liberal Perspective.* At a different level of analysis Kearns ideologically evaluates the Johnson presidency and finds his domestic policies good—indeed his civil rights measures great—and his foreign policies, which become only Vietnam, bad; and in the end the evil of Vietnam destroys the good of the Great Society, and so Johnson becomes a tragic figure. She ignores recent scholarship which suggests that many Great Society programs were inherently flawed and holds to the belief that Johnson destroyed his virtuous domestic creation by devoting too much time and effort to his Vietnam obsession. (Critics who feel that the war effort was impeded by Johnson's excessive meddling may want to turn the tables on Kearns and argue that the Great Society was blessed by being spared Johnson's attention.) Her ambivalences about Johnson's policies seem to heighten her ambivalances about his character; and she is furthermore strangely blind to the possibility that a man who would revive, in the late 1960s, New Deal approaches domestically and stubbornly cling to the "lesson of Munich" in foreign affairs was more consistent and less in conflict with himself than someone who accepts the continuing efficacy of the one experience and not the other.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. *Political Psychology.* Finally, Kearns has written many pages of insightful and subtle interpretation of the dynamics of Johnson's personality. Her thesis is that he was torn between a mother who "hoped to find in his intellectual and cultural achievement a recompense for her dead father, unhappy marriage, and thwarted ambition" and a father who "considered intellect and culture unmanly pursuits" (p. 369). Deprived of sustaining love and compelled to gain affection as rewards for successes, Johnson became a driven man constantly in search of reassurance and of evidence of his efficacy. Johnson "sought revenge on his mother" (p. 373) who taught elocution by being a miserable public speaker, and sought identity with his father by filling his private speech with excessively "masculine" language. There is, of course, much more to her interpretation.

As far as it goes, Kearns's interpretation is brilliant, but there seems to have been a failure of nerve for she has been unwilling to test systematically her insights against the full record of Johnson's political behavior. She thus teases us with glimpses of her skills in political psychology and then withdraws into the security of her other four "books." Consequently, she gives the impression of writing for several audiences and being unsure of what her contribution to knowledge should be. Kearns could have given her book intellectual coherence if she either had integrated her institutional and psychological analyses so as to have enriched her "rational-actor" model with human elements, or had explicitly compared the relative illuminating powers of the two approaches. But she shied away from these difficult alternatives, and now it will be up to others to carry out the demanding assignment of determining whether there is a consistent match between President Johnson's political style and Kearns's interpretation of his psychological dynamics.

LUCIAN W. PYE
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Twilight of Capitalism *by Michael Harrington. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1976.—446 pp. $10.95.*

This volume consists of two parts: first, a reassessment and vindication of the heritage of Karl Marx; and second, a critical analysis of some major features of contemporary American society. The two parts, however, seem disconnected, so that the reader who expects a rigorous dissection of American capitalism in the light of the Marxian tenets discussed in the first part is likely to be disappointed. The Marxian stress on the unity of theory and practice is not conspicuous here. Instead, in the first part Harrington threatens with the big Marxist stick only to conclude in the second that we better not go too fast.

In Part I (and in a series of appendices) Harrington attempts to extract the valid core of Marxist doctrine and to distinguish it from what he considers the many past and contemporary fallacies concerning Marx's essential message. In this endeavor he states that Marx himself and the Marxists "made a major contribution to the mis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understanding of Marxism" (p. 59). Marx was not an economic determinist, nor should he be understood as a positivistic evolutionist despite some unfortunate statements, even from his own pen, and more often from that of Engels. Perhaps. But if, as the author avers, Marx "conceptualizes society as an organic whole in which the economic, the political, the sociological and the cultural so interpenetrate one another that they cannot be explained in and of themselves" (p. 104), then it becomes unclear what distinguishes the Marxian vision from that of a great number of other thinkers. The proletariat, the main actor in the Marxian drama, is all but absent in Harrington's account.

Curiously enough, the most distinctively relevant element of the Marxian canon for Harrington is the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value developed in the first volume of *Das Kapital*. Yet it is precisely that aspect of the Marxian doctrine which has been rejected even by economists such as Joan Robinson who are otherwise most sympathetic to the Marxian vision. Be that as it may, Harrington's Marx is essentially the theorist of capitalist exploitation, and the analyst of the anarchy of capitalist productive relations with their built-in cycles of boom and bust and their dehumanizing effects not only on the working class but on society as a whole. He is a determinately democratic thinker whose spirit has been perverted by most of those who purport to speak in his name, be it in the East or in the West. There is much here with which one may well agree while yet failing to be fully persuaded by Harrington's sometimes rather involuted attempts to save Marx from his critics. In any case, it is a great merit of Harrington's book to introduce American readers to the writings of a number of European Marxists, from Althusser to Poulantzas, who may be rather unfamiliar to most American nonspecialists.

Despite Harrington's undoubted erudition and vast knowledge of both primary and secondary sources of Marxism, one cannot help but feel that he is more at home in his polemical discussions of the present predicaments of American capitalism. Here his social passion and his commitment to the notion of a more equalitarian, more fraternal, and more democratic society serve him well. His documentation of, among others, the American government's collusion with the oil companies both at home and abroad, the government's subsidies to giant agribusiness interests, or the inequities of our tax system is devastatingly effective. His claim that much of what goes by the name of the welfare state, far from bringing about greater equality, has in fact favored the upper classes, sounds convincing indeed. Yet it would seem that these impassioned pages owe as much to the American muckraking and reform tradition as they owe to classical Marxism. Surely many non-Marxist economists and sociologists would agree with Harrington that ours is still a capitalist, profit-oriented society whose largely unplanned development continues to be marked by social and economic crises.

This book is not without serious flaws, but it is informed with the reformer's zeal and vision, and can be read as an excellent antidote to the cold technocratic stance of men like Daniel Bell.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Party's Choice *by William R. Keech and Donald R. Matthews. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1976.—xii, 258 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

This study of presidential nominations from 1936 to 1972 is likely to become the standard supplement to an earlier Brookings project, *The Politics of National Party Conventions.* It differs from the earlier authoritative volume in three ways. Its time span is limited to the period since the invention of the public opinion poll and the abolition of the two-thirds rule in the Democratic party. It places its emphasis on the preprimary and preconvention periods, rather than on the actions of the nominating conclaves. It is far more descriptive in character and relatively modest in its analysis.

The initial chapter discusses the sources of presidential recruitment, pointing to the recent significance of the vice-presidency as a stepping-stone to the White House, the improved opportunities of senators, and the decline of governors, congressmen, and cabinet members as presidential possibilities. The core of the book analyzes three stages in the nomination: gathering a following, the primaries, and the conventions. Each of these stages is treated separately through accounts of the past twenty nominations, with the parties in and out of executive power also considered separately.

Keech and Matthews' general thesis is that public opinion polls and the media have become the dominant influence in presidential choice. The media perform the vital function of winnowing the potential candidates to a very small number. Of these select few, they find, the candidate who is preferred by partisans in the public opinion polls before the first primary in New Hampshire is very likely to become the nominee. The polls provide solid evidence of popularity, in place of the former reliance on politicians' hunches. Therefore, "by reducing uncertainty, the polls have made the traditional, mostly negative, rules of thumb about availability largely irrelevant" (p. 9).

The evidence in support of this thesis is most impressive for the in-party, where eight of ten nominees have been the poll leaders. In the out-party, a clear leader has existed in only six of ten cases and one of these candidates, Muskie in 1972, failed to win nomination. This history leads the authors to denigrate the importance of primaries, which generally do not change the standing of candidates before the first contest in New Hampshire. Particularly for the in-party, primary victories for such aspirants as Kefauver in 1952 and McCarthy in 1968 are of little personal avail. "Playing giant killer may well be self-defeating in terms of the aggressor's presidential prospects" (p. 97) as these cases show. In the out-party, when no clear leader is evident, primaries may have an important multiplier effect, as victories in early, small-state contests provide the money, publicity, and volunteers for later and large-state showdowns. The case of McGovern in 1972 and the recent victory of Carter are illustrative.

The authors conclude with a limited evaluation of the present nominating system, which is generally favorable, and with brief suggestions for change. They are unimpressed by the effects of formal legal rules governing apportionment, variations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in primaries and other means of delegate selection, or even the abolition of the two-thirds requirement. Their prescriptive emphasis rather is on increasing the poll of available candidates at early stages while also providing means to limit the choices quickly to a relatively small number. For these purposes, they find a national primary inappropriate, but instead advocate more uniformity among state procedures, a greater use of winner-take-all primaries, more thorough media exposure of candidates and, in an aside, reform of the vice-presidential selection. The discussion of these proposals, however, is limited to only four concluding pages.

While this volume will be widely read, it is ultimately disappointing in its shallow analysis. The major thesis, the effect of opinion polls, has now been proven incorrect in the last two Democratic conventions and virtually in the Republican case of 1976 as well. Nothing here (or in polls or the media) would have led a reader to predict the successes of Carter and Reagan. Admittedly this fault was shared by virtually all observers, but it is particularly glaring in a book which should facilitate prediction. The reason for this shortcoming is that Keech and Matthews do not place the presidential nominations in a larger context of the decline of American political organizations and the rise of personalist politics. Such a broader perspective is needed truly to understand, rather than only to describe, the parties and their choices.

GERALD M. POMPER
Rutgers University

Explorations in Convention Decision Making: The Democratic Party in the 1970s *by Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, and F. Christopher Arterton. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1976.—xi, 147 pp. Cloth, $6.95; paper, $3.50.*

Despite its title, this small book is devoted primarily to a study of the composition and internal decision processes of the Democratic midterm conference of 1974. The book continues the work previously reported in *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972*, by Sullivan and others. It summarizes previous work in developing the comparisons between 1972 and 1974. It is especially concerned with the way in which newly active groups, mainly blacks and women, organized themselves in an effort to be effective. The influence of other organized groups is also considered, including COPE and the liberal trade unions.

Key propositions which were tested and mostly confirmed included the following: "(1) Delegates generally commit themselves to a candidate organization or functional group in the pre-convention period" (p. 19). "(2) Delegate commitments to candidates or functional groups made in the pre-convention period last until it becomes apparent that the goal for which commitment is made cannot be achieved in the course of the convention" (p. 21). "(3) Purist political styles predispose delegates to strong affiliations with candidate organizations or functional groups at the conventions" (p. 22). "(4) Political style is partly a function of personal character-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istics of the delegates—length of involvement in party affairs, age, class, background, and so on—but it varies according to the organizational situations in which the delegates find themselves" (p. 24). "(5) If in a convention described by conditions (1–4) no majority occurs on the first ballot, bargaining among leaders will break down" (p. 25).

In advance of the 1974 meeting, the authors considered the possibility that the conference might result in "an outbreak of sustained hostility" (p. 26), but theories developed in 1972 inclined them to believe instead that the conference at Kansas City would be less "purist" than the convention at Miami Beach, more inclined to integrative activity supporting party unity, more dominated by caucus activity, more willing to compromise, and more willing to accept outcomes as legitimate. In the event, caucus and other group activity was indeed found to be more potent, partly as the result of experience and better group organization in advance. The Black and Women's Caucuses were much more institutionalized, a factor that has evidently carried over into the proceedings of 1976.

The problem of outcome legitimacy is analyzed at length against the background of the view that the Republican convention of 1964 and the Democratic conventions of 1968 and 1972 had not been successful in achieving full acceptance of the legitimacy of their outcomes. The authors conclude that "a convention is most likely to produce legitimation when (1) the candidate commitments of the delegates are psychologically revocable, (2) there is no issue polarization, (3) political styles are non-purist, (4) there is prospect of victory in the upcoming general election, (5) there are divisible prizes, (6) there are multiple group commitments, and (7) there is at least a minimal level of party loyalty" (p. 119). Some of these factors may help to explain the general level of unity that seemed to prevail at the end of the 1976 Democratic convention.

Since the Democrats have decided to hold another midterm conference in 1978, the present book may have special value in attempts to forecast whether future midterm conferences will contribute to party unity and success. On the whole, it seems to indicate a favorable prognosis.

PAUL T. DAVID
University of Virginia

Financing the 1972 Election *by Herbert E. Alexander. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath & Company, 1976.—xxiii, 771 pp. $21.95.*

Herbert Alexander's latest volume on presidential campaign financing will join its predecessors as a standard reference work. It follows earlier studies with chapters on total political spending, disbursements in the prenomination period, convention financing, general election outlays, the size and sources of political funds, and the role of labor and business. Alexander adds two chapters on Watergate, two on new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

federal political financing legislation, and one devoted to a computer analysis of the size, geographic distribution, and timing of campaign gifts.

The reporting requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Acts of 1971 and 1974, judicially ordered disclosures in lawsuits brought by Common Cause and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, revelations by a watchful press, thousands of pages of testimony and exhibits before several congressional committees, and Common Cause's sweeping examination of 1972 congressional campaign financing allowed Alexander to compile the most complete survey of presidential campaign finance ever written. In barest outline, Alexander reports that all campaigns waged in 1972 cost $425 million (up from $300 million in 1968); presidential campaign spending reached a new high of $138 million (up from $100 million in 1968). Democrats spent $33 million in the prenomination sweepstakes, while Republicans spent virtually nothing. Richard Nixon's reelection canvass topped $60 million, while McGovern's general election effort reached about $30 million. Senate campaigns cost about $36 million and House contests about $55 million. The number of political givers in 1972 did not reach the level of 1964, despite a much larger electorate; and $73 million (17 percent of all political funds) was contributed or lent in sums of $10,000 or more by a handful (about 1750) of Americans.

Regrettably, Alexander is content in his 1972 study, as in its predecessors, to report his findings without significant analysis. Only rarely does he connect the facts about campaign money to the social, economic, or political environment which defines the need for and manner of election financing. And where elementary analyses are hazarded, they are often poorly conceptualized. Hence, analysis of the geographic distribution of contributions is flawed by inconsistency in selecting indexes to measure the bias of that distribution. And per voter primary expenditures by candidates are measured by the number of votes they received, rather than the total eligible electorate to which each candidate must ordinarily appeal.

As most Americans now know, the story of political finance in 1972 is not a pretty one. Money was raised by scarcely concealed threats, obtained from illegal sources, managed in violation of federal laws, and spent without regard to those basic canons that underlie a democratic polity. This compilation—stark page after stark page—is an effective reminder of how much illegal or unethical wrongdoing there really was.

Alexander is fascinated not only by this wrongdoing, but also by how sharply campaign costs have risen and by the startling number of excessively large contributions, mainly from those with apparent or possible special interests in public policy. These fascinations must not, however, divert the reader from learning the other, mainly unspoken, lesson of this volume. Democratic elections cannot be had on the cheap. It takes money, and lots of it, to register voters, field candidates, argue issues, contest nominations and elections, conduct conventions, and monitor the whole process against impropriety. Yet this money, essential for free elections, is simply not available from untainted or disinterested sources.

Finally, then, this is a troubling book. Alexander tells us more than we have ever before known about political finance in America. But he gives us very little insight

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into what we can do to enhance the equal standing of citizens in democratic elections in a polity that continues mainly to rely for campaign funds on private sources with dramatically unequal means.

DAVID ADAMANY
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Party Dynamics: The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change *by Richard L. Rubin. New York, Oxford University Press, 1976.—x, 203 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

This is *not* another book on the realignment or dealignment of the American party system. Its subject matter is suburbanization and the Democratic party coalition in the North. The major conclusion of the work is that suburbanization has had far greater effect on *intraparty* conflict than on the *interparty* balance of strength.

The first four chapters deal with what the author finds to be the noneffect of suburbanization on the national interparty struggle. Chapter One is the latest installment in the old "conversion" versus "transplantation" debate about suburban Republicanism. There is not much news in it (transplantation wins again) but it is one of the clearer discussions available on this topic and is well documented by Harris survey data.

The next three chapters in this section, however, are rather curious. The author sets out to explain defection of Catholics and labor union members from the Democratic coalition over the past two or three decades. But we are given very little evidence that such defections have actually occurred or increased, either relative to other coalition partners or relative to some previously normal vote. Then, quite unaccountably, the focus shifts from group loyalty or defection over time to the differences in group loyalty between two geographic regions at one point in time. "Why are Eastern Catholics and Eastern labor slightly more Republican than Midwestern Catholics and Midwestern labor?" becomes the operative question for most of the three chapters. This question is in its own right rather interesting and the author is quite resourceful in dealing with it, but it is not the question he originally posed. The reader should therefore ignore the early window dressing of "dynamics" and "change" and read these chapters for their real content: a good analysis of regional differences in interparty politics based on static and cross-sectional data.

In the last four chapters, which rely much less on survey data, the focus turns to intraparty affairs and here we are treated to some dynamics. According to the author, middle-class suburban Democrats have over the years gained significantly in numbers and activism, have pressed for ideological causes as well as for reform of party procedures, and have helped to create an almost plebiscitarian type of presidential nomination. The result has been destabilizing intraparty conflict between a purist New Politics faction and the more traditional organization/labor faction, a challenge to the old bargaining and brokerage style of Democratic politics, narrowed maneuvering room for leadership, and the nomination of candidates of lim-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ited appeal who are likely to be rejected in general elections. The author's remedy for these ills is a reduction in intraparty democracy. Open processes for factional elites should be maintained in nonprimary activities, he argues, but rank-and-file involvement in heated primary election battles should be ended or seriously contracted.

That we can suffer from a surfeit of democracy is an argument we hear increasingly as the New Realism pervades the 1970s. But as regards intraparty politics, it is really a terribly familiar argument (Schattschneider, Ranney, J. Q. Wilson) and Professor Rubin's version is not particularly well developed. He says almost nothing, for instance, about the feasability and implementation of his proposal: Just how would he have us go about limiting mass participation and reining in the suburban Democrat? Nor does he think through very fully the wider political consequences of his reform beyond the particular consequence he desires. These criticisms stress the familiarity and underdevelopment of the argument and are one way of saying that the last four chapters could have been longer and a bit more inventive as well, for the author does demonstrate a basically shrewd ability to analyze intraparty politics.

We may naturally come to enjoy a more even balance of direct and indirect democracy as the emotional causes of the 1960s recede and take with them much of the impetus for mass activism. But neither this respite nor Rubin's present exhortations seem likely to stem the historic American inclination to democratize the internal life of our nation's political parties and, intentionally or not, to weaken them in the name of openness.

MICHAEL R. KAGAY
Princeton University

The Future of Political Parties *edited by Louis Maisel and Paul M. Sacks. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1975.—279 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $7.50.*

This is Volume One of the Sage Electoral Studies Yearbook and the tip-off is in that word "yearbook." It is a volume of eight somewhat disparate papers about political parties and electoral behavior without very much more of a unifying theme or subject than that. In short, it is a "nonbook."

As one might expect of a nonbook, the nature and quality of the eight pieces are variable. Seven of them report empirical research, but one is an interpretive essay. In locale they extend from the United States to Australia. Their prose ranges from social science pedestrian to exceptionally lucid. They vary also in quality. While several of the papers are of major interest and importance, the volume leaves an overall impression of moderate interest and professional competence.

The editors have shrewdly opened and closed the volume with the two best articles. Gerald B. Finch's well-crafted piece on the relationship between physical changes (i.e., migrations and new generations) and partisan changes in the American electorate is a very good one. It is especially valuable in exploring the impor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant relationships between generational change and party realignments. The volume concludes with Walter Dean Burnham's essay, "American Politics in the 1970s; Beyond Party?" It is a very full statement of his views on party decomposition, presenting more systematically and completely what was often merely suggested in *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. The scenario for "post party" politics is somewhat fuzzy and apocalyptic, and it is clearly colored by Burnham's disenchantment with contemporary American politics. But the analysis of the present condition of the parties is powerful, and one does not have to agree with the conclusions or projections to find them stimulating.

The remaining six articles deal with changes in individual party identifications (two articles), the decline of class voting in Australia, the electoral bases of the New York Conservative party, political participation in the Democratic party of Maine, and the stages of growth the British and Norwegian Labor parties went through. The two articles on party identification by Richard J. Trilling and John E. Jackson make an interesting pair since both report—contra some earlier wisdom—that the formation of favorable images of a party (Trilling) and the acceptance of its issue positions (Jackson) precede rather than follow changes in party identification. Perhaps the very process by which individuals arrive at party identifications has undergone some basic changes over the last thirty years.

The two editors of the volume try in their introduction to bring the assorted pieces together around the theme of change and the uncertain future of political parties. There are some signs that they may have urged some of the contributors to do the same. But despite their best efforts, the fact remains that the eight articles do not constitute an orderly or systematic attack on the subject. The labors of the "other" editors, the copy editors, were also only partly successful. There is a generous sprinkling of typos in the book, and a number of grammatical and syntactical klinkers remain (e.g., "nor" where there should have been "or"). They also let pass a good many opportunities for a skillful pencil. Consider for example the sentence: "A central theme in many discussions of industrial society over the last quarter century has been the theme of the disappearance of differences between categories of voters within the major cleavage systems" (p. 128).

What we have here, therefore, is in effect the first volume of a journal on parties and electoral behavior. It has the variety and variability we take for granted in our journals. It lacks the focus and sustained argument we expect of a book. In such a format the best pieces may be less visible and accessible than they would be in a good journal. And so the nonbook, as always, threatens us with the worst of both worlds.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Blacks in Power: A Comparative Study of Black and White Elected Officials *by Leonard A. Cole. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1976.—xiv, 267 pp. $12.50.*

The 1970s have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of black officials elected to political office, yet little is known about these current politicians beyond mere vital statistics. Leonard Cole attempts to narrow this gap in information by comparing a select group of black and white officials in New Jersey to ascertain whether and to what degree differences exist between them. Within a pluralistic and integrationist-oriented framework, Cole examines the background, behavior, and perceptions of black and white officials, arriving at both predictable and unexpected differences between the two groups. Cole begins by reviewing the ascendancy of a group of black and white officials to public office, emphasizing their social and political background as well as their road to the office. He then focuses on the behavior of these politicians in office, particularly on their voting record and the importance of issues having racial implications. Finally, the author devotes a significant portion of the book to the functions that these officials perceive for themselves, and to certain issues that involve the translation of their perceptions into action. Overall he concludes that black officials do make a difference in a variety of ways, particularly by exerting influence in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting blacks, by sensitizing their white counterparts to black interests, and by serving as role models for the black community.

The data for this study was compiled through a series of interviews in 1972 with thirty-one black officials and ninety-six white officials then in office in sixteen New Jersey cities having a population of at least 25,000 and containing at least a 15 percent black population. The author also included 551 telephone interviews from a random sampling of the population in these same cities. The black and white officials were interviewed in person using a set of structured and open-ended questions, whereas the citizens submitting to telephone interviews were asked a more limited and structured set of questions, several of which paralleled questions asked of the officials. The bulk of the book, however, deals with a comparison and interpretation of the responses of the elected officials while the citizens' responses are only minimally interjected.

The book is both interesting and readable, and makes a definite contribution toward understanding the background, perceptions, and role of the black officials of this decade. In analyzing the differences between black and white officials, Cole makes a thorough comparison in regard to age, sex, education, occupation, and political background, noting that black officials tend to be slightly younger, and also better educated than their white counterparts. While both sets of politicians are males, with the exception of one woman senator, the black officials are predominantly Baptist and from a variety of professions, whereas the white officials are overwhelmingly Catholic, and more than half of them are attorneys by profession. In their goals the two groups also vary, for white officials are concerned chiefly with civic interest, whereas black officials are concerned with the advancements of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their race. Cole, however, leaves the reader with some queries that demand further clarification. For instance, he points out that at-large and nonpartisan elections have in no way precluded the election of blacks, yet he neglects to follow up on this observation by pursuing the possibility of dissimilarities, perhaps in ideology or in degree of legitimacy within the black community, between blacks elected within that type of structure and those elected from partisan and ward districts. While Cole gives priority to perceptions and issues, with the exception of busing and zoning he chooses issues pertinent to particular localities rather than those common to many of the cities in his analysis; thus his choice of issues becomes somewhat of a hindrance to comparative studies of officials across cities, not merely within cities. In addition, this reader was disappointed that Cole has not gone beyond the views and behavior of black and white officials to focus directly on their accomplishments. Nevertheless, Cole is to be commended for the valuable insights he has revealed about current black politicians—a contribution that leads to further questions and hopefully to ongoing research as the number of black officials continues to increase.

SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM
York College of the City University of New York

The Making of Congressmen: Seven Campaigns of 1974 *by Alan L. Clem and associates. North Scituate, Mass., Duxbury Press, 1976.—ix, 275 pp. $5.95.*

This book, which includes case studies of 1974 congressional election campaigns in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin, has many of the values and problems of case studies.

The value of such studies lies in the presentation of the flavor of campaigns in an interesting format. Alan Clem assembled an outstanding group of authors, including John Bibby, Charles Bullock III, William Cavala, John Fenton, Thomas Flinn, and Robert Lineberry. The studies are well written, indicating uniformly high level of skill on the part of the authors or excellent editing by Clem. Since most of the authors have woven academic concepts into their tales, the book is an easily readable introduction for students to political science literature on this topic. In addition, it is current—the authors managed to publish their study of 1974 campaigns fairly early in 1976, a substantial feat in a joint project, given the usual delays in publishing.

The problem with case studies is the difficulty of making generalizations, of establishing scientific patterns. For one thing, the seven cases are not a probability sample. Most of the authors apparently tried to ensure a case study which would be meaningful by selecting a contest which would be competitive and active, or candidates who are colorful and important, like Father Drinan of Massachusetts and Dr. Larry McDonald, the John Birch member from Georgia.

A second difficulty in generalizing is the lack of explicit criteria for comparing the seven races. For example, the authors utilized the variable of ideological con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sonance, the extent to which Democrats are liberal and Republicans are conservative. But no criteria were established for measuring liberalism-conservatism, so that the authors may have relied on quite different sources and on different issues in their measurements.

The third difficulty is the lack of a conceptual approach. Clem has, in introductory and concluding chapters, presented and analyzed fourteen variables. Examples include (1) degree of independence or attachment to other campaigns, (2) ideological consonancy, (3) incumbency or nonincumbency, and (4) closeness of the contest. While there is some attempt to measure these variables, there is no discussion of the relationships, if any, of one to another.

A conceptual approach might be developed by a focus on particular concerns. For example, if we assume with John Stuart Mill that an important purpose of democracy is the development of the citizenry, then the education of the voters is a significant purpose of campaigns, and a comparative analysis of the factors which increase or inhibit that education would be useful. Alternatively, we can assume that the purpose of campaigns is to keep representatives responsive and examine those factors which increase or reduce responsiveness to various groups in a district.

This book is a delightful source of new political figures of speech, especially from Robert Lineberry and his associates. Examples include the "Hereford look"—"In small counties . . . you contact a person and ask them to do something and they agree and you go back and ask if they've done it and they just stand there and look at you as if they don't understand what you're saying" (p. 188); the "finger in the dike thesis" that "the role of incumbency is to hold back the tides of electoral change" (p. 172); and the "George P. Miller syndrome," which is the reluctance of a long-term incumbent to change the campaign strategies that have always worked (p. 39).

The value of the book is that skillful political scientists have utilized their background and insight to describe seven campaigns. Each case study provides important knowledge about campaigns but the combined product illuminates the need for and the difficulty of genuinely comparative studies of campaigns.

DAVID A. LEUTHOLD
University of Missouri, Columbia

Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: The Manipulation of Public Opinion in America *by Michael Wheeler. New York, Liveright, 1976.—xviii, 300 pp. $9.95.*

"The polls offer only the trappings of scientific accuracy and the illusion of popular choice" (p. 269) according to Michael Wheeler. For they are rife with sampling errors (especially in primary elections), refusal rates (increasing), piggybacking (putting items for different clients on the same questionnaire), deceptions by respondents (including outright lies), and derelictions by interviewers. Wheeler is particularly critical of the poorly constructed, misleadingly worded, forced-choice

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(agree-disagree) questions with which, he claims, polls abound. In passing, he devastates the Nielsen television ratings for such manifest inadequacies as inflating the number of viewers by counting each television set in a multiset home separately (thereby counting fractions as wholes).

The indictment continues. Pollsters are charged with rigging their polls, suppressing and distorting data, favoring particular parties (Gallup, the Republicans; Harris, the Democrats), and collusion. "During the 1968 campaign, Nixon had a source within the Gallup organization who provided advance word on when the surveys were going to be taken. This allowed Nixon to time his activities so that they would have the maximum impact on Gallup's polls" (p. 9). Pollster Louis Harris is explicitly accused of cozying up to power and of conflict of interest; he provided poll data to the Nixon White House in advance of its public release and polled for the Nixon administration's Domestic Council. "Before Harris began dealing with the administration, his ratings of Nixon were invariably lower than Gallup's, sometimes markedly so. Thereafter, the disparity vanished" (p. 6).

Wheeler's severest criticism is that the pollsters try to present their data as scientifically reliable, their interpretations as authoritative. They do not admit the tentativeness of their polls, nor explain the inevitable judgments they make in presenting their data. The press compounds the problem: "editors look for a flashy story and tend to play up the numbers and cut out the analysis" (pp. 120–121). Television is even worse.

We should care because "the most conspicuous influence of polls is on politics (p. xiv). Potential, able candidates with low name recognition or low standing in polls are deterred from running. The electorate is at its most volatile in primary elections, yet flawed polls set the expectations for candidates' performances. Democratic front runner Edmund Muskie (Maine) was a victim of the polls in 1972 when his victory in New Hampshire was less than they had predicted. Polls also encourage or discourage voter turnout and campaign contributions. Polls that identify public attitudes and concerns can dictate campaign strategies and lead to the packaging of candidates. Polls may inhibit, or even determine, policy choices by elected officials; they led to President Nixon's wage-price freeze decision.

For the common reader (his intended audience), Wheeler's critique will be incisive and profoundly disturbing. For specialists in public opinion, however, the book is repetitive and superficial. About such subjects as market research, attitudinal studies, the relations of pollsters with their private business clients, it left this reviewer unsatisfied or dissatisfied. Moreover, academic survey research is ignored. And the absence of footnotes, the failure to incorporate significant past research (e.g., by V. O. Key) and the lack of a formal bibliography, impair the book's usefulness for scholars.

Worse, Wheeler's indignation leads to sputtering hyperbole ("polls . . . have a pervasive and often dangerous impact in America" p. 15). After an incisive analysis of polls on Vietnam, the "silent majority," and Watergate, we are told that "rather than benefiting from the polls, as Gallup had promised, democracy suffered deeply because of them" (p. 156). As for commercial surveys, "rather than making business

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more responsive to the needs of consumers, they often make it less so" (p. 225). Such accusations are not convincingly substantiated by the evidence offered.

The book is short on remedies as it is long on charges. Only one state has passed reform legislation—New York's statute requiring "any candidate who discloses the results of a poll to reveal some of the basic methodology on which it was based" (p. 257). The courts are unlikely to provide relief. Self or organizational regulation by pollsters is chimerical. Thus Wheeler plumps for greater public awareness of the pitfalls and incapacities of polls. This, indeed, is the book's purpose and he summarizes his helpful hints in a postscript entitled "How to Read the Polls."

But Wheeler also urges pollsters to devise more sophisticated questions, undertake more subtle analysis and interpretation. Such apparently innocuous recommendations may be undesirable; for there is serious question whether the techniques exist or can be devised to capture accurately the elusive, frequently gossamer nature of public opinion. Interpretation is risky, and more of it may increase the dangers Wheeler deplores.

DAVID L. PALETZ
Duke University

The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment: Free Speech *vs.* Fairness in Broadcasting *by Fred W. Friendly. New York, Random House, 1975. —xvi, 268 pp. $10.00.*

What happens when the right of broadcasters to discuss topics of their choice clashes with the rights of listeners to publicize different topics and to rebut the views aired by the broadcasters? Fred W. Friendly, currently professor of journalism at Columbia University, experienced broadcaster, communications consultant, and a former CBS executive provides the answers in a book which is a mixture of solid, occasionally stolid scholarship, vivid exposé journalism, and fervent and explicit reformism.

The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment sets forth the difficulties encountered in attempts to assure maximum freedom for broadcasters while safeguarding the right of the listening public to hear and express views of their own choosing about controversial public issues. Rather than discussing these problems in the abstract, Friendly has chosen the landmark *Red Lion* case as the prototypical dilemma. In fact, he calls his book "a documentary about *Red Lion*, its ghosts and a series of other fairness cases which grew out of that historic decision" (p. xiv). By showing in painstaking, step-by-step detail how such cases move through the administrative hierarchy and the courts, he is able to present both sides of the argument in a realistic and eminently fair fashion. It becomes clear that each side has sound reasons for viewing itself as the "Good Guys," confronting "Bad Guys" who worship on different political altars.

There is only one major departure from objectivity. That occurs when Friendly lashes out against a study sponsored by the Institute for American Strategy which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had charged CBS with biased reporting of national defense issues. Friendly impugns the motives of the sponsors of the study, he questions the soundness of their research design and methodology, and he strongly attacks the validity of their findings. The more balanced approach used in other parts of the book which shows that goodness and badness often are matters of perspective, would have provided better insights into the controversy.

Besides presenting a wealth of information about all major landmark cases involving the fairness doctrine, the book also contains interesting insights into the political uses of regulatory laws. There are fascinating details about the strategies that Democratic and Republican administrations have employed to further their own political goals and to muzzle their enemies by generating appeals to the FCC and the courts. Friendly describes a number of cloak-and-dagger operations which sound like chapters from a Watergatelike saga. In fact, after reading about secretly commissioned books and carefully engineered court cases, one begins to wonder if Friendly's study might have some hidden political godparents.

There are good reasons for suspecting a mustering of forces in the first amendment versus fairness doctrine battle at the present time. In the past decade, the courts have spoken with forked and discordant tongues about these issues. The FCC has become mired in a morass of claims and counterclaims which it cannot process with its current limited resources. This has brought matters involving the freedom of the airwaves to the renewed attention of Congress. Friendly's eloquent and well-documented plea for congressional action and his proposals for a compromise between the forces who favor abandonment of the fairness doctrine and the forces who wish to broaden the right of access and rebuttal may well play a crucial part in shaping the outcome of that battle.

Friendly proposes that the FCC should refrain from its current practice of appraising fairness on a case-by-case basis. It should not be allowed to order broadcasters to air specific points of view. Broadcasters should enjoy the unhampered privilege to determine through what specific series of programs they wish to fulfill their public service obligations. The quality and fairness of their performance and their success in presenting a wide array of viewpoints on controversial issues should be judged periodically by the FCC using total performance, rather than individual broadcasts, as a yardstick. In return, broadcasters should be more zealous in presenting issues in breadth and depth. They should expand newscast time and they should create regular, formal channels for airing rebuttals and neglected views.

Friendly believes that his proposals will make the fairness principle the spur to the airing of controversy that it was intended to be. His suggestions, he argues, will remove rules and regulations which have intimidated broadcasters and have stifled the desire to air controversies because of the fear of becoming involved in time-consuming legal and administrative battles over rebuttal rights. If his plans are adopted, the electronic media, which have become the chief source of information for the average American, will enjoy the same freedoms now enjoyed by print media; the public will benefit, without sacrificing the ultimate right to avenge misuse of the privilege of free speech through the denial of renewal licenses. With this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

book, Friendly has made a persuasive case for reforms in the regulations governing broadcasting; Congress would do well to pay heed to his message.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Are Government Organizations Immortal? *by Herbert Kaufman. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1976.—x, 79 pp. $2.50.*

The multiplication of bureaucratic departments is one of those issues that figure prominently in the mythology about government, but has seldom invited careful analysis. Herbert Kaufman shows why. The problems of research are considerable: How to discern the moment of bureaucratic birth or death when the typical process is one of transformations involving the separation of once-merged functions, the combination of once-distinct units, or symbolic renamings by a new administration? How to assess the causes of birth or death when each event is surrounded by numerous claims and expectations?

Kaufman builds this study on the base of compilations made in 1923 that recorded the birth dates of certain national government units then in existence. He identified those units from 1923 which survived or had died as of 1973, and identified the birth dates of certain other units existing in 1973. Due to limited time and resources, he missed those units that appeared then disappeared during the 1924–1972 period, as well as numerous units that did not meet the criteria for inclusion in either the 1923 or 1973 samples.

Despite the limitations of data and technique, Kaufman presents several findings that may have wide application. They are not final words on the subject of birth and death among government units, but they will serve as an empirical anchor for the rhetoric until something better comes along.

Kaufman reports that government organizations do indeed show impressive endurance, and that births exceed deaths. Yet there are deaths. Although Kaufman's techniques preclude a precise statement of their frequency, deaths appear to be small in number but not so small as to be insignificant. The causes of death include leadership failures; short-term experiments that failed to take root; the completion of limited organizational assignments; changes in departmental leadership that removed an organization's protective cover; incapacity to meet changing circumstances; and competition between units that lead to the absorption of some into others. Sheer chance—perhaps represented in the personal idiosyncracies of leaders—also plays its role; Kaufman is not otherwise able to determine why some units survive, while others with similar traits succumb. Statutory protection offers no assurance of long life; units established by executive orders show no greater death rate than those established by statutes. Both organizational births and deaths come in spurts. Some of these reflect the presence of an administration generally noted for innovative policy, but some (as the spurt of births during the first Nixon term) do not. A high administrative rank is an advantage in the bureaucratic struggle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for life. No cabinet department has ever disappeared, although the War and Navy Departments became part of Defense, and the Post Office Department changed form to a government corporation. Birth records show more of an increase in staff than line organizations; this may reflect the need for greater control effects in the context of a growing bureaucracy.

Kaufman describes a doubling of the organizational birth rate between 1923 and 1973. Unlike the more nervous of human demographers, however, he does not panic at the prospect of overpopulation. He is not favorably impressed with arbitrary techniques of controlling births or deaths of government organizations. He surmises that procedures of bureaucratic control may improve along with the increasing number of units. He also remains skeptical about straight-line projections of the organizational population beyond 1973, especially when they rest on so few observations.

The author makes clear the exploratory nature of his project. The thin size of the book shows his reluctance to subject the data to more analysis than they deserve. At times the commentary is too thin, as when the reader is left without concrete examples for processes of birth or death being described. Yet the book should have no trouble establishing its place in the underpopulated field of organizational demography. We can hope for more of this intensive digging and sifting to clarify issues that look so simple from the surface. Kaufman concludes with a low-cost proposal for maintaining birth and death records that should be mounted by an organization like the Brookings Institution.

IRA SHARKANSKY
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and
The University of Wisconsin-Madison

FBI *by Sanford J. Ungar. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1975.—xv, 682 pp. $14.95.*

Interestingly written for the general reader, this study of the FBI is primarily descriptive rather than analytical so that the author's judgments must often be inferred. If there is a principal conclusion it appears to be that the FBI has been "neither as good nor as bad as anyone had feared or expected" (p. 635).

For political scientists the book has some value. It demonstrates that the growth of the FBI into an agency of 20,000 persons was not simply the result of the late J. Edgar Hoover's empire-building skills but much more the twin consequence of the great growth of congressionally mandated expansion of federal jurisdiction from the New Deal onward and of the workload given the bureau by both presidents and Congresses struggling with intelligence problems in the cold war. The legal and constitutional problems arising from the tasks given the FBI and its manner of performing them are accurately but too summarily mentioned to be of much help to the student of public law. A chapter each is given to "'Applicant Work' and Civil Investigations," "Counterintelligence," "Internal Security," and "Big

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brother"—this last a consideration of some of the problems of privacy raised by computerized data banks.

The book's greatest worth to political scientists is as a case study of bureaucracy. The student of bureaucracy will find a number of familiar themes developed at length. There is the reliance on routine, the insistence on uniformity in operations, and the resultant glacial growth of the paperwork. Tensions between headquarters and the field loom very large. The fending off of political pressures (proper and improper) is recounted, but the author insufficiently recognizes that Hoover's success in this greatly contributed to the high popular esteem for the FBI, which in turn enhanced the ability of its long-time director to resist such pressures. Familiar, too, is the bureaucratic avoidance of tasks perceived as too difficult to accomplish. In this instance, the great effort avoided has been a full-scale campaign against organized crime, surely a serious failure, but one that should hardly be ascribed so narrowly to the bureau. Not least is bureaucratic secretiveness, never popular with a journalist (and the author is one) nor with scholars, however justified some of it may be.

Finally, the book proffers what may be called a diagnosis of bureaucratic gerontology. The thesis is that as J. Edgar Hoover aged, his bureau grew sclerotic. It is scarcely too much to say that this is the predominant theme of the book (see the chapter "J. Edgar Hoover's Decline and Refusal to Fall"). Almost one-third of the book is devoted to the four years since Hoover's death over against the forty-eight years during which he was director of the FBI. His successors are portrayed largely in terms of their successes and failures in softening the stamp Hoover had put upon his bureau.

It is precisely this theme that raises one of the book's greatest problems as a study of bureaucracy. The FBI had not been a typical bureaucracy. For one thing it is in a real sense a police agency with the paramilitary organization police departments commonly have. For another it has been, like the Foreign Service or the Marine Corps, an elite organization. But above all, for almost its entire effective life the FBI was led by one man, J. Edgar Hoover.

Few readers are likely to find Mr. Ungar's treatment of J. Edgar Hoover unduly sympathetic. The author realizes that he is grappling with an extraordinary man but never succeeds in apprehending him. He paints Hoover warts but not all; the portrait shows us an egotistical, vain, cold, peevish, and petty tyrant. Extraordinary men do have large faults but it is hardly that which makes them extraordinary. The author acknowledges the fierce loyalty Hoover received over almost half a century and the generally high morale which in good part stemmed from it. Something in Hoover's character and personality must have accounted for this, but whatever it was, to the author it remains an unsolved mystery.

A political theorist especially may find the book disappointing. Like the various recent congressional investigators of American intelligence activities, the author seems to adopt as an inarticulate major premise the view that the doctrine of *raison d'etat* simply has no place in a constitutional democracy. But no viable democratic government since Machiavelli's time has been able to survive without some recourse

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to "reason of state," however uncomfortably the doctrine may fit with libertarian versions of democracy. The reconciliation of democracy and *raison d'etat* in twentieth-century America still awaits our Friedrich Meinecke.

ROBERT A. HORN
Stanford University

Justice by Consent: Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse by Arthur Rossett and Donald R. Cressey. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1976.—xvi, 227 pp. $10.00.

This comprehensive book, directed to the pervasive method of resolving criminal cases commonly known as "plea bargaining," presents its observations and conclusions through an engrossing balance of daily dialogue and social theory. The daily dialogue is that of Peter Randolph, Joe Carbo, Steve Ohler, and Judge Perkins, whose respective interactions as defendant, prosecutor, public defender, and judge provide a vivid picture of the process of a plea bargain. The social theory is a mixture of jurisprudence and sociology, developing on one hand a general theory of "multilevel discretion" as essential to the sound operation of our criminal justice system and, on the other, a depiction of intensely interactive legal subcultures effecting results beyond the purposes and goals of the individuals in them.

Rossett and Cressey's essential thesis—that a rule-based, adversary process, or what they call "judicialization," should never replace the sensible exercise of discretion by reasonable persons—and their proposals for reform—essentially to humanize, communalize, and decriminalize—are carefully developed and logically appealing. Their stress on closer integration of courts and the communities they serve is particularly refreshing. In fact, from my own perspective as a justice in a neighborhood court in Boston, it is precisely the community court approach that allows for individualization, reduced caseloads, and a measured pace to judicial work, largely consistent with, rather than antagonistic to, basic procedural fairness.

Nor can an appreciative reviewer fail to mention the detail and variations of perspective with which the authors cover the numerous actors and motivations involved in plea bargaining. The reader seeking to better understand this process will find the saga exceedingly detailed, accurately portrayed, and vividly descriptive. Those more interested in an analysis of what these characters are up to and why, particularly when Peter Randolph finally walks out of that busy, crowded superior court a free man sentenced to "time served," will not be disappointed. It is all there, well paced and engagingly arranged.

The authors' perspective, however, does neglect one particular reality of plea bargaining with direct impact on two groups. In their interest in the process of plea bargaining and in analyzing the multiple values involved, they have neglected its ultimate result, the sentence, and the people directly affected, the defendant and the public. While the process and participants are important for study, the end result also needs consideration; for if this book makes anything clear, it is that no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particular set of societal goals sought in sentencing can result from the plea-bargaining process.

With respect to the authors' emphasis on process over result, or plea bargaining over the substance of sentencing, one need not conclude, as the book portrays, that undisciplined judicial work is simply a modest price society pays for the discretionary ability of our prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to together arrange their own private brand of professional, utilitarian "justice." The frustration of a trial judge, locked in and prevented by others from rendering the sentence he personally wishes to give, is all too vividly portrayed.

So too is the frustration of the prosecutor who receives a variety of messages from the actors in the system that he had better not rely on his independent judgment of the severity of a case and the appropriate punishment, but give in to the needs of the other participants and the maintenance of reciprocal relationships.

This sad state of affairs can be restricted, not by continuing to laud discretion and the flexible operation of the legal subculture in which it is exercised, but by restricting its exercise through a set of rules setting minimum standards for both the process and its outcome. Firm speedy trial rules and presumptive, or even fixed, sentences are contemporary concepts which can bring both certainty and uniformity into the criminal justice system.

None of the author's remedial proposals are really inconsistent with such a regulatory approach. Open, fair, commitment-oriented plea-bargaining procedures; community courts; decriminalization and less severe sentences; all can, and should, function hand-in-hand with swift and certain punishment. The authors' profess, and most Americans share, a deep and abiding concern that the cumbersome mechanism they describe better achieves "justice." Reduction of the impact of the varied personalities, prejudices, and private influences that participate in that mechanism will, if only in the eyes of the all-important public, bring us closer to that elusive goal.

JOHN C. CRATSLEY
Harvard University

Financing the New Federalism: Revenue Sharing, Conditional Grants, and Taxation *edited by Wallace E. Oates. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.—xiii, 160 pp. Cloth, $12.00; paper, $3.95.*

The New Federalism was President Nixon's title for a set of proposals to decentralize intergovernmental fiscal relations. The set included general revenue sharing, six special revenue-sharing (grant-consolidation) proposals, HUD's annual arrangements and planned variations programs, and various other items. About half the package—general revenue sharing and special revenue sharing for Labor and HUD—were passed by Congress. Special revenue sharing for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and HUD's annual arrangements and planned variations were created through administrative action.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The programs are all relatively new. We do not have many case studies describing how they work. Correspondingly, *Financing the New Federalism* raises more questions than it gives answers, and general questions at that. Of the five papers written for this volume, only two deal with the New Federalism per se. The others deal with questions of intergovernmental fiscal relations on a broader, more theoretical level.

The book begins with Oates's brief history of the New Federalism and its origin in the Walter Heller-Joseph Pechman proposals for revenue sharing in the early 1960s. Jeffrey Pressman follows with a summary of the New Federalism's political culture. Robert Reischauer analyzes the mechanics of the general revenue-sharing formula and the behavior incentives it may offer localities. Robert Inman investigates the efficiency of several grant formulas in achieving various distributional objectives. Martin McGuire outlines a methodology for empirically estimating the impact of federal grants on local spending. Oates closes by looking at the relationship between the elasticity of a tax system and the growth of expenditure.

Political scientists will find the Pressman and Reischauer readings accessible and informative. Pressman emphasizes the varied meanings of decentralization and shows how the New Federalism was designed to redistribute power to local elected officials and away from both the federal government and from local paragovernmental and community groups which had flourished in the 1960s. He also presents interesting anecdotal evidence, much of it firsthand, to suggest that the existing distribution of power may be more immune to change than the Nixon administration supposed. One political factor, not discussed by Pressman, was the administration's hope that grant consolidation would aid in "capping" the domestic budget. By making existing funds more flexible, they hoped to derail a process by which every new local problem created pressure for a new categorical federal program with new funding. Here, too, the verdict is still out.

Reischauer's lucid explanation of the general revenue-sharing allocation formula is must reading for anybody interested in the subject. He goes beyond the workings of the formula to describe the ways in which localities might change their behavior to maximize their revenue-sharing funds. In some cases, the incentives are quite real—for example, rerouting certain types of expenditure into categories that count in the revenue-sharing formula. But most of the cases involving bizarre geographic consolidations and other unusual behavior seem more farfetched and, in fact, Reischauer himself is dubious that they will occur.

The remaining essays require background in both economic theory and econometrics. Inman builds a general equilibrium model of local public finance to simulate the impact of various grant formulas. He presents intriguing first conclusions on the general superiority of unconditional grants (rather than, for example, matching grants) in maximizing several alternative social welfare functions: a sum-of-individual-utilities function, a Rawlsian minimax function, and so on. His work is at an early stage but it may ultimately give guidance to legislators working on allocation mechanisms. McGuire's work, also at an early stage, suggests a method in which the expenditure stimulation of a government grant can be decomposed into a price effect—stimulation because spending in a particular program area is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now "cheaper"—and an income effect—stimulation because the locality has more money. The essay is written for public finance economists but subsequent empirical work may produce results of interest to a more general audience. Oates's final piece tests the hypothesis that states and localities could not let government expenditures grow with demand because their tax systems were relatively inelastic, i.e., revenues did not automatically grow with incomes. This was, as he notes, one (untested) justification for the original revenue-sharing proposals under which revenues from the highly elastic federal tax system would be transferred to state and local governments. Oates's investigation is relatively inconclusive and while he finds some evidence in favor of the hypothesis, he is properly skeptical of the results.

This is a book worth browsing but not worth buying. Most of the authors have elaborated on their pieces elsewhere and the serious reader is best advised to go to the more complete source.

FRANK LEVY
University of California, Berkeley

The Urban Predicament *edited by William Gorham and Nathan Glazer. Washington, D. C., The Urban Institute, 1976.—xvii, 364 pp. Cloth, $10.00; paper, $4.95.*

The editors begin by saying that *The Urban Predicament* is "a volume in which a stable of expert contributors bring together much of what is known about some of the city's major problems" (p. xv). This rather dismal description does not do justice to this collection of better than average essays. In format the book consists of an overview by the editors and five long essays, each on a particular urban problem area: finance, housing, crime, education, and transportation. As an anthology it is unusual because of the consistency of form and tone of the individual essays. Indeed, if there is any failure it can only be the absence of a good concluding essay systematically explicating the connections between the individual problems discussed.

The format of each essay follows the same general plan. With some very minor exceptions no new information is presented. Rather, each article surveys the history and present state of its problem area and discusses relevant controversies. Following this, the impact of government action is evaluated, and policy options for the future discussed. Finally, the prospects for change, both through government intervention and secular trends, are touched upon.

Beyond the structural consistency these essays display a philosophical consistency that might be characterized as a moderate conservativism. The goal is "to further the search for more effective government policies and to temper public expectations as to what government can accomplish" (p. 1). This goal is pursued diligently in every essay. In each, the primary role in defining, causing, and solving the problem is assigned to market forces and to the aggregate result of individual actions. Collective action through government is viewed as a minor additional force, both because of its scale when measured against long-term demographic and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market trends and because of the inherently unpredictable effects of planned intervention. None of the essays foresee dramatic improvements in the problems under discussion; indeed most anticipate a deterioration. Nevertheless, no one views this deterioration with undue alarm. Things may get a bit worse, in their view, but not a lot worse and in any case there are forces for equilibrium as well as forces for deterioration. The tone is one of contented pessimism and most of the authors end with certain modest policy recommendations which might have ameliorative effects.

The quality of the individual articles is high and while they contain little that is new, they generally present the old in a skillful and enlightening fashion. In this regard the first article, on finance, by George Peterson, can be especially commended. It covers an immense field in a systematic and balanced way, and the Kemp and Cheslow article on transportation shares most of its virtues.

The essays on housing and transportation are also strong but do suffer from some odd distributions of emphasis. While each touches upon all the necessary points, the authors seem to spend most of their time on what they know best rather than what they say is most important. This is especially noticeable in the essay on education which contains the book's most provocative thesis but which sacrifices its adequate development to a discussion of segregation. Wilson and Boland's essay on crime is the weakest in the book, especially in its formalistic discussion of the uses of "incapacitation" (imprisonment) as a way of decreasing crime..

In its own terms the book is a considerable success, presenting compact and cogent reviews of five important areas of public concern. The individual essays are generally of a high quality of scholarship and well done. The consistency of format and style to some degree compensates for the absence of a concluding essay.

JEFFREY PROTTAS
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Post-Industrial America: Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts
edited by George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes. New Brunswick, N. J., Center for Urban Policy Research, 1975.—267 pp. $12.95.

This important and timely volume grew out of a Conference on the Aging Metropolis sponsored by the Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University in March 1975. Its subject is not simply the "problems" of the aging metropolis, with which we are now all familiar, but rather those problems seen in the context of two social trends that have abruptly seized our attention and may shape our history for the next several decades—"metropolitan decline and inter-regional job shifts."

Metropolitan decline, if indeed it is taking place, would be something new. We had come to expect perpetual metropolitan growth. For a hundred years or more the nation's metropolitan population has grown far faster than the nonmetropolitan, so that an ever larger fraction of the whole was concentrated into metropolitan areas. This concentration was the result both of foreign migration to our cities and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a vast internal movement from rural and small town America to metropolitan areas.

The census of 1970 showed that migration out of nonmetropolitan areas had slowed considerably during the 1960s. Yet no one was prepared for the abrupt change of direction signaled by the Census Bureau's estimates of population change (amply reviewed in this volume) which have been published since 1970 in its *Current Population Reports:* from 1970 to 1974, according to CPR estimates, the nation's nonmetropolitan population grew *faster* than the aggregate in metropolitan areas; moreover, eight of the fifteen largest SMSA's actually lost population between 1970 and 1974 (only one in the same group had done so in the preceding decade); finally, from 1970 to 1974 the flow of net migration reversed its direction and ran from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas. It is this dramatic change in the direction of migratory flow that has suddenly forced us to ask whether the more than century-long trend of metropolitanization in the United States is at last played out.

The answer to that question is obscured by two factors examined in this book. The first is the strong regional component of recent population and job change. In the Northeast and North Central regions job and population growth is now very slow and both regions are experiencing net outmigration. Both jobs and population, however, attracted by the warm climate and cheap energy, among other factors, continue to grow rapidly in the South and West, and the South, long a source of migrants to the rest of the United States, is now the principal recipient area, exhibiting a net inflow of blacks as well as whites. Since large declining metropolitan areas are heavily concentrated in the Northeast and North Central regions, while rapidly growing ones occur mainly in the South and West, it is difficult to know how much of the observed decline among larger metropolitan areas is caused by external regional factors and how much by dissatisfaction with their internal features, such as size, physical obsolescence, high taxes, or disquieting social problems.

The probable effect of business fluctuations must also be taken into account in assessing recent metropolitan decline. As John F. Kain points out in his contribution to this volume, many of the declining metropolitan areas of the 1970s appear to be suffering from heavy cyclical unemployment. When (or if) the economy returns to full employment, jobs and population in those areas may well begin to grow again. The "turning point" that so surprised us may turn out to be only a cyclical effect superimposed upon a continuing trend of metropolitan expansion.

Sternlieb and Hughes have organized the invited papers that make up this volume into three sections. They have provided an introduction to each section as well as a twenty-five page "Prologue" which serves simultaneously as a general introduction, a summary, and a locus for their own comment on the important issues raised. Papers in the first section examine the trends and patterns of change discussed above. Vincent Barabba's detailed description of the Census Bureau's estimates of population change and of interarea migration is followed by an analysis of "Recent Economic Trends in the Major Northeastern Metropolises" by Michael Greenberg

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Nicholas Valente. Sternlieb and Hughes then look into the question, "Is the New York Region the Prototype?" Finally, John Smith and Michael Batutis make use of the Continuous Work History Sample of the Social Security System to estimate net migration for New York State. The rates they independently calculate from that data tally closely with the Census Bureau's estimates for the state, thus reinforcing one's faith in the reliability of the latter's CPR series.

The second section of the volume is devoted to "Underlying Processes and Problems." Brian Berry and Wilbur Thompson contribute papers which look respectively at the cultural and the economic roots of decline in the older metropolitan areas. Thomas Muller compares the fiscal problems of declining and growing metropolitan areas in a preliminary version of an interesting study later published by the Urban Institute. John Kain examines the "Implications of Declining Metropolitan Population on Housing Markets," and, in passing, argues that the evidence for anything more than a temporary break in the long-run trend of metropolitan growth is far from conclusive.

The third section, entitled "Planning and Policy Dimensions," offers papers by Nathan Glazer on "Social and Political Ramifications of Metropolitan Decline" and by Roger Starr on "The Dilemmas of Government Responses."

It must be said that the papers in the second and third parts of the book (Muller's and Kain's perhaps excepted) are not sustained pieces of rigorous analysis. Rather, they are the imaginative probings and searchings of men with an unusually wide grasp of urban phenomena who have been asked to explain or, failing that, at least to think about something as complex and yet intellectually fascinating as the implications of metropolitan decline. Anyone concerned with the present or the future of metropolitan America will find these chapters stimulating.

Indeed, this volume holds together, despite the necessarily tentative nature of many of its parts. For, whether or not the metropolitanization of the nation as a whole is coming to an end, it seems likely that adverse regional trends combined with unfavorable internal developments are bringing a halt to the growth of the large metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest. In those regions it is time to put aside the ancient American preoccupation with growth and begin to think seriously about planning for decline. The mental habits of 200 years are not easily shaken off, however, least of all by those who make public policy. Perhaps this volume will help us to get started.

JAMES HEILBRUN
Fordham University

The Changing Face of the Suburbs *edited by Barry Schwartz. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976.—ix, 355 pp. $16.00.*

This collection of original papers, sponsored by the *American Journal of Sociology* and Chicago's Center for Policy Studies, provides powerful evidence of the demography and sociopolitics of American suburbs, which their editor chooses to interpret

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a new round in a twenty-year query. That is, are suburbs distinctive places for social life, or are they mere extensions of familiar city patterns?

The fact of demographic change in city-suburban locales is updated for the 1970 census (and later) in the opening paper by Reynolds Farley. This "master trend" is detailed by others in examination of its consequences for family patterns, black mobility, motor transportation, and the occupational structure. The motives for this movement, explored in an impressive analysis by Thomas Guterbock, are not fears of blacks or of crime. Rather, what occurs is not a white "flight" but a "rush," not "push" but "pull." Christine Rossell's article in this *Quarterly* (Winter 1975–76) similarly challenged the popular view of such "flight."

The institutional and behavioral consequences of such movement forms another focus for these essays. Basil Zimmer finds the familiar fragmentation of political metropolitan structures strongly supported by residents while their officials opt for some reorganization. That fragmentation, as Ann and Scott Greer show, creates distinctive political styles of great variety. They remind us that "sociologists tend to think of politics as *reflecting* social structure [but] it is more appropriate to think of political process as interpreting and channeling social structure" (p. 218).

The attitudinal components of such structural variety are attested to in special studies of suburbanites' racial and religious views. Both areas display considerable variety, making it difficult to talk of "the suburban" attitude. Whether such attitudes are attributable to residence or not—still a major uncertainty—is explored in an excellent review by Claude Fischer and Robert Jackson. Finally, the symbolic life of the suburbanite, centered around transportation, is explored in Scott Donaldson's analysis of John Cheever's novels; "fear and loathing" seem to tremble beneath these citizens' good life out where the developments sprawl.

The foregoing does scant justice to scholarship, impressive in its scope of data, subtlety of concept, complexity of hypotheses, skill of analysis—all helpfully indexed. Here, we can only flag the attention of suburban subspecialists to these important contributions.

Beyond these lies the larger question of the suburbanite's role in the society. Central to that inquiry is another: Are these Americans something quite distinct from city dwellers or merely outward extensions of life styles familiar to the city? That is, are they "new" Americans or the old types in new locales? Social science and popular literature of roughly the 1950s proclaimed them a new breed. But later, beginning with Bennett Berger's *Working-Class Suburb* in 1960, considerable evidence emerged of a suburban variety more like that of central city than once assumed. Hence, this scholarship of antithesis plumped for the similarity of urban and suburban social and political patterns. In this book, too, much of the empirical findings support that thesis.

But its editor, Barry Schwartz, thinks otherwise and in an admittedly selective fashion (p. 325) draws from these findings justification for the "classical" view of suburban distinction. It is an analysis rich in critique and insight, going directly to the social psychological myths and preferences of urban life. But it convinces not, even though opening the old conflict to new contentions. For this analysis fails to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

properly take into account, if considered sufficiently at all, the literature that questions such distinction. What we have, then, is a major contribution to the study of suburbs, part of which shows that some intellectual debates are rarely resolved; we just get tired of them. This one still has much life left.

FREDERICK M. WIRT
University of Illinois

School Finance in Transition: The Courts and Educational Reform *edited by John Pincus. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974.—viii, 324 pp. $15.00.*

This book describes current changes in school finance practices, and also illustrates the dramatic transformation that has occurred in school finance as a field study. Since 1970, at least twenty-five states have made major modifications in the way in which they generate and distribute school funds. Approximately twelve other states have pursued more modest changes, and there is ample reason to believe that the momentum has has not yet been exhausted.

The reform movement was provided intellectual substance in the early 1960s and late 1970s by a series of legal and scholarly publications. These volumes, the most prominent of which was *Private Wealth and Public Education* by John Coons, William H. Clune, and Stephen D. Sugarman, argued that United States school finance practices fell short of assuring equal educational opportunity. They demonstrated that available school resources were tightly tied to the property wealth of a community and suggested constitutional theories by which reform could be sought through the judicial system.

Court cases have been brought in more than thirty states, with mixed results. The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Rodriguez* v. *San Antonio*, could find no constitutional justification for federal intervention. However, various state courts, especially in California and New Jersey, have ordered legislative changes in the manner in which school dollars are raised and distributed. Even in instances where state courts have not seen fit to intercede, legislatures have frequently been motivated by the interest and publicity surrounding such cases to undertake reforms.

Revising school finance statutes is almost always complicated, not only because of the selfish interests of those attempting either to maximize their benefits or minimize their costs, but also because of the need to strike a new equilibrium between the values which influence public policy, equity, efficiency, and freedom. Public officials and policy analysts wrestle with the complexities of raising more revenues for schools and using state government to redistribute them in a different pattern while simultaneously attempting to maintain a fair tax structure, preserve the autonomy of local school decision makers, and provide incentives to assure that the new money is spent in useful ways.

The complex nature of these issues, perhaps coupled with the fact that the reform movement is largely legally induced, has prompted a major transition in the study and practice of school finance. Historically, the field has been dominated by a few professors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with backgrounds in school administration and little formal training in economics and public finance. They had little interest in and even less understanding of matters such as intergovernmental relations and taxation policy.

Today, the awesome dollar amounts involved in school support, increased reliance upon state revenues, efforts to achieve greater equity in the administration of the property tax, attempts to preserve local decision-making discretion, and the desire to enhance school efficiency, have recast the study and practice of public school finance. Increasingly, it is a legitimate branch of public finance and the new breed of scholarly practitioners is not only sensitive to schools and politics, but also knowledgeable about subjects such as computers, simulation techniques, tax policies, development economics, and production-function analysis.

Pincus' book nicely represents the transition of school finance from an intellectually narrow "Old Boy" network to a modern branch of the overall field of public administration. Pincus himself is illustrative of the new outlook; he is trained as an economist and employed by the Rand Corporation. Of the remaining contributors, five are economists, five are trained in public administration, two are lawyers, one is an intellectual historian, and one is a school finance analyst. Half the contributors are from universities and the remainder from other institutions. The topics are equally broad in scope, with sections dealing with the technical mechanics of school finance reform, as well as interesting chapters on political complexity, school efficiency, taxation policy, intergovernmental relations, and the linkage of school finance to social policy. In general, the topics are well chosen, the authors able, and the writing understandable. The book is valuable both for its content and for representing the transition of school finance to a sophisticated field of study.

JAMES W. GUTHRIE
University of California, Berkeley

Philadelphia—The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics, 1789–1801 *by Richard G. Miller. Port Washington, N. Y., Kennikat Press, 1976.—xi, 192 pp. $12.95.*

This is a study of parties and politics at the local level in the formative period of American political parties. In choosing to focus on Philadelphia, Richard G. Miller has selected the city that more than any other was in the center of political activity. Political competition was closer and partisan techniques more advanced in the middle Atlantic states than anywhere else in the nation, and Philadelphia, as the national capital from 1790 to 1800, was the center of the emerging national party system. Moreover, Philadelphia was the nation's largest urban center, with a population that grew from 44,000 in 1790 to more than 61,000 by 1800. Although Pennsylvania and national politics have been much studied during this period, it is useful to have this close look at Philadelphia politics.

Among the book's valuable contributions is the author's analysis of the social and economic standing of party leadership as represented in candidates for office.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He finds that the Federalists drew more of their leaders from the wealthier classes than did the Republicans and that the Federalist leadership contained more merchants and lawyers. While the largest numbers of Republican candidates also came from these groups, the Republicans had more candidates from the skilled crafts and trades than the Federalists. At the same time, while less wealthy than their Federalist counterparts, Republican leaders had attained economic success and wanted a share of the political spoils.

Useful also are the author's data on the social and economic composition of city wards and his analysis of voting data by wards. Republicans, who lost nine out of the twelve wards to the Federalists in the gubernatorial election of 1799, did not carry the city until 1800. They owed their success both to their political organization and to broadening the social and economic basis of political participation. Miller concludes that "local Republicans won control of Philadelphia by building a broad-based urban coalition that attracted votes from all classes as well as ethnic minorities" (p. 144). Republicans did not represent major economic cleavages nor ideological differences with the Federalists.

Miller also argues that the party organizations that formed in Philadelphia in the 1790s were local in origin, using national issues where appropriate to win support; these parties owed little if anything to Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, or other national leaders and would have developed without them. It may be true that local parties in Philadelphia would have developed without the stimulus of national politics, but they would hardly have been the *Republican* and the *Federalist* parties without the developments on the national level. Clearly, as Miller shows (and as Alfred Young showed in regard to New York), where parties on a local level existed, Republicans and Federalists incorporated them into their national organizations. Such well-developed local parties as were found so early in Philadelphia, however, were the exception rather than the rule in the nation as a whole.

NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
University of Missouri, Columbia

Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen *by Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1975.—xiv, 296 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $4.95.*

The initial reaction of students of public policy to the subject of this volume is to question whether the beliefs of businessmen really matter. When President Coolidge pronounced in the 1920s that the "business of America is business" it turned out to be more an epitaph to an era than a prophecy for the future. In the half-century that followed, business witnessed the shifting of much of its previously held power to organized labor, the "permanent" federal and state bureaucracies, congressional committees, and, more recently, organized consumer groups and environmentalists. Hence, if one begins with the hypothesis that the beliefs of businessmen *are* different from those of other identifiable sectors of society, it is an open question

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as to whether they are sufficiently numerous or internally sufficiently homogeneous in respect to public policy beliefs to exert substantial influence over public affairs generally, or foreign policy in particular.

The basic tenet of this book is that the beliefs of businessmen do affect the course of foreign affairs. It then proceeds, using data collected in a survey of 1059 high-level vice-presidents of *Fortune* 500 industrial corporations (the survey yielded 567 completed returns), to determine whether businessmen hold different beliefs from other elite groups in respect to a variety of foreign and domestic issues. The authors modeled their questionnaire after that used by Dr. Allen H. Barton and his associates at Columbia University (see their "Conflict and Consensus among American Leaders," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 38, no. 4 [Winter 1974–1975], 507–530) so that their results permitted comparisons with other elite groups: e.g., political leaders, top civil servants, media executives and professionals, labor leaders, and voluntary organization leaders. To extend the comparisons, the authors conducted their own survey of the armed services as represented by the officers enrolled in 1973 in the five military colleges.

The questions pertaining to foreign policy issues were broadly conceived to determine whether businessmen were more "hawkish" or "dovish" than other groups. On balance, the beliefs of businessmen were not significantly different in this respect from those held by other elite groups: they were more favorable toward military spending than most civilian elites, but less favorable than either the military or Republican party leaders; were no less likely than others to regard American intervention in Vietnam as a mistake. These results, together with how businessmen compared with other civilian groups on such matters as military alliances, acceptance of socialistic governments in South America in which communists participate, and nuclear supremacy, led the authors to conclude that while businessmen were generally more "hawkish" than other civilian groups, they were less so than either the military or Republican party leaders. However, the differences among businessmen on these issues were also significant. For example, they were about evenly divided on the issues of defense spending and of whether the United States had contributed to the cold war, and 78 percent were prepared to accept socialist governments in Latin America. Moreover, the Russett and Hanson sample showed businessmen to be more "hawkish" than had the earlier Columbia sample. These aspects of the data deserved more attention than the authors gave them.

On domestic issues, the beliefs of businessmen tended to straddle those of other groups so that no consistent ideology emerges: they were less in favor of income redistribution, but were also considerably less inclined to think the Supreme Court decisions had placed excessive restrictions on the police, and did not differ from other groups as a whole on the legalization of marijuana.

What, then, do the authors conclude from all this? Their most significant finding is that the foreign policy preferences of businessmen are much more closely related to their ideology and strategic motivations than to their economic motivations; in fact, they found the latter to account for no more than 2 percent of the variance in foreign policy preferences, while domestic ideology was consistently a much strong-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

er influence. They argue that for those who hope for enduring change in our foreign policy this is encouraging. Economic interests are stable while ideology is subject to change over a short period of several years. This is an intriguing proposition but surely one that is neither self-evident nor blessed with pursuasive empirical findings.

The contribution this very interesting volume makes to our understanding of business leadership is of immense potential significance. It is a widely held view that business reporting by the various media—with the possible exception of the *Wall Street Journal*—is notoriously superficial and inadequate, an all-the-more lamentable commentary since nearly 90 percent of the goods and services that make up our gross national product originate in the private business sector. Other survey data show that the general public holds apprehensions, often misapprehensions, about the objectives, motives, and methods of those industry leaders who manage such a large portion of the nation's economic affairs. The authors here attempt to substitute high-quality analysis of what those businessmen believe for the images occasional, and often unflattering, headlines may create. Their results show that businessmen may, in terms of certain foreign policy issues, be different, but not all *that* different, from other elite groups that make up the highly complex and diversified fabric of American society.

JESSE W. MARKHAM
Harvard University

The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880–1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change *by Louis Galambos with the assistance of Barbara Barrow Spence. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.—xii, 324 pp. $15.00.*

Through exhaustive content analysis of publications catering to selected segments of the American middle class, Professor Galambos of Johns Hopkins has attempted in this volume to chart the fluctuating public attitudes toward big business and to explain what caused these changing moods. He finds that anger at big corporations peaked during the 1890s. In the half century that followed, there were cyclical increases in antagonism toward big business, for example after World War I and in the Depression of the 1930s, within a secular trend toward acceptance of the control of the economy by giant enterprise.

Galambos shuffles four variables—social, economic, political, and organizational—to explain these trends. During the first two decades, attitudes were primarily affected by the performance of the economy. The political ferment of the Progressive Era was the leading factor for the following twenty years. From 1920 to 1940, the greatest influence was changing social views: "Class consciousness had given way to organizational norms" as society finally found the order which it had sought in "bureaucratic values" (p. 262).

Indeed, it is the general acceptance of large organizations which Galambos sees

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as most responsible for the long-term diminution of ill-feeling toward big business. Instead of complaining about corporate giantism, farmers, workers, and professionals decided to form powerful organizations of their own. As long as these groups could unite and play in the big league, they could accept business doing likewise.

This book contains a noteworthy effort to place business history in the context of major historiographical schools, and its thesis is one with which historians of the twentieth century will have to familiarize themselves. The thesis may even be right, but there are some methodological problems which make it doubtful that this book has proven it.

Galambos was forced to make the not uncommon assumption that there is a relationship between the content of a publication and the ideas and feelings of its readership. There probably is, but the historian can never determine the precise nature of this relationship. This difficulty takes on an added dimension when discussing the particular problem that Galambos has tackled.

The reason is that the period 1880 to 1940 witnessed the growth of corporate public relations. This activity has sought to influence in behalf of big business the news and editorial content of many publications. By staging stunts, sponsoring junkets, or manipulating advertising contracts, public relations men have had a demonstrable impact. Nevertheless, their field is hardly even mentioned and does not rate an entry in the index. The question is, then, are Galambos' sources among those tainted by *sub rosa* corporate activity?

One incident will indicate the implications of failing to control for this possibility. In March 1906, Ray Stannard Baker wrote an article for *McClure's* about railroad manipulation of public opinion. He reported that, according to a railroad public relations man, cantankerous newspapers had been brought quite into line. In one week in 1905, Nebraska papers had published 212 columns of material unfavorable to the railroads and only two favorable. Eleven weeks later, the box score had been almost precisely reversed: 202 favorable columns to four unfavorable ones. In what sense could a content analysis of these papers be said to reflect reader opinion?

Doubtless the journals Galambos used were not nearly this malleable. Nevertheless, the corporate public relations budget did soar dramatically during this period. To what degree did the moderating treatment of big business which Galambos finds result from such expenditures rather than from spontaneous changes in the opinions of the readership?

RICHARD S. TEDLOW
Brandeis University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Outer Space and Inner Sanctums: Government, Business, and Satellite Communication *by Michael Kinsley. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1976.—xiii, 280 pp. $11.50.*

Nader reports have persistently exposed the politics of how the federal government makes decisions on many subjects, such as drugs and the environment. Michael Kinsley undertakes this task in satellite communications, and makes a significant contribution to the literature on the subject. He painstakingly exposes the influence of private industry in government decision making, and the impact is stunning. Yet while some chapters (I–IV) are excellent, others (V, IX) are sometimes superficial. The book changes focus several times, for no apparent reason, and often overwhelms us with details of events whose general significance has not been made clear. A few remarks in the latter part seen gratuitously offensive.

Kinsley's analysis of the origin and functioning of Comsat reduces it to an impotent, inefficient monster emerging from the complex interplay of private carriers, Washington bureaucrats, and congressional politicians. If true, his analysis is devastating. He argues that since 1965, the decisions of the Federal Communications Commission concerned with developing satellite technology have consolidated decision-making power among the carriers, rather than increasing the power of the FCC. This, in turn, has allowed these carriers to impose their reluctance to let Comsat be used for domestic service, where it could challenge the efficiency of the existing services. Kinsley supports his argument by pointing to many inconsistent policy decisions which the FCC has taken over time. He is particularly adept at exploring the internal politics between the carriers and Comsat, in positioning earth stations and relay loops.

Kinsley sees Comsat as a model for government-financed technological development, which is increasingly being used in our society—e.g., Amtrak and the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships. He does not view this with favor. In his analysis, he concludes,

> Here we have a new regulatory arrangement that remains largely uncriticized, one that can be used to legitimize new government giveaways and satisfy the public demand for government supervision without causing any trouble. Meanwhile the old regulatory agency is still around to bail out its regular clients in case the youngster gets out of hand (p. 231).

But according to Kinsley, this is not new. The development of the railroad followed a similar pattern. This leads us to the observation that technologies change very rapidly, unlike the politics of developing publicly financed technologies.

Unfortunately, the author does not discuss the international aspects of satellite communication with the same rigor and perceptiveness he applies to domestic politics. For example, he attaches great significance to the absence of China, Yugoslavia, and Rumania as formal members of Intelsat and overlooks the very considerable practical importance of having Intelsat earth stations in China. Significant cooperation in the international arena often takes place by circumventing highly symbolic, controversial issues (for example, the near universal exchange of meteorological data through the World Weather Watch long before China became a formal member of the World Meteorological Organization). The author gives us a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fascinating saga of the bid by Hughes for the Intelsat IV system. But it would have been useful to follow this with a careful analysis of the impact of the new Intelsat institutional arrangements upon its operations and procurement policies. This is in itself a complicated subject.

There is a bias running throughout the book that satellite communication is infinitely preferable to cable for the United States, and is much cheaper. This may be so, but the author never fully substantiates his assumption. The frequency spectrum in outer space is not a free resource, even though we treat it as such. The most desirable frequencies and the most desirable orbital slots are becoming a scarce resource. The costs of using these resources need to be consideerd in the economic calculations evaluating the relative merits of both forms of communication.

Nevertheless this is a book which anyone seriously interested in satellite communication or in domestic regulatory politics should read.

EDITH BROWN WEISS
Princeton University

Herbert H. Lehman and New York's Little New Deal *by Robert P. Ingalls. New York, New York University Press, 1975.—xx, 287 pp. $16.00.*

This model of a monograph, ably researched and interestingly developed, fulfills the stated objectives of the author as it focuses upon the New York State Legislature between 1933 and 1942. Although not a biography of Herbert H. Lehman, the governor is found on virtually every page because of his intimate involvement in recurring crises and in the formulation of vital, pioneering legislation.

Federal aid and presence helped alter the face of the state during this critical period, and did much to revive the hopes and aspirations of young and old alike, but it was Lehman—humorless, plodding, projecting the image of a cautious banker, and lacking the charisma of a Franklin D. Roosevelt or Fiorello H. LaGuardia—who built upon the Empire State's strong progressive traditions to develop the "best known Little New Deal in the country. . ." (p. x).

Lehman assumed the governorship in January 1933, when some 50 percent of the state's labor force was totally or partially unemployed, New York City was about to collapse financially, and cold and hunger enveloped millions. He quickly secured millions in emergency relief aid from President Herbert Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and did the same with President Roosevelt's Federal Emergency Relief Administration a few months later.

In the face of New York City's sufferings from an era of free spending and padded payrolls under Tammany Hall's Jimmy Walker, Lehman pushed the legislature to empower the city to levy specific emergency taxes and offer more responsible care for 1.5 million human beings in need. Lehman personally facilitated a bankers' agreement whereby leading banks promised to refinance short-term municipal loans, purchase bonds for relief and facilitate future city borrowing. In return, New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

City "pledged to segregate all tax payments for the next four years, budget specific sums to cover tax delinquencies, and limit imposts on real estate" (p. 37). Thus he saved the city from bankruptcy, and millions from going hungry. And so, what is new Governor Carey?

Under Lehman's leadership, the legislature adopted the philosophy of collective responsibility, which meant cooperating with local communities in financing and supervising unemployment relief. As Lehman put it during the 1936 campaign, "we will never again countenance private bread lines and we will never again force men and women out of work to go begging from door to door for food and clothes" (p. 58). This new approach helped, in particular, the much beleagured black community which, while constituting only 5 percent of New York City's population in 1937, made up 22 percent of the welfare rolls. Looking at the unemployment figures of blacks in 1976, it seems that we have made little progress in forty years.

Although Socialist legislators introduced a job insurance bill as early as 1921, it required the Great Depression, education of Lehman by progressive advisers, and thirty-nine-year-old George Meany to ensure enactment. Within a year after Meany broke a stalemate among job insurance proponents in 1934, New York became the second state to enact a limited system of unemployment compensation, though more progressive and pattern-forming than that of Wisconsin.

Lehman, however, was not above cutting old-age assistance because of budgetary considerations, until he was flooded with protests from labor and social welfare organizations. And his efforts to master the giant utilities and oblige them to reduce their exorbitant rates failed dismally because of defecting Democratic lawmakers. Not all New York Democrats were progressive, and not all Republicans were reactionary.

Lehman's programs marked both a continuity as well as a sharp break with the earlier progressivisms of the century. A pragmatist who was educated to the principle of government guaranteeing a minimum standard of living as a matter of right, he pushed the legislature to lay the foundations for the modern welfare state. Although Roosevelt and Congress often provided a model for state governments, they played a limited role in Albany. The impact of the Great Depression made momentary liberals out of former conservatives, and the state's varied progressive heritage of Charles Evans Hughes, Alfred E. Smith, dedicated social reformers, and Socialist-oriented trade unions readied New Yorkers for pioneering legislation, which only a rich state could afford.

Insufficiently developed were the catalyzing roles of Socialists like Norman Thomas, and many of his defecting colleagues who were joined by Communists in the American Labor party. They, alongside the enlightened and commited spokesmen of key reform and progressive organizations, largely determined the social welfare goals for Herbert H. Lehman and his historic Little New Deal.

BERNARD BELLUSH
City College of the City University of New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Madame Secretary: Frances Perkins *by George Martin. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.—xv, 589 pp. $16.95.*

Frances Perkins was a remarkable American woman. As Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of labor (1933–1945) she served as first woman cabinet member of the United States. In retrospect, she held a more responsible formal position in the federal government and was more widely known among the people than any other woman in American history. Yet, she had no desire to be remembered simply as a symbol of her sex. Asked by a reporter if being a woman was a handicap in government service, George Martin recounts that Perkins replied "crisply," "only in climbing trees" (p. 211). She just as crisply went about her business, which was to participate in the development and implementation of much of the New Deal's labor and social legislation.

Centering his study upon the recently opened Frances Perkins materials at Columbia University as well as extensive interviews, Martin has written a long, loving biography of the New Deal's Madame Secretary. His work is most interesting in its portrayal of the young Frances Perkins against the background of the Progressive era. Here one discovers the militant social worker who for four years was a dues-paying member of the Socialist party; the student of the conditions of women workers and the urban poor who earned the respect of Al Smith, Robert Wagner, Sr., and even Tammany's legendary "Big Tim" Sullivan; and the unostentatious yet strong personality who made her way through reform and government circles while she provided support for an emotionally disturbed husband and raised a daughter.

In the second half of the biography, however, Martin has a tendency to lose perspective and become mired, with Perkins, in the legislative details of the Roosevelt administration without developing a broad enough framework to understand the social forces that influenced shifting New Deal policies. Most significantly, he ignores the major contributions of the authentic radicals of the period, the Communists and other left-wingers, in both the grass roots organizing and the militant struggles of the labor unions and the mass progressive organizations—struggles that were essential to the achievement of trade union recognition, fair labor standards, unemployment insurance, social security, and the other working-class gains popularly associated with Roosevelt, Perkins, and the New Deal government. But, in all fairness, Martin has followed a scholarly literature that still largely interprets the era through Roosevelt's personality, and the clash of ideas among his brain-trusters, political underlings, and opponents. Sitdown strikes, general strikes, and other forms of mass agitation around specific reform proposals are secondary to and often disconnected from the maneuverings of the leadership.

Martin's treatment of Perkins and the Labor Department contains interesting and exciting material about the inner workings of the Roosevelt administration along with stories worth remembering about the vicious anticommunism and open anti-Semitism of the anti-New Deal opposition, and portrayals of the honesty, courage, and high aspirations of the New Dealers themselves. Most striking perhaps

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the politics of today was the New Dealers' belief in a new kind of government, expressed so eloquently by Roosevelt when he told the Democratic national convention in 1936,

> the royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of Government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody's business. They granted that the Government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the Government could do anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live. . . . These economic royalists complain that we seek to overthrow the institutions of America. What they really complain of is that we seek to take away their power (p. 365).

At a time when the economic royalists have been born again, so to speak, and apparently have neither learned nor forgotten much from the past, Martin's colorful and informative biography of Frances Perkins is well worth reading. It is both a good study of a gifted American reformer and, whatever disagreements one may have with its perspective, a useful addition to the scholarship on twentieth-century reform.

NORMAN MARKOWITZ
Livingston College

A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Palliative *by Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1976.—xi, 207 pp. Cloth, $10.00; paper, $2.95.*

The Hoogenbooms attempt to illustrate that the failures of the Interstate Commerce Commission evolved more from uninspired leadership and an entrenched, unimaginative staff than from the workings of economic laws, political pressures, or congressional vagueness. Theirs is an interesting thesis, but they fall short in cogently presenting and integrating it with other factors relating to the history of the ICC. They present a clear chronological approach to their subject, relying heavily on secondary source material. Their brevity and clarity, necessitated by the format of the Norton Essays in American History, often lapses into gross generalizations. For example, in discussing the events leading to the formation of the ICC in 1887, they claim that the "Railroads destroyed individual businessmen and stunted entire areas; discriminatory rates on Minneapolis flour ruined New York State millers, while rates on Chicago-bound Iowa grain and livestock starved Iowa river-town markets" (p. 5). Their outdated, progressive rhetoric misinterprets George Miller's interesting work, *Railroads and the Granger Laws* (1971). Miller more carefully analyzes the economic and political factors involved in the east-west rail traffic and concludes that shippers were just as involved in destroying and stunting various market areas as were the railroad executives. Pushing their weak thesis, the Hoogenbooms note that the highly capable Henry Carter Adams strengthened the ICC staff in the formative years of the 1890s, but sadly conclude that "Strong staff members, however, cannot redeem weak leaders; the agency is bound to suffer" (p. 38).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The authors apparently expected immediate success from an agency devised as a panacea of many conflicting business interests.

The Hoogenbooms' narrow focus on ICC administrators blots out other relevant factors involved in the history of the commission. Noting the gains in authority garnered by the ICC through the Hepburn and Mann-Elkins Acts during the Progressive era, the authors unabashedly claim "The ICC could have rationalized the transportation system" (p. 69). With this conclusion, the authors ignore the provocative analysis of the period provided by Albro Martin in his book, *Enterprise Denied: Oirigins of the Decline of American Railraods, 1897–1917* (1971). To Martin, Progressive era legislation and ICC actions reflected an inability to comprehend the needs of the nation's transportation system. Many participants, from rail executives to ICC examiners to Louis D. Brandeis, misunderstood the implications of the expanding economy in the early 1900s. While the ICC held some authority to revamp the rail system, it gained its power from Progressive era political rhetoric that called for consolidation and efficient management, when what was needed urgently was more facilities and rolling stock to meet the twentieth-century demands of the American economy. The Hoogenbooms unfairly criticize the ICC for failing to rationalize a system no one fully understood.

The section on the Great Depression contains contradictions that emerge from the lack of a broad interdisciplinary approach to history as well as from a confusion over the concepts of authority and power. Ignoring business and political factors, the Hoogenbooms claim that, "Having acted indecisively in the past, the ICC could do little to save the railroads after the crash" (p. 121). They later conclude that coordination of the transportation system envisioned in the Transportation Act of 1933 "failed primarily because railroads, which controlled regional coordinating committees, did not wish to coordinate" (p. 127). This conclusion does not agree with their thesis that a lack of leadership in the commission presaged failure—it indicates that outside factors (in this case, business and political power) also affected the performance of the ICC. The commission may have held the authority to rationalize the transportation system in the 1930s, but it did not hold the power: too many interest groups diffused the initiative toward coordination. New forms of transportation (trucks and airplaines) further complicated the task of coordination. The most that could have been expected from a federal regulatory commission in a representative democracy was guidance and a forum for discussion. The authors unfairly criticize the ICC for failing to perform a task that could have been carried out only with the full cooperation of business leaders, shippers, and Congress.

One must utilize this volume carefully: factual descriptions are fairly accurate; but the analysis is often too simplistic and misleading.

WILLIAM R. CHILDS
The University of Texas at Austin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The 103rd Ballot: Democrats and the Disaster in Madison Square Garden *by Robert K. Murray. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976.—xiv, 336 pp. $10.95.*

Appearing propitiously in the midst of the convention season of 1976, Professor Murray's popular narrative follows the course of the Democratic party through the low point in its history. From these pages the reader will even learn the name of the gracious lady who led the delegates through the daily rendition of the national anthem—perhaps the peak of concensus the party reached during the nearly three weeks of its deliberations—and the reader, too, can vicariously suffer some of the discomfitures of the several thousand sweltering participants jammed into old Madison Square Garden.

Since the convention itself was only the most emphatic manifestation of the deep-lying schisms in the Democratic party, Murray prefaces his main event with a discussion of the divisive issues of the Ku Klux Klan and Prohibition and in this perspective assesses the strengths and, more important, the weaknesses of the contestants for the nomination. Much of this detail is familiar to historians and Murray admits his obligation to David Burner's 1968 book, *The Politics of Provincialism.* Thus we are reminded again that Al Smith was a provincial New Yorker, not a cosmopolitan politician. He once avowed: "I'd rather be a lamppost on Park Row than Governor of California."

Despite its engaging style and rich detail, *The 103rd Ballot* is of limited value to political scientists and historians. Murray is unaffected by the growing and significant political analyses of scholars such as Gerald Pomper, Walter Dean Burnham, Richard Jensen or Paul Kleppner. Rather he sets out to "write an old-fashioned descriptive and literary narrative" and insists "that where other scholars see social, cultural and demographic movements manipulating men, I still see men as the primary initiating agents" (p. xii). This avowal is difficult to reconcile with the author's assertion that the convention "reflected a nation in the midst of traumatic changes. . . . In that struggle, which involved competing life styles, religious beliefs, social backgrounds and conflicting moralities, partisan candidates like Smith and McAdoo elicited a fanatical response and became symbols which helped perpetuate and intensify that struggle rather than resolve it" (p. 217). Moreover, there is lacking any systematic analyses of voting blocs in the convention. The author fails to mention the conclusions of the standard reference work on political conventions (Richard C. Bain and Judith N. Parris, *Convention Decisions and Voting Records,* 2d ed., Washington, D. C., 1973) that McAdoo's first ballot vote correlated .63 with the bitterly contested convention plank condemning the Klan without mentioning its name, while the final vote for Davis correlated .71, indicating that the successful nominee's major backing came from ex-McAdoo supporters and disproportionately from supporters of the successful majority plank on the Klan.

Although one finds it difficult to quarrel with the author's assertion that only a national disaster could rescue the Democratic party, it might be questioned whether, given the restrictions of his methodology and style, Murray has explored fully the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implications of the disaster at the Garden. Was 1924 a sort of fiery trial through which the divided Democratic party had to pass? It could be argued that this was the last Democratic convention until the 1960s (or 1976) where a distinct southern-based candidate was a significant presidential contender. Again it might be hypothesized that even in the wake of the depression, the 1924 debacle continued to haunt the Democratic party. The principal national figure who tried, unsuccessfully, to inspire among Democrats a reassessment of their role after the rout in November was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Need one be reminded of the assiduousness with which Jim Farley cautiously wooed and cultivated the contending factions in the party during the months that preceded the 1932 convention or the caution President Roosevelt exercised until 1938 in gingerly treating the tenuous elements that made up his party's coalition?

JOHN L. SHOVER
Late of University of Pennsylvania

The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the NAACP *by James M. McPherson. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1975.—xiii, 438 pp. $20.00.*

James M. McPherson has written a new defense of the abolitionists which extends the thesis offered in *The Struggle for Equality: The Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and Reconstruction*—namely, that the abolitionists did not abandon the cause of black advancement after the Civil War. The present work examines the activities and attitudes of abolitionists and their offspring during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period of increasingly intense white racism and erosion of black civil rights. While conceding the existence of paternalism and ethnocentrism as important strains in the thought and behavior of white liberals, McPherson argues that abolitionists and their descendants remained active in racial reform efforts and assumed progressive positions on most racial issues. The followers of William Lloyd Garrison are found to be most consistent in their support of black civil rights after 1870; fourteen of the Garrisonians are identified as among those active in the early NAACP. Less consistent in their commitment to black civil rights were descendants of political or evangelical abolitionists, but they too are found to be active in racial reform activities, such as the drive to establish missionary schools for southern freedmen.

McPherson has carefully sifted through journalistic and manuscript sources to construct a balanced description of the attitudes of individuals who confronted the difficult racial issues of the period. He is less successful in his attempt to provide statistical precision for his study by focusing on the attitudes of a sample of neo-abolitionists as expressed in public statements on a series of racial issues. His sample of 284 persons is disproportionately composed of political activists and writers whose views could be readily ascertained, and thus it does not necessarily reflect the views of all the abolitionists' descendants. More troubling are the smaller sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

samples used to determine the attitudes of abolitionists on particular issues. For example, the fact that thirty-five abolitionists denied the existence of significant innate racial differences, while only nine expressed racist positions is perhaps less important than the fact that the vast majority of this highly vocal sample did not publicly express their views on the issue. In addition, judgments regarding the views of the abolitionists would have been more valuable had they been explicitly contrasted with the attitudes of other Americans from similar educational, class, ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds. Without such a comparison, it remains unclear whether McPherson is arguing for intergenerational continuities in political values or simply for similarities in the social origins of succeeding generations of racial reformers. McPherson might favor the former notion, but such an argument should be buttressed by descriptions of patterns of parent-child relationships and of socialization within abolitionist families.

Also worth noting is the polemical tone of many of the book's passages. McPherson clearly sympathizes with and seeks to defend the abolitionists from past and contemporary attacks. In his view, they not only persevered in their concern for blacks, but they were more often right than were critics of their own time and the present. Thus he argues against "the viewpoint of the black power movement of recent years" that missionary education "perpetuated the blacks' colonial dependence on white liberals" by stating that "without this colonialism there would have been little black higher education. . . . And there would have been fewer educated leaders of black power movements" (p. 295). He also disagrees with recent historical works that affirm the viability of Afro-American cultural institutions and family life under slavery. Thus, the teachers in southern black schools, although probably guilty of exaggerating "the 'Sambo' syndrome in the black personality" and "the universally corrupting impact of slavery," "were not racists; they believed the Negro inherently equal to the Caucasion and saw their mission as one of helping him to achieve this equality." McPherson acknowledges their "first-hand knowledge of the effects of slavery. Their conclusions, however biased by middle-class Victorianism, were probably sounder than historians' generalizations based on inferential analysis of incomplete quantitative data" (p. 66).

A major theme in the study is the increasing determination of black leaders during the post-Reconstruction period to challenge the control exercised by white reformers over black schools established by predominantly white religious groups. McPherson does not make clear the extent to which his sample of abolitionists were active in the development of southern black education, but he does demonstrate that the abolitionist spirit survived, though transformed, in the work of white missionary-teachers, who saw themselves as the uplifters of the black race. As the white neoabolitionists of the turn of the century were precursors of contemporary white liberals, so also were the assertive black leaders of that era the forerunners of the black nationalists and racial separatists of recent decades. In addition to discussing the complex blend of egalitarianism and paternalism in the thought of white proponents of black advancement, McPherson offers suggestions of the intricate mixture of racial consciousness, individual ambition, and racial romanticism that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continue to fuel modern black separatism. Much remains to be said regarding the ideological components of white liberal thought on racial issues and the relationship between such thought and the changing social structure of the period. And certainly McPherson does not pretend to offer the last word regarding the roots of modern black nationalism. One hopes that *The Abolitionist Legacy* will stimulate further research regarding these important topics.

CLAYBORNE CARSON
Stanford University

American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia *by Edmund S. Morgan. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1975.—x, 454 pp. $11.95.*

Over the past decade, the growing interest in the social history of the Anglo-American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has yielded excellent monographs on the Caribbean colonies by Richard Dunn and Richard Sheridan; on New England by Kenneth Lockridge and Philip Greven, among others; and on Pennsylvania by James Lemon. But this superb volume is the first modern book-length study of the socioeconomic development of Virginia, England's first and, in many respects, most important continental colony. Of fundamental importance to the understanding of the origins of American society, it both brings us closer to a comprehensive reconstruction of the social history of British colonization and serves as a solid base for the study of early American history. Three introductory chapters explore the impulses behind and the nature of English and native American culture on the eve of the founding of Virginia, a final chapter offers a cursory and not entirely persuasive interpretation of the relationship of society to political thought in eighteenth-century Virginia, and an appendix contains a careful discussion of the demography of seventeenth-century Virginia. But the core of the book is a detailed and brilliant exposition of the emergence and articulation of Virginia society during the seventeenth century.

What Morgan describes is a new society involved in a century-long search for sustenance, stability, and definition. Readers of his previously published articles will be familiar with his interpretation of the earlier phases of this process. The initial Jamestown settlement was a fiasco, he suggests, not only because of poor planning, unsuitability of the immigrants, and other reasons traditionally emphasized, but also because the settlers, who brought no tradition of industry with them and associated agricultural work with the Indians they quickly came to disdain in a typical example of early modern xenophobia, refused to cultivate enough corn to feed themselves. Once the possibility of quick riches through tobacco cultivation drove the settlers to frenzied work after 1615 during the first American boom, food shortages, a high death rate among its laborers, and the expropriation of its resources by its own officers brought the Virginia Company close to ruin before it lost its charter in the mid-1620s. During the boom many of the features that sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sequently characterized Virginia—and indeed much of the contemporary Anglo-American world during its early stages—achieved clear shape: great extremes of wealth with the monopolization of a significant proportion of available resources by a few; high mortality; a heavy preponderance of males and young adults; concentration on a single crop; high valuation of labor within a labor system that treated people as disposable commodities; the routine subordination of the corporate welfare to private interests; and a lack of permanent commitment to the society by the settlers.

As the boom died in the early 1630s and the death rate slowly declined over the next three decades, Virginia achieved some stability—and became demonstrably more English—as a largely self-sustaining pasture-farming empire preoccupied with growing tobacco and expressing its wealth in livestock and servants. Immigration was steady: by 1660 there were 25,000 inhabitants. But all was not well. Opportunity declined steadily for new freemen and small producers between 1640 and 1670. Virginia became a rich man's country, as the emerging elite monopolized offices and engrossed the best lands. To meet the social problem created by the proliferation of freemen just out of servitude and with few prospects of upward mobility, the elite lengthened terms of servitude and deprived the landless of the franchise. The weakness of traditional institutions of social control forced the elite to rely on swagger, solidarity, and a judicious dispensation of offices to keep the rest of society in line. Elite solidarity was broken and the discontented mobilized in Bacon's Rebellion during the mid-1670s, but little changed in its wake. The reckless pursuit of gain and exploitation of the poor by the elite was never more rampant than in the 1680s.

What did change Virginia social configurations was the gradual substitution of African slavery for white servitude after 1680. That development both ended the continuous social threat of new white freemen and, along with the racism that accompanied it, created such profound pressures toward white solidarity as to produce a variety of elite concessions to the lower orders, a diminution of lower-class hostility toward the rich, and a common identity that linked whites of all classes together. The remarkable political and social harmony and the vaunted freedom and personal independence among white Virginians after 1730, argues the author in the principal thesis of the book, was thus to a large extent dependent upon the enslavement of blacks—a point that once again raises the intriguing if, outside Marxist circles, little entertained question of whether the freedom and independence of any society has ever been achieved without, if not the enslavement, at least the unthinking exploitation and subordination of some groups within them or in satellite societies.

JACK P. GREENE
The Johns Hopkins University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trotsky: An Appreciation of His Life *by Joel Carmichael. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1975.—512 pp. $15.00.*

This book at last provides a one-volume biography of Trotsky, one of those rare giant personalities present at a crucial moment in history who acted to change its direction drastically. Aside from Lenin, only Trotsky might be considered essential to the Bolsheviks' seizure of power. If anything, Trotsky was even greater after his expulsion from Russia than before it, in the bitter, difficult, and dangerous days of his uneven struggle with the Stalinist colossus, until an assassin's ice axe crushed his skull on August 20, 1940. Not only Trotsky's greatness, however flawed, but also the raging conflicts over his meaning and myth cry out for reliable and objective study of the man, his ideas, and his impact.

Carmichael's book inevitably invites comparison with the magisterial three-volume Trotsky biography by the late Isaac Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed* (1954), *The Prophet Unarmed* (1959), and *The Prophet Outcast* (1963). Even a strong critic of Deutscher's historicist pro-Trotskyism like Sidney Hook called Deutscher's biography "one of the most remarkable briographies of the 20th century . . . a moving and evocative study of a heroic figure, a master of the word and of the deed."

Carmichael's book is less evocative because the author is not as close to the subject or sources as was Deutscher. But among its merits, this book retains much of Deutscher's narrative, condensed but in extensive passages, thought for thought and almost word for word. It is easier to grasp the shape of Trotsky's life in this shorter text: the saga of his journey through a defiant and already brilliant adolescence away from the family farm, the commune interlude so formative of Trotsky's Populism and Marxism, his early gifts of oratory and repartee, his two confinements, exiles, and escapes, triumphs and agonies. Then where Deutscher becomes rich in exposition of background and Trotsky's writings, Carmichael truncates all this, almost omitting "permanent revolution," for example.

Rather, Carmichael deals with factors passed over by Deutscher. He uses others' research completed on German Foreign Office archives to sketch the important German financial subsidy to the Bolsheviks, while possibly exaggerating the importance of that contribution to a Bolshevik victory, and certainly relying mainly on innuendo and vague circumstantial evidence to link Trotsky with the deals. Also, Carmichael dwells at some length on the roots of Trotsky's behavior. Trotsky, both biographers show in their own ways, excelled as writer, speaker, and doer, as man of action. But he displayed hauteur to those he considered lacking in his flair, he worked poorly in organizational harness and fixated on "Ideas" rather than on dealing with people. He appeared to disdain intrigue and did not even defend himself from Stalin's plotting while he still had the chance, during the days of his swift decline from power after Lenin's first stroke in May 1922.

Carmichael goes further in seeking psychological roots of Trotsky's passivity in defending himself—such a contrast to his energetic leadership during his brief three and a half years of heroic preeminence, making the putsch, leading and building the Red Army, salvaging Russia's shattered transport and earlier, in 1905, distinguishing himself as the outstanding figure in the St. Petersburg Soviet. Car-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

michael reasons that Trotsky suffered from self-doubt and shyness with peers because he rejected his father and his Jewish origins and never developed an identity fully satisfactory to himself. That is why, Carmichael says, Trotsky lost persuasive power among his colleagues. His authority with the organization people came from his assignments and not himself. Trotsky at his greatest moments was always the "adjutant" (p. 300), carrying out tasks, albeit vital ones, handed him by others on stages set by others, without the confidence, closeness to associates, or the Leninist or Stalinist type will necessary to create an organized following of his own. One looks forward to a next edition in which Carmichael develops this psychohistorical theme more systematically throughout the book and relates his findings to existing psychological portraits of Trotsky and the Bolsheviks, such as those by E. Victor Wolfenstein in *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* (1967). Carmichael inexplicably does not refer to this book at all.

Trotsky should serve as an absorbing and provocative teaching text on Soviet history and politics, revolutionary leadership and psychohistory, especially if there is a cheaper edition with an entry on Trotsky added to the index, and with more care given to backing some statements such as: "from the very foundation of the Russian Social Democratic Party to the Bolshevik putsch there were no innovations in theory at all" (p. 141).

PETER JUVILER
Barnard College, Columbia University

Asia and the Road Ahead: Issues for the Major Powers *by Robert A. Scalapino. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.—x, 337 pp. $10.95.*

Asia and the Road Ahead is a panoramic survey of the foreign policies of six major states (Japan, China, India, Indonesia, the USSR, and the United States) in the Asian-Pacific region. (Professor Scalapino further subdivides this into the Pacific Ocean, Northeast, Southeast, South Asia, and the Continental Center.) Most books of this ambitious a scope are the collective effort of several specialists and hence frequently suffer from the lack of a consistent point of view. Such is not the case with Scalapino's effort.

The book has two great merits. First, by treating the entire Asian-Pacific region as a whole, Scalapino avoids the pitfalls of a purely bilateral approach to foreign policy analysis, and enables the reader to look at the same issues from multiple points of view. Second, in each chapter he stresses the domestic parameters within which foreign policy decisions are made and assays the likelihood for future change in the political systems he examines.

The result is a skillful summary of the main lines of foreign policy in the region which will be particularly useful to readers with little prior knowledge of the area. In this sense, Scalapino's book performs the same function as an undergraduate survey course or, perhaps, an academic briefing for touring politicos. However, for even the partially initiated there is little new or especially absorbing in this part of the book.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scalapino sees little chance for an alteration in the present low-posture Japanese foreign policy even should an opposition coalition government replace the LDP. He sees China continuing to develop as a major regional power in Asia, India exerting its dominance on the South Asian subcontinent, Indonesia as an important though less than dominant factor in the inchoate Southeast Asian arena, and the USSR augmenting its credibility and strength as an Asian-Pacific power. These views are as unexciting as they are unexceptionable. Still, Scalapino observes that, "Uncertainty, however, is the hallmark of the present" (p. 161), so that one must be prepared to expect the unexpected.

By far the longest chapter (eighty-seven pages) deals with American policy, and here the author shifts from dispassionate analysis to policy advocacy. In specific areas, he favors a low-posture United States role in South Asia, the retention of American troops in Korea, a do-nothing policy with respect to the China-Taiwan issue, and continuing American involvement in Southeast Asia because of that region's links to the more important Northeast and Pacific Ocean arenas. What he is most anxious about is the ebb tide of American power in the wake of the Vietnam defeat and the new isolationist mood at home. To combat this peril Scalapino proposes a posture of "selective internationalism" (p. 280), or what might better be termed "Asian-Pacific activism" including the maintenance of a strong American military posture in the area.

Why? Scalapino cleaves to an older innocence that in a turbulent world of ambitious powers only the United States, upholder of freedom, can be depended upon to provide stability and security in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, in a sense, he is the last soldier in a lost war of which he was a leading academic supporter. Unfortunately, although a strong case can be made for this position, Scalapino's arguments are more rhetorical than substantive and further marred by peevish attacks on various unnamed "revisionists" who disagree with him. He would have done well to heed his own call for restraint.

In sum, despite its single authorship this is a bifurcated book. Its survey chapters are throughly professional but bland. Its recommendations for American policy are both livelier and more controversial.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
East Asian Institute
Columbia University

Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837–1860 *by Richard H. Sewell. New York, Oxford University Press, 1976.—xvi, 379 pp. $14.95.*

This is traditional narrative history, skillfully executed. Written in a graceful style and based on years of research in dozens of antislavery newspapers and 100 manuscript correspondence collections, it provides the fullest account we have of political abolitionism from the birth of the Liberty party in 1839 to the Republican triumph

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of 1860. These subjects had been earlier treated by Theodore Clarke Smith's old monograph, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest* (1897); Frederick Blue's *The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics, 1848–1854* (1973); and Eric Foner's splendid analysis of Republican ideology, *Free Soil, Free Politics, Free Men* (1970). But Sewell covers a wider geographical area, draws upon a far greater number of sources, and offers a more subtle interpretation than Smith. He deals more succinctly with a longer time period and with the history of two more parties than did Blue. And while Foner's study could scarcely be improved upon, Sewell places Republican free labor ideology firmly in the context of two decades of developing political abolitionism. If one wishes to read only a single book on antislavery politics before the Civil War, this is the book to read.

It has become fashionable in some circles to scorn the type of history that Sewell has written as "impressionistic" because it does not utilize quantitative data, computer technology, or advanced social science theory. I do not share this sentiment. There is still a need for solid narrative history laced with interpretive insights which emerge from the author's empathic immersion in written sources. Sewell has given us such history. Nevertheless, one wishes that he had made one or two concessions to simple quantification—a collective biographical portrait of a hundred or more political abolitionists, for example, which by cross-tabulating such variables as place of birth, education, religion, occupation, and previous political affiliation might have told us a great deal about the kinds of men who joined these parties. An analysis of the socioeconomic character of counties that gave the highest Liberty and Free Soil vote might have provided important clues to the dynamics of the movement. A systematic inquiry into the complex relationship between antislavery ideology, nativism, evangelicalism, and economic modernization might have enabled Sewell to deal more effectively with the "ethnocultural" interpretation of antebellum northern politics. Sewell does not ignore this interpretation, which emphasizes nativism as the primary political impulse of the 1850s. But his assertion, accurate so far as it goes, that the most dedicated antislavery leaders attacked nativism as a red herring and as a violation of their egalitarian principles slides around the question of the degree to which nativism infected the Republican party.

Contrary to most recent scholarship, Sewell's study emphasizes the opposition of many Liberty, Free Soil, and Republican leaders to racial discrimination and racist beliefs. They denounced slavery and resisted its expansion not only because it harmed the interests of northern whites but also because it violated the humanity of southern blacks. At considerable political risk they worked against black laws and in favor of Negro suffrage in northern states. Sewell concedes that few political abolitionists measured up to the egalitarian standards of today and that a good many members of the diverse Free Soil and Republican coalitions harbored racist attitudes even by the standards of their own time. But "to a remarkable extent" Republicans and Free Soilers, as well as the earlier Liberty party, managed "to transcend the racism of the age" and to "recognize the Negro's humanity and protect his most basic freedoms" (pp. 176, 336). Although at each stage of the broadening antislavery impulse—from moral suasion in the 1830s to Liberty party politics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the 1840s and the less militant Free Soil and Republican coalitions after 1847—the movement lost some of its moral purity and radicalism, the purpose of abolishing slavery nevertheless remained at "the very core of Republican ideology" and the Republican party of 1860 was "the logical extension" of the abolitionism of the 1830s (p. 292). If this perhaps overstates Republican radicalism, there was enough evidence behind it to convince southern leaders that their peculiar institution was not safe in a Union headed by a "Black Republican" president. And the war came.

JAMES M. MCPHERSON
Princeton University

The Political Police in Britain *by Tony Bunyan. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1976.—xi, 320 pp. $15.95.*

This book should make a jarring impact on those stubborn anglophiles who hold up the British state as a model of Western democratic liberalism. Written from a Marxist perspective, it convincingly demonstrates that behind a liberal façade, an active political police system flourishes in Britain marked by all the pathologies made familiar by the recent disclosures of our Senate and House investigating committees. These include illegal or unethical operational practices (wiretapping, bugging, mail interception and openings, informers and provocateurs); juridictional rivalries; and, most important of all, a tremendous overkill in targeting, a result of what the author calls "institutional paranoia." In fact, some areas of British intelligence are far more "advanced" than their American counterparts. The British system is, for example, more coherent and integrated than ours. A second observable difference is that British intelligence has developed assessment theories based on predictive indicators while American countersubversive intelligence has all but abandoned evaluation initiatives. In this country, internal security intelligence evaluation was from the beginning a stepchild of operations—i.e., of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI. Operational intelligence was transformed from a means of collecting information into an end in itself.

Bunyan's book treats both intelligence institutions and operations but does not consistently distinguish between intelligence for law enforcement purposes and ongoing people watching. An initial section on the political use of law is useful to anyone interested in the origin and interpretation of the Official Secrets Acts, measures which have no counterpart in American law. His analysis makes it clear that these statutes, designed to prevent disclosures which would endanger the national interests and especially to thwart foreign espionage, have in fact served primarily to suppress information which an enlightened citizenry should know and to control the press. The devastating case that Bunyan makes should be pondered in evaluating proposals to use criminal law to plug leaks in governmental information. If the British experience is a guide, the inevitable consequence of such a "remedy"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will be, in addition to the already mentioned evils, to intimidate and demoralize the civil service.

Also highly useful is a discussion of Special Branch, the Scotland Yard component ultimately accountable to the Home Office, which is charged with policing offenses of a political nature. Both in its law enforcement and its intelligence work, it resembles the large urban antisubversive police units in this country. Organized in 1883 to combat the Fenian bombings, its responsibilities expanded over the years to include foreign-born radicals and anarchists, labor leaders, suffragettes, Indian radical students, suspected Communist spies, antiwar protesters, and members of the black community. Its initial assignment in the area of Irish unrest has been institutionalized; today it is a major concentration. Bunyan's discussion of the contemporary roles of Special Branch in monitoring the left and the labor movement shows that it is a political police unit with intelligence functions which far outrun its blue-printed law enforcement format.

This transition to countersubversive intelligence is clearly indicated by its operational ties with MI 5, a "pure" domestic intelligence agency. Special Branch exchanges information with MI 5 and supplies the necessary policy functions (arrests, preparation of evidence, and court appearances) that MI 5 is barred from performing. Primarily a domestic counterespionage and security agency, MI 5 grew into its style as a response to the Bolshevik revolution. From its formation in 1909 until 1924 it was run by the legendary Sir Vernon Kell ("K"), the "founding father" of modern domestic countersubversive intelligence. The author's discussion of MI 5 is worthwhile, especially disclosures of the monitoring of members of Parliament by this unit.

Included also are chapters on surveillance techniques, the private security industry, and counterrevolutionary preparations. The exploration of this last item is an eye-opener. Since the mid-1960s, the intelligence establishments in all Western countries have begun tooling up for a predicted showdown between capitalism and its challengers. Bunyan documents the way combined political police and military forces are being trained to deal with a revolution. This valuable chapter is a chilling notice that the politics of deferred reckoning, the body of counterrevolutionary assumptions upon which modern political intelligence rests, has finally moved center stage.

FRANK J. DONNER
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City *by Wayne A. Cornelius. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1975.—xii, 319 pp. $12.50.*

This book represents the natural conclusion of a series of partial studies published by the author during the last six years. It is also a felicitous culmination for a particular stage of urban research in Latin America. This stage saw the gradual demolition by a group of empirically oriented social scientists of the mythologies on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

urbanization and urban poverty prevailing in the past, such as the notions of the intellectual marginality of the poor, their entrapment in a subculture of poverty, and the likelihood that they would become the radical spearhead of revolutionary confrontations.

Much of the material presented is already familiar, but the volume puts together, in synthetic form, a compelling, sophisticated image of what it is like to be poor in Latin America. In agreement with studies from such different cities as Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, and Santiago, the view that emerges from the impoverished *colonias* of Mexico City is that of a dynamic population, rationally adapting to existing conditions, and attempting to gradually improve their situation within the existing order rather than confronting it.

Successive chapters review the impact of community of residence as a context for political socialization, urban migrants' political attitudes and involvement, goals and means for political demand-making, and the interaction between state initiatives and the political behavior and system support among the poor. Taken together they represent an exemplary corrective to the earlier generalizations of scholars like Huntington, Kornhauser, and Scott, who linked urbanization to increasing mass politicization and, consequently, to civil strife as the state faced an increasing overload of demands.

The present study, like others on Latin America, shows that community is at least as important as class in socializing political orientations among the poor and that, instead of confrontation with the rich, the main form of political action by squatters lies in bargaining and accommodation with government bureaucracies. Clearly, the state must respond to the massive needs of the squatter population, but it does so in a way that limits the scope of demands, regulates channels of access to authorities, and extracts maximum political payoff from benefits granted.

The situation, therefore, is not one of angry masses taking the initiative and progressively cornering a purely reactive government. It is rather a complex process in which both sides socialize and mold the behavior of the other. "Rules of the game" eventually emerge which guarantee to the poor a modicum of access to system benefits and to the state a source of popular legitimacy and support.

Because the book culminates a period of research in this field, it also shows its limitations. Having demolished previous stereotypes and rejected earlier generalizations, little else remains but to continue analysis of individual attitudes and behavior. This is inevitable, given the nature of survey data, and contains many instructive insights. It also lapses, at times, into repetition and trivial results. The very thrust of the most important findings of the study leads away from exclusive concentration on the attitudes of the poor and toward analysis of the broader political and economic context in which their situation is embedded.

The author is aware of this trend and the next to last chapter moves from individual results to discussion of "system performance." This chapter, developed in a dialogue with earlier studies of the Mexican polity, highlights again the particular mix of ideological cynicism and concern with popular support, of administrative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inefficiency and political alertness, of egalitarian rhetoric and exploitation of the poor which have been trademarks of Mexico under the PRI.

Still this is only the beginning of a truly macrostructural analysis. In the conclusion, the author touches on many such themes without really pursuing any and even makes the questionable assertion that "policies aimed to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth within the country may actually generate more frustration among the poor than a perpetuation of the 'high growth' policies that have contributed to extreme income concentration" (p. 232).

But these are minor shortcomings. On the whole, the book represents a major contribution to the study of urban poverty and will be a standard reference in courses and research on Third World urbanization for years to come. While it is not a work on political economy, its logical bearing will push many future students in this direction.

ALEJANDRO PORTES
Duke University

Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile *by Theodore H. Moran. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1975.—xiv, 286 pp. $12.50.*

The confrontation between the governments of developing countries and multinational corporations (MNC's) in the extractive industries has already accomplished a fundamental restructuring of that economic relationship. While most attention has rightfully been focused on petroleum and OPEC, the changes in copper and bauxite /aluminum are important but less dramatic. Theodore Moran analyses the adjustments in the relationships among the major American copper companies operating in Chile—Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro—the Chilean government, and the United States government. The basic changes took place in the postwar period.

This book is to be highly recommended. It is thorough and scholarly, yet very readable. It is at once a book on the politics of *dependencia*, as it emerged and was articulated in Chile, as well as on the economics of the copper industry and the major Chilean copper companies in particular. It skillfully analyzes the motives for policy decisions in Chile, the strategy of companies, and the power bases for the various participants. It is above all a balanced book, avoiding the simplistic views of the "exploitation" of developing countries by mammoth MNC's at one extreme, and the notion that unfettered foreign investment is always good for the host country at the other.

Chilean copper, similar to that in extractive industries in many other developing countries, is characterized by a substantial amount of economic rent. This is normally defined as the difference between the cost of producing copper in Chile, and the cost of effective substitutes for Chilean copper. The difference constitutes economic surplus, which can accrue to the consumers of copper (in the form of lower

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prices); to the government of the home (importing) country (in taxes); to the companies (above "normal" profits); or to the host country (in royalties, taxes, and other payments). Extractive industries are also often characterized by low short-term price elasticities of demand and supply. Shifts in demand (or supply) cause huge movements in prices. These, in turn, affect the foreign exchange earnings of the exporting country, and the division of the economic rent among the parties. Such industries frequently require large-scale capital and technology-intensive projects to be internationally competitive—capabilities that are beyond the capacity of many developing countries. These barriers to entry of new firms make most extractive industries oligopolistic in nature. The relatively few producers each have substantial discretion over pricing, investment, marketing, and similar decisions, without challenging the existence of the firm. An interrelationship exists between the sharing of the economic rent among the parties and the actual amount of the economic rent. For example, if the profits of the MNC's are squeezed sufficiently hard, new investment will not occur, production will not expand, and the potential size of the economic surplus may shrink. Everybody is worse off. There may, however, be significant leeway for shifting some of the economic surplus toward the host country, and away from the MNC's or home country, without affecting the actual level of production in any substantial way.

This stylized picture fits the Chilean copper industry in the postwar period. Moran describes the negotiations and confrontations over the distribution of the economic rent in Chilean copper production, and relates it to the discovery and exploitation of copper in Chile. During and immediately after World War II, Chile had relatively little bargaining power and received a small though rising share of the total economic rent from its own copper deposits. Indeed, Chile indirectly subsidized the Allies during World War II by supplying large amounts of copper at controlled prices well below equilibrium. This implicit subsidy continued into the Korean conflict, as the United States government imposed a new price ceiling, which limited Chile's balance-of-payments receipts, as well as their stake in royalty, and tax revenues. Thus, the major blame for the "exploitation" of Chile did not lie with the MNC's, but with United States government policies.

A second notable line of analysis deals with the radical changes in the bargaining position of Chile vis-à-vis the companies and importing countries. One reason was the awakening of a now semideveloped country to the realities of world markets, and the development of indigenous expertise to analyze and forcefully represent the interests of the country in its relationships with the MNC's. Chile became aware that she was receiving a minor share of the benefits from her copper, even though the perceived need for financial resources to meet the rising aspirations for social and economic development had escalated greatly. These various strands came together in the notion of *dependencia*.

A third reason for the shift in bargaining advantage was the relative decline in the monopoly power among the major copper MNC's. As indigenous technicians learned to manage and run mines, as technology became more readily available from alternative suppliers, and as financial resources became less constrained, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

need for any particular MNC became lower. In the 1950s and 1960s, not only the will, but also the ability, of the Chilean government and technocrats to displace *dependencia* on the international copper companies grew. Moran makes the interesting point that these shifts in bargaining position would likely have occurred regardless of the Chilean political context, and have in fact persisted during and through three quite dissimilar regimes.

Close attention is given to the political bases of Chilean policy toward the copper companies at the disaggregated level, i.e., among politically important groups whose coalitions and positions changed as the circumstances of the country relative to the companies changed. Moran similarly disaggregates his analysis of the companies and their strategies. The result is a fascinating account of shifting responses and changing strategies of the landed right, the left, the academics, and the technocrats, as they are combined into national policies, and the separate responses of the Kennecott, Anaconda, and Cerro.

The book has two minor faults. Moran overplays the originality and the usefulness of his "model" of host country-MNC relations. Much of it has existed in the literature for some time, and his formulation is still not sufficiently precise to permit rigorous testing or generalization. All the same it is a useful and efficient framework for organizing one's thoughts about such relations.

A second fault is in the analysis of the actual nationalizations of the three companies. There was much debate at the time over the valuation of the properties, appropriate compensation, and the legitimacy of the Chilean claims for back taxes and excess profits. The discussion of the takeover of the Anaconda subsidiary is somewhat muddled, and in general Moran avoided any assessment of the legitimacy of the claims and counterclaims of the government and the companies.

In looking to the future, the book contains an interesting discussion of the outcome of *independencia* in Chile. He rightly concludes that the organization of copper-exporting countries (CIPEC) cannot match the success of OPEC. Already the CIPEC share of the world market is declining and a poorly managed strategy of major production and price controls will turn CIPEC members into marginal producers in world copper. As such, they would bear the brunt of the ups and downs in free market price, as long-term supply agreements with fixed prices govern the traditional buyer-seller relationships. Indeed, Moran suggests that a more appropriate strategy for Chile may be to reintegrate into the mainstream of the copper oligopoly, and negotiate advantageous arrangements within it, rather than to bypass the established market relationships and risk displacement by alternative sources of supply. The military junta seems to be following the same line of reasoning. For those interested in the economics and politics of the extractive sector, this is a required book.

ROBERT G. HAWKINS
New York University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana *by David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. New York, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1975.—x, 369 pp. $12.50.*

Biafra, Burundi, Bangladesh, Ulster—these and other lethal contemporary conflicts pivoting upon the communal factor in politics took both scholars and statesmen by surprise. The melting pot and unilinear integration that implicitly dominated an earlier generation of analysis are in disorderly retreat; with this interesting study of cultural pluralism in Ghana and Lebanon, the Smocks join those in hot pursuit of these failed concepts. To examine the political dynamics of cultural pluralism, the Smocks have chosen one case where cleavages are primarily ethnic (Ghana), and a second where confessional division dominates (Lebanon).

The distinctiveness of their approach is threefold: (1) the focus on intercommunal relationships; (2) the stress on policy arenas of conflict, and formulas for reconciliation; and (3) the interesting use of survey data on communal solidarities. Extensive field inquiry was undertaken in both countries; the documentary foundations for the work are excellent. The three pillars of analysis underpin a book of real merit. Yet some important dimensions of cultural politics have received inadequate attention, accounting in part for some of its failures in prophesy.

The Smocks conclude that specialists in Lebanese politics have overemphasized its attributes as a "precarious republic," while *aficionados* of Ghanaian affairs have underestimated the impact of ethnicity on national life. "Lebanon has come closer than Ghana to achieving national accommodation" (p. 317) they argue, citing the decline of religiousity, the diverse power-sharing mechanisms of the national pact, and the commitment of the political elite to the nurture of Lebanon. By contrast, "none of Ghana's political structures, neither the two parliamentary democracies, the two military regimes, nor the one-party system, has institutionalized mechanisms to assure the incorporation of the major ethnic groups into the political system in a meaningful manner" (p. 317).

The grisly turn of events in Lebanon since completion of the manuscript do not wholly invalidate their analysis, although questions necessarily arise as to why history has strayed so far from the moderately hopeful path they saw. In fact, all the volatile elements that went critical in 1975 are identified by the Smocks. Some, however, were clearly underestimated, which does suggest some weaknesses in the approach. What unhinged Lebanon was not the interconfessional relationships alone, but the remorseless pressures of external factors, joined to some particular characteristics of the Lebanese state as an authoritative arena of politics. The potential dislocating impact of the militant, stateless nationality of Palestinians, who came to outweigh the small, weak Lebanese armed forces in arms and numbers receives insufficient stress. The ambiguities of the nation-state self-concept, in the face of competing armed and funded visions (pan-Arabism, greater Syria, "secure borders" for Israel) required more systematic analysis. Pluralism does not occur in a vacuum, but within a bounded arena, the state—a simple yet decisive fact. Constraints on policy choice for the consociational confessional state created, by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

default, a laissez-faire entrepôt polity. This permitted the concentration of great wealth in Beirut as a secure financial and mercantile island in a socialist sea; it also generated an ideological challenge, investing religious conflict with a new moral imperative, in interaction with the Palestinian dilemma.

The authors may also have placed too much weight on results of their survey, however fascinating these were. The data presented were doubtless correct at the time they were collected, but we run afoul of the cross-sectional limitation of the survey instrument. The Smocks do persuasively argue elsewhere that identities are situational and contextual; a dramatic alteration of situation and context, largely produced by external factors, renders the attitudes reported largely inoperative.

Events have been kinder to the Ghanian material; the spectacular political trials of a largely Ewe set of plotters in mid-1976 appears to validate their cautionary observations on the underlying conflict potential of ethnicity. Here again, the role of the state itself as arena defining the contours of ethnic interaction, tending to formulate pluralism into four or five major cultural aggregates, of which the most important (Akan) has no existence as an historical identity system, deserves more attention than it received. The determinants of change, the conditions for formation and mobilization of ethnic solidarities, might have been explored with profit.

Despite these reservations, the Smock study is interesting and important. It provides a sophisticated, creative perspective on the challenge of national integration in plural societies. The careful exploration of policy alternatives offers many thoughtful suggestions, which will make the study valuable to statesmen as well as academic observers. The two-case comparison does succeed in enhancing our understanding of both polities. The "probabilistic theory of the polity" which Almond called for fifteen years ago still eludes us all; at a more modest level, we may be grateful for the new dimensions of understanding that the Smocks have contributed.

M. Crawford Young
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style *by Samuel Decalo. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1976.—viii, 284 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $4.95.*

This book focuses on the praetorian social systems of Dahomey (Benin), Togo, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Uganda. (A praetorian system has been defined by Samuel Huntington as one in which all the major social groups—army church, labor, etc.—have been politicized and in which all the major social issues are dealt with in the political arena.) In all these societies the army has come to dominate political life, acting as the focal point of political bargaining and resource allocation.

The book is introduced and concluded by theoretical chapters but the bulk of it is devoted to case studies of the four societies with a view to tracing how their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respective systems evolved. Each of these chapters follows a pattern: For each country the author sets the stage by presenting the relevant socioeconomic data. He then recounts the history of the political system leading up to the army's intervention. Finally, he covers the events following that intervention in some detail.

Decalo argues two interrelated points: (1) The motivations for intervention by armies in African political systems are to be found in analysis of the personal ambitions of the military leaders and not in any supposed goal that they may have of rescuing a political system which has collapsed as a result of civilian mismanagement. Decalo challenges the view that African armies are "cohesive, nontribal, Westernized, or even complex organizational structures" (p. 14). Instead, he sees them as *"a coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances"* (pp. 14–15). (2) Military regimes are no better and in many ways much worse at political and economic development than the civilian regimes they replace. They are not more committed to socioeconomic change; they do not produce more stable regimes; they are not more nationalistic. Army leaders turn out to be primarily concerned with their own aggrandizement at the expense of other groups within the social system. As a result, they appropriate the lion's share of the country's resources for themselves and their allies thereby often intensifying the very dysfunctional tendencies which preceded their intervention in the first place.

The four case studies are the heart and strength of the book. They are succinct, well written, and well documented. They give a sophisticated, informed, and accurate account of four highly politicized African regimes, three of which (Dahomey, Togo, and Congo) are rarely dealt with in the English literature. The author demonstrates that given the preconditions in each of these societies—heritage of the colonial period, neocolonialist dependence, severe economic scarcity, bloated civil service, ethnic conflict, and sharp personal conflicts—the emergence of praetorian systems was predictable. We get a glimpse of the intensity, confusion, and sometime brutality of political life in marginal Fourth World states. These chapters would make worthwhile reading for courses on comparative politics in general or African politics in particular, or indeed for anyone who might be unfamiliar with any of these states.

On the whole, then, this is a good book. This reviewer tends to share the author's evaluation of the role of army regimes in Africa, with, however, a couple of reservations. First, there is a tendency to generalize too widely on the basis of four relatively uniform cases. Each of these states is listed by the United Nations as among the poorest developing countries. As such, it is problematical whether one can draw theoretical conclusions from their experiences about the nature of military rule in developing states in general. Decalo virtually admits as much on page 233. His argument would have been stronger had it been more restricted in the scope claimed for it.

Second, there is a strong emphasis on personal motivations of the coupists coupled with the assertion that "It is both simplistic and empirically erroneous to relegate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coups in Africa to the status of a dependent variable, a function of the political weakness and structural fragility of African states and the failings of African civilian elites" (p. 13). It seems that this represents a confusion between short-term and middle- or long-range causation. Over the short term it is, of course, correct to say that military leaders act for their own reasons. This is true of all political behavior at the individual level. To concede this point does not negate the fact, however, that the *fundamental* cause is to be found in the prior evolution of the social system itself. Indeed, the fact that military leaders behave much like the politicians before them only strengthens the point that the critical factor is the systemic context. It is not that there is a direct relationship between systemic conditions and military takeover (pp. 21–22), but rather that coups are a manifestation of those conditions and cannot be separated analytically from them. This is a significant point since research strategies are in large measure the result of where one places one's conceptual emphasis. If we are to achieve comparative insights, we will have to focus our attention on middle- and long-term causation. What is puzzling is that Decalo's four case studies proceed historically and demonstrate quite clearly that the interventions which occurred must be seen as the end products of long evolutionary processes.

LEWIS BROWNSTEIN
State University of New York at New Paltz

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections 1788–1790, Vol. 1 *edited by Merrill Jensen and Robert A. Becker. Madison, Wisc., The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.—xxxi, 896 pp. $30.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, Vol. 1: General; The United Nations, Part I *prepared by Department of State. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1976.—xii, 509 pp. $8.50.*

India: The Transfer of Power 1942–7, Vol. VI: The Post-war Phase *edited by Nicholas Mansergh. London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976.—lxxxvi, 1280 pp. $120.00.*

Political Handbook of the World: 1976 *edited by Arthur S. Banks. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976.—xi, 545 pp. $19.95.*

Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence *prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1976.—xxi, 490 pp. $4.35.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

(Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

1. Title of publication: *Political Science Quarterly.* 2. Date of filing: October 5, 1976. 3. Frequency of issue: Quarterly: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. (a) Number of issues published annually: four. (b) Annual subscription price: individuals, $16; libraries, $22. 4. Location of office of publication: The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025. 5. Location of the general business offices of the publisher: same as 4. 6. Name and address of publisher: same as 4; name and address of editor: Demetrios Caraley, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

7. Owner: The Academy of Political Science (nonprofit corporation).

8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: none.

9. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding twelve months.

10. Extent and nature of circulation:

	Average Number of Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	*Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date*
(a) Total number of copies printed	11,836	11,861
(b) Paid Circulation		
(1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales	99	——
(2) Mail subscriptions	10,506	10,040
(c) Total paid circulation	10,605	10,040
(d) Free distribution, including samples	300	12
(e) Total distribution	10,905	10,052
(f) Copies not distributed (office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing)	931	1,809
(g) Total	11,836	11,861

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(Signed) William V. Farr, Business Manager

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 91
1976

Managing Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Assistant Managing Editor
MARY ANN EPSTEIN

. . . .

Associate Editor
JOYCE FINE SCHULTZ

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Publishing continuously since 1886.

Copyright © 1976, by The Academy of Political Science.
All rights reserved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD OF THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Allan Bloom
University of Toronto

Inis L. Claude, Jr.
University of Virginia

Lewis A. Coser
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Lewis J. Edinger
Columbia University

Richard R. Fagen
Stanford University

Charles V. Hamilton
Columbia University

Robert L. Jervis
University of California, Los Angeles

Joyce K. Kallgren
University of California, Davis

Doris H. Kearns
Harvard University

Walter LaFeber
Cornell University

Lance Liebman
Harvard University

William S. Livingston
The University of Texas at Austin

Alpheus T. Mason
Princeton University

Robert A. McCaughey
Barnard College, Columbia University

Nelson W. Polsby
University of California, Berkeley

Jeffrey L. Pressman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Robert D. Reischauer
Congressional Budget Office

Joseph Rothschild
Columbia University

Susanne Hoeber Rudolph
University of Chicago

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
City University of New York

George L. Sherry
United Nations

Tom Wicker
The New York Times

M. Crawford Young
University of Wisconsin—Madison

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Franz Schneider
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Grayson Kirk
Vice President

Thomas M. Macioce
Vice President and Treasurer

John V. Connorton
Secretary

Charles Preusse
General Counsel

Douglas M. Black
Courtney C. Brown
Arthur F. Burns
Leland M. Goodrich
Robert MacCrate
George B. Munroe
Alfred C. Neal
Edward L. Palmer
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson
Alan H. Temple
Aaron W. Warner

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025. Manuscripts must be submitted in duplicate and accompanied by an abstract of between 100 and 200 words specifying the article's major theme or conclusions. Correspondence concerning advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index to Volume 91

Articles

ADAMS, CHARLES	See Nathan, Richard P.	
ARTERTON, F. CHRISTOPHER	See Pressman, Jeffrey L.	
CARALEY, DEMETRIOS	Congressional Politics and Urban Aid	19
CHERN, KENNETH S.	The Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia	631
COLBURN, DAVID R.	Governor Alfred E. Smith and Penal Reform	315
DANIELSON, MICHAEL N.	The Politics of Exclusionary Zoning in Suburbia	1
DOTY, PAMELA	See Etzioni, Amitai	
ELSON, MARTHA	See Paletz, David L.	
ETZIONI, AMITAI, and DOTY, PAMELA	Profit in Not-for-Profit Corporations: The Example of Health Care	433
GORDON, NICOLE A.	The Constitutional Right to Candidacy	471
GROSSMAN, MICHAEL BARUCH, and ROURKE, FRANCIS E.	The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange Analysis	455
KEARNS, DORIS	Lyndon Johnson's Political Personality	385
LADD, JR., EVERETT CARLL	Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order	577
LAZER, HARRY	British Populism: The Labor Party and the Common Market Parliamentary Debate	259
LEE, MARCIA MANNING	Why Few Women Hold Public Office: Democracy and Sexual Roles	297
LEVITAN, SAR A., and TAGGART, ROBERT	The Great Society Did Succeed	601
LICKLIDER, ROY E.	Soviet Control of Eastern Europe: Morality versus National Interest	619
LICKLIDER, ROY E.	Rejonder to Piers	629
MASON, ALPHEUS THOMAS	America's Political Heritage: Revolution and Free Government—A Bicentennial Tribute	193
NATHAN, RICHARD P., and ADAMS, CHARLES	Understanding Central City Hardship	47
NINCIC, MIROSLAV	See Russett, Bruce	
ORNSTEIN, NORMAN J.	See Peabody, Robert L.	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PALETZ, DAVID, L., and ELSON, MARTHA	Television Coverage of Presidential Conventions: Now You See It, Now You Don't	109
PATTERSON, DAVID S.	The United States and the Origins of the World Court	279
PEABODY, ROBERT L., ORNSTEIN, NORMAN J., and ROHDE, DAVID W.	The United States Senate as a Presidential Incubator: Many Are Called but Few Are Chosen	237
PHILLIPS, KIM T.	The Pennsylvania Origins of the Jackson Movement	489
PLOUGHMAN, PIERS	Advancing American Interests Through Soviet Control: A Modest Proposal	625
PRESSMAN, JEFFREY L., SULLIVAN, DENIS G., and ARTERTON, F. CHRISTOPHER	Cleavages, Decisions, and Legitimation: The Democrats' Mid-Term Conference, 1974	89
PYE, LUCIAN W.	Mao Tse-tung's Leadership Style	219
ROHDE, DAVID W.	See Peabody, Robert L.	
ROURKE, FRANCIS E.	See Grossman, Michael Baruch	
RUSSETT, BRUCE, and NINCIC, MIROSLAV	American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad	411
SLATER, JEROME	Is United States Foreign Policy "Imperialist" or "Imperial"?	63
SULLIVAN, DENIS G.	See Pressman, Jeffrey L.	
TAGGART, ROBERT	See Levitan, Sar A.	
THEOHARIS, ATHAN G.	The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936–1953	649
WEINER, SANFORD L.	The Competition for Certainty: The Polls and the Press in Britain	673
WILKINSON, DAVID	World Order Models Project: First Fruits	329

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Reviewed

Adamany and Agree, Political Money	ALEXANDER HEARD	137
Alexander, Financing the 1972 Election	DAVID ADAMANY	705
Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy	ROBERT JERVIS	544
Austin, Saints and Samurai	ROBERT D. PUTNAM	183
Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World	WALTER LAFEBER	697
Bernal, Chinese Socialism to 1907	MICHAEL GASSTER	563
Blackmer and Tarrow, eds., Communism in Italy and France	MARK KESSELMAN	553
Boardman, Britain and the People's Republic of China 1949–1974	ANNE F. THURSTON	552
Braeman, Bremner, and Brody, eds., The New Deal	ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.	138
Break and Pechman, Federal Tax Reform	IRA L. TANNENBAUM	175
Bruce, Portugal	JOHN L. HAMMOND	555
Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain	FRANK J. DONNER	748
Burchell and Listokin, eds., Future Land Use	WILLIAM B. SHORE	534
Burton, Urban Terrorism	PAUL WILKINSON	358
Califano, A Presidential Nation	ERWIN C. HARGROVE	141
Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers, The Quality of American Life	ANDREW A. BEVERIDGE	529
Carmichael, Trotsky	PETER JUVILER	744
Chambers and Burnham, eds., The American Party Systems	DOROTHY BUCKTON JAMES	147
Clem and associates, The Making of Congressmen	DAVID A. LEUTHOLD	711
Cole, Blacks in Power	SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM	710
Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City	ALEJANDRO PORTES	749
Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government	ROBERT J. STEAMER	513
Cronin, The State of the Presidency	DALL W. FORSYTHE	343
Davis, National Health Insurance	STANLEY S. WALLACK	337
Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa	LEWIS BROWNSTEIN	755
Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadershp	ABBAS KELIDAR	560
Dickey, Canada and the American Presence	ANNETTE BAKER FOX	548
Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option	AKIRA IRIYE	561
Enloe, The Politics of Pollution in Comparative Perspective	JOHN H. HERZ	188
Epstein, ed., Women in the Professions	JESSIE BERNARD	531
Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations	PETER FRICKE	341
Fausold, James W. Wadsworth, Jr.	JOHN O'SULLIVAN	174

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fine, Frank Murphy — John W. Chambers — 170
Foley, Community Mental Health Legislation — Stephen David — 353
Freidson, Doctoring Together — George G. Reader — 533
Friedman, The Legal System — Donald M. Roper — 382
Friendly, The Good Guys, the Bad Guys and the First Amendment — Doris A. Graber — 714
Frye, A Responsible Congress — David W. Tarr — 145
Galambos, with Spence, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880–1940 — Richard S. Tedlow — 731
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy — Lincoln P. Bloomfield — 154
Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. IV — Walter L. Arnstein — 550
Gilpin, U. S. Power and the Multinational Corporation — Stephen D. Krasner — 361
Gittings, The World and China, 1922–1972 — Mike Pillsbury — 373
Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination — Elinor G. Barber — 517
Goldfarb, Jails — Harry E. Allen — 166
Gorham and Glazer, eds., The Urban Predicament — Jeffrey Prottas — 722
Greene, Stresses in U. S.-Japanese Security Relations — Akira Iriye — 561
Guttman and Willner, The Shadow Government — Grant McConnell — 512
Hamilton, The Power to Probe — Robert J. Harris — 519
Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 — John Spanier — 157
Harrington, The Twilight of Capitalism — Lewis A. Coser — 701
Harris, ed., The The Political Economy of Africa — Joel Samoff — 571
Heilbroner, Business Civilization in Decline — Robert Lekachman — 545
Hellman and Rosenbaum, eds., Latin America — Richard R. Fagen — 180
Hinton, Three and a Half Powers — Mike Pillsbury — 373
Holborn, with Chartrand, P., and Chartrand, R., Refugees — Leland M. Goodrich — 367
Holmes, The New Deal in Georgia — Daniel J. Leab — 540
Hoogenboom, A., and Hoogenboom, O., A History of the ICC — William R. Childs — 737
Howe, ed., Women and the Power to Change — Phyllis Keller — 150
Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics — William B. Quandt — 372
Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism — W. R. Campbell and M. P. Rejai — 155
Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York's Little New Deal — Bernard Bellush — 734
Iriye, ed., Mutual Images — Yung H. Park — 363
Jaffe, The Rise and Fall of American Communism — Daniel J. Leab — 165
Janowitz, Social Control of the Welfare State — Lewis A. Coser — 528
Jantscher, Bread upon the Waters — Steve C. Dune — 172

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jessup, The Birth of Nations — James Barros — 366
Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age — Lincoln P. Bloomfield — 698
Kahn, The China Hands — Warren I. Cohen — 161
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal? — Ira Sharkansky — 716
Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream — Lucian W. Pye — 699
Keech and Matthews, The Party's Choice — Gerald M. Pomper — 703
Kessel, The Domestic Presidency — Dall W. Forsythe — 343
Kinsley, Outer Space and Inner Sanctums — Edith Brown Weiss — 733
Kluger, Simple Justice — Charles S. Bullock III — 516
Knorr, The Power of Nations — Inis L. Claude, Jr. — 569
Krauss, Japanese Radicals Revisted — Susan J. Pharr — 185
Krickus, Pursuing the American Dream — S. J. Makielski, Jr. — 352
Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System — Richard W. Boyd — 524
Lekachman, Economists at Bay — Susan Previant Lee — 527
Levitan and Taggart, The Promise of Greatness — James L. Sundquist — 509
Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya — Dennis L. Dresang — 379
Lopez and Herbert, The Private Franklin — Stephen Botein — 547
Lowenthal, ed., The Peruvian Experiment — Cynthia McClintock — 566
Maisel and Sacks, eds., The Future of Political Parties — Frank J. Sorauf — 708
Martin, Madame Secretary — Norman Markowitz — 736
Marwah and Schultz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries — Philip Dyer — 542
Matthews, Revolution in Cuba — Robert R. Kaufman — 376
Mazlish, The Revolutionary Ascetic — Eugene Victor Wolfenstein — 558
McCarthy, The Hard Years — Robert Lekachman — 140
McPherson, The Abolitionist Legacy — Clayborne Carson — 740
Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy — Michael Harrington — 178
Meehan, Public Housing Policy — M. Leanne Lachman and Anthony Downs — 346
Merle, Sociologie des relations internationales — Stephen G. Xydis — 189
Mikdashi, The International Politics of Natural Resources — Cynthia H. Enloe — 573
Milenkovitch, M., and Milenkovitch, D., eds., Parts of a Lifetime by Milovan Djilas — Alex N. Dragnich — 179
Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City — Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. — 728
Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy — Michael Hogan — 360
Mondale, The Accountability of Power — Richard M. Pious — 342
Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence — Robert G. Hawkins — 751
Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom — Jack P. Greene — 742

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Murray, The 103rd Ballot — JOHN L. SHOVER — 739
Nash, Nuclear Weapons and International Behavior — LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD — 698
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, The Changing American Voter — HERBERT B. ASHER — 510
Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa — M. CRAWFORD YOUNG — 186
Oates, ed., Financing the New Federalism — FRANK LEVY — 720
Office of Public Information, U.N., Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972 — LELAND M. GOODRICH — 574
Okun, Equality and Efficiency — SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT — 350
O'Meara, Rhodesia — J. LEO CEFKIN — 377
Parmet, The Democrats — EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR. — 520
Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton, Representatives and Represented — DUANE LOCKARD — 539
Pechman and Timpane, eds., Work Incentives and Income Guarantees — DENNIS P. SOBIN — 348
Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls — THOMAS PEARDON — 176
Phillips, The 1940s — NORMAN MARKOWITZ — 164
Pincus, ed., School Finance in Transition — JAMES W. GUTHRIE — 727
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment — NATHAN TARCOV — 380
Ranney, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction — GERALD M. POMPER — 142
Raptis, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile — JAMES F. PETRAS — 181
Rivlin and Timpane, eds., Ethical and Legal Issues of Social Experimentation — PAULA JEAN MILLER — 536
Roland, The Improbable Era — WILLIAM C. HAVARD — 541
Rosenbaum and Sederberg, eds., Vigilante Politics — RICHARD E. LIBMAN-RUBENSTEIN — 526
Rosenman, S., and Rosenman, D., Presidential Style — JOSEPH COOPER — 521
Roshco, Newsmaking — DORIS A. GRABER — 151
Rossett and Cressey, Justice by Consent — JOHN C. CRATSLEY — 719
Rubin, Party Dynamics — MICHAEL R. KAGAY — 707
Russett and Hanson, Interest and Ideology — JESSE W. MARKHAM — 729
Sale, Power Shift — JAMES L. SUNDQUIST — 144
Sampson, The Seven Sisters — LAWRENCE J. WHITE — 364
Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead — STEVEN I. LEVINE — 745
Schwab and Friedlander, eds., Detente in Historical Perspective — ALAN K. HENRIKSON — 159
Schwartz, ed., The Changing Face of the Suburbs — FREDERICK M. WIRT — 725
Serge and Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky — JOEL CARMICHAEL — 371
Sewell, Ballots for Freedom — JAMES M. MCPHERSON — 746

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sherwin, A World Destroyed — Robert E. Beitzell — 152
Smallwood, Free and Independent — Alan Rosenthal — 537
Smerk, Urban Mass Transportation — Michael N. Danielson — 347
Smock, D., and Smock, A., The Politics of Pluralism — M. Crawford Young — 754
Sniderman, Personality and Democratic Politics — Roberta S. Sigel — 148
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation — Richard E. Morgan — 515
Steggert, Community Action Groups and City Governments — Peter A. Lupsha — 356
Sternlieb and Hughes, eds., Post-Industrial America — James Heilbrun — 723
Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton, Explorations in Convention Decision Making — Paul T. David — 704
Taylor, China and Southeast Asia — Mike Pillsbury — 373
Thurow, Generating Inequality — Sylvia Ann Hewlett — 350
Tökés, ed., Dissent in the USSR — Robert G. Wesson — 557
Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela — Kenneth E. Sharpe — 567
Ungar, FBI — Robert A. Horn — 717
Urofsky and Levy, eds., Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, Vol. IV (1916–1921) — Osmond K. Fraenkel — 169
Valenzuela, A., and Valenzuela, J., eds., Chile — Patricia Weiss Fagen — 564
van den Haag, Punishing Criminals — James P. Gifford — 339
Vaughn, The Spoiled System — Wilbur C. Rich — 359
Warren, The Radical Center — Howard Penniman — 523
Westergaard and Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society — Leon D. Epstein — 551
Wheeler, C., White-Collar Power — Torbjörn Vallinder — 369
Wheeler, M., Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics — David L. Paletz — 712
Wicker, A Time to Die — Richard E. Libman-Rubenstein — 168
Wilkinson, Political Terrorism — W. R. Campbell and M. P. Rejai — 155
Wittner, Cold War America — Richard D. Challener — 162
Wootton, Pressure Groups in Britain 1720–1970 — Ira Katznelson — 368
Yin and Yates, Street-Level Governments — Richard L. Cole — 355

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Concepts in Poli Sci from DORSEY

available March

MANAGING THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Grover Starling, University of Houston (Clear Lake City)

Completely new, this practitioner-oriented text blends relevant theory with how-to-do-it techniques drawn from an exciting variety of sources. It provides a coherent, up-to-date, and highly readable overview of public administration.

available February

COMPARATIVE POLITICS: Notes and Readings, Fifth Edition

Edited by **Roy C. Macridis,** Brandeis University, and **Bernard E. Brown,** City University of New York (Graduate School and Lehman)

This classic reader has been expanded and updated; 50 per cent of the material is new. The authors provide the best presentation of the basic building blocks in the systematic study of comparative politics. (Paperbound)

available March

COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: United States, Soviet Union, and Europe

Richard L. Siegel and **Leonard B. Weinberg,** University of Nevada (Reno)

Presents a comprehensive study of the sources, content and results of governmental policy in the United States, Soviet Union, and Europe. The text uses a dual organizational framework: (a) distributive, regulative, and extra-active policies, and (b) welfare, warfare and post-industial policies. (Paperbound)

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS
Homewood, Illinois 60430
Write for our complete catalog

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LANGUAGE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN NORTH INDIA

PAUL R. BRASS

"Brass's *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* is a thorough, well researched, and well thought-out study of the political process of group integration and differentiation in modern north India."—*The Journal of Politics*

" . . . an impressive work . . . the study has a broad significance beyond a north Indian or even a South Asian context."—*The Annals, AAPSS*

"A challenging work, which can be expected to constitute a nucleus of controversies for the scholarly world."—*Choice* $29.50

THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE BRAZILIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

THOMAS C. BRUNEAU

"A comprehensive study of the Brazilian Church as it affects and is affected by its social and political environment . . . and a source of theoretical insight into church-state relations generally."—*The Journal of Politics*

"The author of this commendable book is a political scientist at McGill University. . . . His empirical analysis is nearly flawless and can well serve as a model because of its integrity." . . . —*The Journal of Developing Areas*

Cloth $19.95 Paper $6.95

STRATEGY, RISK AND PERSONALITY IN COALITION POLITICS

The Case of India

BRUCE BUENO de MESQUITA

"A marvelously Machiavellian application of social scientific methods to practical politics, this study tests the hypothesis that coalition partners serve their own interests best by mixing a strategy of cooperation with one of conflict, and by terminating the coalition at the best psychological moment."—*Foreign Affairs* $17.50

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, New York, N. Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From Prentice Political Power

POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHANGE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICAN POLITICS
Irving Leonard Markovitz — Queens College of the City University of New York, Flushing

An introductory look at African politics that provides the problem-focused mechanism for understanding the continuities and conflicts between Africa's past and present. Dual heritage of imperialism and pre-colonial greatness are emphasized, as well as the evolution from the struggle for independence through the consolidation of power phase, to the process of bureaucratic development and economic growth. A major synthesis of social science research about Africa, including that of African intellectuals, especially in the last two decades.

1977 416 pp. (est.) Paper $8.95 Cloth $12.95

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, 3rd Edition
Kalvei Jacques Holsti — University of British Columbia, Vancouver

Updated version of a leading introduction to international relations emphasizes factors underlying foreign policy decisions and probes the essential question of how states act in diplomatic situations and international systems — and why. New in this edition: dramatic changes that have developed in the past five years; comments on problem-solving in negotiations; theories on arms limitation and control; regional organizations; summary of theoretical positions; and reassessment of the fundamental problem of organized violence between nation states.

1977 560 pp. (est.) Cloth $12.50

OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE: SWEDEN, SPAIN, ITALY, YUGOSLAVIA, AND EAST GERMANY
Michael Roskin — Lycoming College, Pennsylvania

This supplement to the standard comparative European government course discusses and analyzes five minor governments of Europe. Expands the student's horizons beyond the conventional "big four" and demonstrates political systems less stable and legitimate than major powers. Each country has a chapter organized along common-sense lines: history, key institutions, political attitudes, patterns of interaction, systems, and results. Suggests looking at European politics in three patterns: Northern (Sweden, Britain, West Germany), Latin (Italy, France, Spain), and East (East Germany, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia).

1977 208 pp. (est.) Paper $5.95

THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES, 4th Edition
William J. Keefe and **Morris S. Ogul** — both of the University of Pittsburgh

Extensive revision of a best-selling text on Congress and the American legislative process. Continues the tradition of comprehensive organization and diligent research that distinguished earlier editions. An extraordinarily wide-ranging analysis of the role of legslative institutions in their political context. The many new developments in legislative politics in the 1970's are noted in all their legal, behavioral, normative, and historical dimensions.

1977 528 pp. (est.) Cloth $12.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

-Hall for '77: and Power Politics.

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF DECISIONS
Morton Berkowitz — Brooklyn College, City University of New York;
P. G. Bock — University of Illnois;
Vincent J. Fuccillo — Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Text enables students to examine and understand the practical processes and domestic concerns that shape foreign policy, while it also defines and clarifies the principal issues in foreign-policy research. Examines a wide variety of case studies using a common perspective and analytical framework, which invites expanded interpretation of issues and theories. Provides insight into the decision-making process and the overall thrust and continuity of foreign policy.

1977 320 pp. (est.) Paper $6.95

SOLDIERS IN POLITICS: MILITARY COUPS AND GOVERNMENTS
Eric A. Nordlinger — Brown University

Government by coup d'etat — and after — is the subject of this uncommon text. An examination of the military officers who have stepped into the political arena in the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East since 1945. Describes and analyzes the intrusive attainment of power by military officers and the exercise of power once they are in the governmental saddle. Presents a comparison between military and civilian governments, and the similarities and differences in the officers' political behavior.

1977 208 pp. (est.) Paper $6.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT
Martin C. Needler — University of New Mexico

Introductory text combining two basic approaches to Latin American politics, each presented in a separate section: 1) the systematic, balanced analysis by topics, reflecting the latest research in the field; and 2) an individual country-by-country and regional approach. Particular attention is given to the role of the U.S. and U.S. corporations in Latin American affairs. Includes relevant social and economic data for each country, chronological listings of recent presidents, and extensive bibliography.

1976 256 pp. (est.) Cloth $10.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO ASIAN POLITICS
C. I. Eugene Kim and **Lawrence Ziring** — both of Western Michigan University

A thorough survey of the politics of Asia, treating the major nations — China, Japan, and India — separately, the other nations by region. Each chapter begins with historical and cultural presentation that helps to explain how these countries have developed their particular political systems and the kinds of problems that continue to challenge them. Features readability, conciseness and information that can be digested readily, augmented by maps, illustrations and recommended reading.

1977 432 pp. (est.) Cloth $11.95

For further information, please write to: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-675, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632.
Prices subject to change without notice.

Prentice-Hall

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AVAILABLE FEBRUARY '77

Carr and Bernstein's AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Eighth Edition
WALTER MURPHY and MICHAEL DANIELSON
Princeton University

An authoritative and responsible treatment of American government and politics has been revised to reflect contemporary developments, with particular attention to:

- recent rulings of the Supreme Court
- Watergate and its aftermath, especially with respect to the uses and limitation of executive power and the relations between Congress and the President
- revenue sharing and the evolution of fiscal federalism
- stress on urbanization and "suburbanization" and their effects on particular institutions such as Congress, the electoral process, and formulation of public policy
- congressional reform and important changes in the composition of Congress
- coverage through the 1976 Presidential Election

Other improvements:

- improved readability
- chapter introductions
- chapter summaries
- glossary
- annotated bibliographies for each chapter
- completely new instructor's guide
- 3x5 card file test bank

ISBN: 0-03-089490-5

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INCOMPLETE CONQUEST
THEODORE J. LOWI,
Cornell University

- Announcing a shortened paperback version of Lowi's eminently successful *American Government: Incomplete Conquest*, which is now in use at more than 150 colleges and universities
- Coverage through the 1976 Presidential Election
- Ancillaries available for both books include: Instructor's Manual/Study Guide Casebook/Card File Test Bank/Filmstrip and Taped Interview with the author

ISBN: 0-03-019886-0

THE DRYDEN PRESS

For further information, please send course title and approximate enrollment to:
James T. Ryder
THE DRYDEN PRESS, a division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston
383 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Arms Control

Issues and Agreements

Edited for The Stanford Arms Control Group by John H. Barton & Lawrence D. Weiler. This is an exhaustive analysis of national and international arms control: its history, philosophy, cultural context, technology, economic and political ramifications, achievements, and future prospects. The book will assist the general reader in understanding and forming intelligent opinions on such issues as the role of doctrine in the military, difficulties posed by rapidly changing technology, and the value and limitations of arms control as a way to prevent war. An appendix contains the text of eighteen major arms control agreements, and the volume concludes with discussion questions and suggestions for further reading. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $12.95

Holistic Thought in Social Science

D. C. Phillips. This book is a highly readable synthesis and critical examination of the character, history, and utility of holism ("A part cannot be understood in isolation from the whole"), especially as seen in its long conflict with the mechanistic or analytic method of viewing reality. After identifying the points at issue, the author examines holism as manifested in various social scientific systems of thought, notably general systems theory, structuralism, functionalism, and Gestalt psychology. He concludes that "the analytic or mechanistic method . . . is such a moderate and reasonable position that no scientist, not even a holist, can avoid putting it into practice. By contrast, holism—taken seriously—is an eminently unworkable doctrine." $8.50

Stanford University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Editions of Distinguished Texts

Democracy for the Few

Second Edition

Michael Parenti

- A best-selling analysis and critique of American government and politics, *Democracy for the Few* has been hailed as:

  "By far the best American government text I've seen."
  —William A. Barnes, Ohio State University—Lima

  "...a first class study—a creative piece of work beyond what one normally refers to as a textbook."
  —H. H. Wilson, Princeton University

  "An outstanding book which launches an intelligent, well-reasoned, frontal assault on the sacred cows of American politics."
  —H. Michael Erisman, Mercyhurst College

- The Second Edition, while retaining the basic structure and size of the First, includes updated materials and examples, and expanded chapters on the media, law and order, and political economy.

  February 1977 approx. 320 pages, illustrated
  paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

State Politics in the United States

Second Edition

Kenneth T. Palmer, *University of Maine—Orono*

- Widely used in courses on state and local government and American government, *State Politics in the United States* has been cited as:

  "The best short text on state politics I have seen."
  —Paul C. Schmidt, California State University

  "Concise and penetrating analysis of the fundamental patterns of state politics."
  —Bill Jackson, Mobile College

- This thoroughly revised and updated edition features helpful chapter summaries and includes new material on intergovernmental relations, public policymaking, public opinion, state bureaucracies, and state environmental differences.

  February 1977 approx. 240 pages, illustrated
  paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from St. Martin's Press

American Government
A Brief Introduction

Second Edition

Max Skidmore, *Southwest Missouri State University*
and
Helen Marshall Carter, *University of Texas at El Paso*

- Brief, comprehensive, and flexible, here is the second edition of a highly successful, provocative core text for courses in American government.

  "Exactly what I've been looking for—a short, pithy book that lays out the broad outlines of American government and how it actually performs . . . an ideal core book."
  —William Jenkins, Wayne State University

- Thoroughly updated, the Second Edition includes material on Watergate, congressional reform, the Ford presidency, and the 1976 elections.
- A revised and expanded Instructor's Manual is available.

February 1977 approx. 256 pages, illustrated
paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

Technology and Man's Future

Second Edition

edited by
Albert H. Teich, *George Washington University*

- A new, extensively revised edition of a highly acclaimed text—

  "An important, provocative work, particularly useful in the study of change." *—Avtar Singh, East Carolina University*

  "In a class by itself as a selection of readings on the subject."
  —Lester G. Hawkins, SUNY at Albany

- Organized to provide maximum flexibility, the articles include some of the most significant contemporary thought on the relationship between technology and society—the only book now available that gives thorough coverage of the "limits of growth" debate and issues of assessment and control.

February 1977 approx. 300 pages paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

For complimentary examination copies, please write (specifying course titles and approximate enrollments) to:

St. Martin's Press
P. O. Box 5352, New York, New York 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Sociology and Jurisprudence of Leon Petrazycki

edited by Jan Gorecki

Social theorist Leon Petrazycki evolved a theoretical system which anticipated later developments of the behavioral sciences and articulated many ideas of classical conditioning and instrumental learning theories in a manner that has never been excelled. His system, encompassing the philosophy of science, sociological theory, the sociology of law, social policy, psychology, and the theory of law and morals, presents law as a psychological force which not only organizes economy and polity, but also — in conjunction with morality — accounts for social evolution. This collection of essays by international scholars offers a concise and critical presentation of Petrazycki's work. $6.95



Discretionary Justice in Europe and America

Kenneth Culp Davis

The foremost authority on discretionary justice in the United States turns his attention to discretionary justice across the Atlantic in this provocative study. Nine of Davis's European associates have used his methods of investigation in their own studies of discretionary powers possessed by individuals and organizations in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, France, and the Common Market as a unit. Each essay is followed by Davis's analytical commentary, contrasting European and American views of the problem. $9.95

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From GLP . . .

texts designed to keep students on target



BUREAUCRACY AND THE MODERN WORLD

Victor A. Thompson (University of Florida)

This comprehensive text offers a moral or philosophical basis for organization without sacrificing the behavioral understanding gained in recent years. It sets forth the moral assumptions of modern institutions, especially those engaged in providing goods and services, both public and private.

1976 150 pages paper, $5.95



CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Larry L. Berg (University of Southern California), Harlan Hahn (University of Southern California), John R. Schmidhauser (University of Southern California)

The purpose of this book is to assist students and other citizens in a reappraisal of the sources of—and reasons for—the systemic corruption found in the very structure of American politics.

1976 224 pages paper, $4.50



CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES

Leroy N. Rieselbach (Indiana University)

Indicating why Congress has not initiated public policy and suggesting that beneath this surface deference lies Congress' spirit of independence, this text discusses the first serious reform movement in the United States Congress in nearly three decades.

1977 160 pages paper, $3.95

For examination copies, write Director of Marketing

GENERAL LEARNING PRESS

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Available in Canada from GLC Publishers, Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Special offer to members and subscribing members of the Academy

Selected back issues of the
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science

$1 each

Plus postage and handling: 35c for the first book and 10c for each additional book

- ☐ Control or Fate in Economic Affairs (vol. 30, no. 3, 1971)
- ☐ Unionization of Municipal Employees (vol. 30, no. 2, 1970)
- ☐ The Corporation and the Campus (vol. 30, no. 1, 1970)
- ☐ Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (vol. 29, no. 3, 1969)
- ☐ Municipal Income Taxes (vol. 28, no. 4, 1968)
- ☐ Science in Human Affairs (vol. 28, no. 2, 1966)

The Academy of Political Science
2852 Broadway
New York, New York 10025

Enclosed is my check for $_____ payable to the Academy of Political Science. Please send me the *Proceedings* checked above.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip Code _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Columbia

PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY

WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH and FRANCIS P. KING

This new book examines in-depth the public policy issues surrounding the three major old-age income support systems in the U.S. today—Social Security, pension plans of private employers, and public employee retirement plans. Legislators, decision-makers in business, government and labor, and individuals covered under one or more of these retirement systems will appreciate this cogent analysis of how business and public policy can significantly affect the ability of pension plans to meet economic and social objectives in the post-ERISA era. $15.00

THE POLITICS OF ATTRACTION

Four Middle Powers and the United States

ANNETTE BAKER FOX

The relationship between a superpower and friendly middle powers is examined in this unusual study of the mutual attraction and interaction between the United States and four representative middle powers: Canada, Mexico, Australia, and Brazil. Major areas explored include defense, trade, investment, and foreign policy.
Institute of War and Peace Studies $15.00

SKEPTICAL SOCIOLOGY

DENNIS H. WRONG

This unique volume contains the finest and most enduring essays by Dennis H. Wrong, one of America's best-known sociologists. Among the topics discussed by this vital and stimulating thinker are the Freudian, Marxian, and Weberian heritages in sociology; social class in America; power and politics; and the sociology of the future.
$14.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Franz Schneider
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Grayson Kirk
Vice President

Thomas M. Macioce
Vice President and Treasurer

John V. Connorton
Secretary

Charles Preusse
General Counsel

Douglas M. Black
Courtney C. Brown
Arthur F. Burns
Leland M. Goodrich
Robert MacCrate
George B. Munroe
Alfred C. Neal
Edward L. Palmer
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson
Alan H. Temple
Aaron W. Warner

HONORARY MEMBERS

Miguel Alemán
George W. Ball
Claude T. Bissell
David Bruce
W. Randolph Burgess
Roberto de O. Campos
Louis Camu
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Milton S. Eisenhower
Luther Gulick
W. Averell Harriman
Oveta Culp Hobby
Jerome H. Holland
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
W. Earle McLaughlin
Harold Macmillan
Charles Malik
Paul Martin
Jean Monnet
N. A. Palkhivala
Galo Plaza
Sir Eric Roll, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Carlos P. Romulo
Dean Rusk
S. M. Sikri
Margaret Chase Smith
Sir Duncan Wilson, G.C.M.G.

The Academy of Political Science was founded in 1880 to promote objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting widely divergent views of these problems. It does not make specific policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE twice a year at irregular intervals. Members receive both publications and invitations to all Academy conferences and functions.

Regular membership: One year, $16. Three years, $42. Student, $12 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year.

Special membership: Contributing, $25. Sustaining, $35. Supporting, $50. Life, $300. Patron, $1,000 or more. Special members receive a certificate.

Contributions are tax deductible.

Dues are payable in advance. Checks should be made payable to the Academy of Political Science and mailed to 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED